In Answer to Maxine's comments While I understand Maxine's concern that we remain a phenomenological orientation in these discussions, and am gratified that in places we do seem to be achieving that, I also feel that many of us are here to bring our own particular perspectives, whether in Maths (Louis), Physics (myself), or Philosophy (albeit with Pragmatist leanings - Soren Brier), and to leave the phenomenologists themselves (such as Maxine) to take what is of use and translate it more precisely into terms that phenomenologists will accept more readily.
For myself, I often have to listen to ideas (or students' questions) from those not familiar with strict scientific technicalities, and then to answer them in a language chosen for to try and avoid them being swamped (blinded?) by science. At the same time, I would like to thank Maxine for the depth and clarity of her thoughts - particularly her comment, "The bodies we are not", which I read through Vedanta-tinged spectacles (!!), her wonderful quotes from Aristotle, which were for me an eye opener. With regard to the referenced article on 'How Consciousness arises in Matter" in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, it is clear that the current discussion is less concerned with description and more with how biological systems can support the sense of agency that leads to organism movement(s) in response to various stimuli. Here at the 2016 Science of Consciousness Conference in Tucson, there have been marvellous presentations on behaviour of babies, and how to appreciate various levels (or strengths) of self-awareness of agency, and of what kinds of behaviour may be expected in the first year, or two or three years of life as the brain grows and synaptic connections develop different levels of complexity in different brain regions like the (pre) frontal, auditory and visual cortices. The more synaptic connections the more complex behaviours and the more refined movements become possible. But with babies, we are limited to descriptions from the outside, rather than narratives by the 'person' him/her-self. On 30 April 2016 at 10:37, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone <m...@uoregon.edu> wrote: > To FIS colleagues, > > First, an open-to-all response to Lou Kaufmann: > > Thank you for your lengthy tutorial—some time back--but I wonder and am > genuinely puzzled given the “phenomenology-life sciences theme” why none > of the articles that I referenced were read and a response generated at > least > in part on the basis of that reading in conjunction with your own work. > > Is there some reason why they were not taken up, especially perhaps the > article > identified as being a critique of Godels’s incompleteness theorem from a > phenomenological perspective? I would think that you and perhaps FIS > persons > generally would feel particularly inquisitive about that article. I would > think > too that people in FIS would be particularly inquisitive about the > reference to > Biological Cybernetics. Viewpoints that differ from one’s own are by some > thought > a waste of time, but for my part, I think they rightly broaden a > discussion, which > is not to say that entrenched or deeply held views are not solidly based, > much less > wrong, but that they have the possibility of being amplified through a > consideration > of the same topic from a different perspective. > > For example: Language did not arise deus ex machina, and it certainly did > not arise > in the form of graphs or writing, but in the form of sounding. Awareness > of oneself > as a sound-maker is basic to what we identify as a ‘verbal language’. > Moreover this > awareness and the verbal language itself are both foundationally a matter > of both > movment and hearing. A recognition of this fact of life would seem to me > to be of > interest, even primordial interest, to anyone concerned with > ‘SELF-REFERENCE', its > essential nature and substantive origins. > > With respect to ‘substantive origins’, does it not behoove us to inquire > as to the genesis > of a particular capacity rather than take for granted that ‘this is the > way things are and > have always been’?. For example, and as pointed out elsewhere, the > traditional conception > of language being composed of arbitrary elements—-hence “symbols”--cannot > be assumed with > either epistemological or scientific impunity. Until the origin of verbal > language is accounted > for by reconstructing a particular lifeworld, there is no way of > understanding how arbitrary > sounds could come to be made . . . let alone serve as carriers of > assigned meaning. > What is essential is first that arbitrary sounds be distinguished from > non-arbitrary sounds, > and second, that a paradigm of signification exist. Further, no creature > can speak a language > for which its body is unprepared. In other words, a certain > sensory-kinetic body is essential > to the advent of verbal language. In short, in the beginning, thinking > moved along analogical > lines rather than symbolic ones, hence along the lines of iconicity rather > than along arbitrary > lines. See the extensive writings of linguistic anthropologist Mary LeCron > Foster and > Sheets-Johnstone’s The Roots of Thinking, Chapter 6, "On the Origin of > Language." Foster's > finely documented analyses show that the meaning of the original sound > elements of language > was the analogue of their articulatory gestures. Similarly, in my own > analysis, I start not with > symbols or symbolic thought but at the beginning, namely, with a > sensory-kinetic analysis of the > arbitrary and the non-arbitrary. > > Husserl wrote that "each free act [i.e., an act involving reason] has its > comet’s tail of Nature.” > In effect, living meanings are, from a phenomenological perspective, > historically complex phenomena. > They have a natural history that, in its fullest sense, is bound not both > ontogenetically > and phylogenetically. Like living forms, living meanings hold—-and have > held—-possibilities > of further development, which is to say that they have evolved over time > and that investigations > of their origin and historical development tell us something fundamental > about life in general and > human life, including individual human lives, in particular. WITH RESPECT > TO ORIGINS AND HISTORICALLY > COMPLEX PHENOMENA, consider the following examples: > > Information is commonly language-dependent whereas meaning is not. > We come into the world moving; we are precisely not stillborn. > We humans all learn our bodies and learn to move ourselves. > Movement forms the I that moves before the I that moves forms movement. > Infants are not pre-linguistic; language is post-kinetic. > Nonlinguistic corporeal concepts ground fundamental verbal concepts. > > > To all FIS colleagues re Alex Hankey's presentation: > > I thought at first that we might be talking past each other because it was > my understanding > that this 4-part discussion was about phenomenology and the life sciences. > What this means to > me is that we conjoin real-life, real-time first-person experience, thus > methodologically > anchored phenomenological analyses, with real-life-real-time third-person > experience, thus > methodologically anchored empirical analyses. With this last conversation > between Rafael and > Alex, the terrain seems to be shifting precisely toward this ground. With > respect to that > conversation, I would like first to note my accord with their critique of > Heidegger's > metaphysical view that animals are "poor-in-world." In an article > published at the end of > last year, I give a detailed critical analysis of that metaphysical view > in conjunction > with a detailed critical analysis of Heidegger's own metaphysical > shortcoming, namely, his > being, among other things, "poor-in-body." See "The Enigma of > Being-toward-Death," Journal of > Speculative Philosophy,2015 24/4: 547-576. > > I recommend Aristotle (again) to FIS colleagues: > > "Every realm of nature is marvellous. . . .[W]e should venture on the > study of every kind > of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something > natural and > something beautiful." > "If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an > unworthy task, > he must hold in like disesteem the study of man." > > Aristotle wrote four astoundingly perceptive books on animals. The above > quotes are from > his book Parts of Animals. Of Aristotle, Darwin in fact wrote, "Linnaeus > and Cuvier have been > my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere school-boys > to old Aristotle." > > With respect to consciousness,may I refer you to a thoroughly documented > article titled > "Consciousness: A Natural History" that first appeared in the Journal of > Consciousness Studies > (1998) and that both critically and constructively addresses the question > of 'how consciousness arises > in matter'. Documentation is based on corporeal matters of fact from > vertebrates to invertebrates > and includes consideration of bacteria. The article was later included in > The Corporeal Turn: An > Interdisciplinary Reader and in The Primacy of Movement. > > What I term "phenomenologically-informed" studies of "the bodies we are > not" requires acute > observations to begin with, observations untethered to theories and > beliefs about X, and then, > finely detailed descriptions of those observations. Just such untethered > observations and > meticulous descriptions are the cornerstone of any life science. One is > not out there trying to > make others as you want them to be, but attempting to know them as they > are. The task is precisely > a challenge since it is a matter of achieving knowledge about living > bodies that are different from, > yet evolutionarily connected to, your living body. Jane Goodall's years of > dedicated study set > the original gold standard, so to speak, for such research, the > foundations of "good life science." > As I earlier wrote (and documented by way of a publication), descriptive > foundations undergird > phenomenological analyses, studies in evolutionary biology, and ecological > literature. > > Cheers, > Maxine > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > -- Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.) Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science, SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 ____________________________________________________________ 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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