Hi Alex,
On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:
RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
something material.
ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at
least one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave
function as a real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.
I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which
he received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing
is 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite
existence of quantum correlations destroys all that.
Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations
existence be definite if nothing is objective?
With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the
universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of
elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain
why machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that
beliefs can last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with
the quanta, and why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet
undoubtable, like the qualia.
(*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not
withdrawing your kids from school when they learn the table of
addition and multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not
correct.
Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of
what to accept as fundamental. I have always considered
'information' in the sense of the process or flow that connects the
observed to the observer as a satisfactory alternative. The process
of information flow creates the observer-observed relationship and
(the illusion of??) their separation.
I can be OK with this. In arithmetic, it is more like a consciousness
flow, and actually a differentiating consciousness flow, from which
the laws of physics evolve.
Sequences of information production made possible by lack of
equilibrium, both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of
particle tracks at the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at
the macroscopic level.
This already seem to presuppose a physical reality. As I am interested
in understanding what that could be and where it comes from, I prefer
to not assume it. I gave an argument why such an assumption is not
quite compatible with the digital mechanist assumption (not in
physics, but in cognitive science).
Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum
correlations in mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the
Many Worlds interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the
mathematics, but do not concur with the interpretation).
Everett did not talk about a new interpretation. He just gave a new
Quantum Mechanics formulation, which is basically the old one
(Copenhagen) but without the assumption of a wave collapse. I tend to
agree with David Deutsch on this: the "many-world" is just literal
quantum mechanics, where we apply the wave or matrix equation to the
observed and the observer as well.
In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects
among its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp
two days ago at the conference after his talk, and checked that he
still approves of this approach.
The only problem with Everett theory, is that he used digital
mechanism, and what I did show, is that this should force him to
extend the embedding of the physicist in the wave to the embedding of
the mathematician in arithmetic (a dormant notion, alas). The ultimate
equation of physics might be only arithmetic (or anything Turing
equivalent). All the rest becomes internal phenomenologies, at least
assuming digital mechanism.
This makes also digital mechanism testable, by comparing the physical
phenomenology with the actual observation. Up to now, it fits: the
quantum weirdness of the universal wave (the multiverse) seem to match
well the digital mechanist arithmetical weirdness of arithmetic
(intuitively and formally).
The only trouble is that such a top down approach leads to complex
unsolved problem in mathematics, which is normal, given the depth and
complexity of the subject. I am not a defender of digital mechanism, I
use it only because the philosophical and theological questions
becomes mathematical problem. I search the key only under the lamp of
mathematics.
Best,
Bruno
P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting
discussion.
--
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
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Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
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