Joseph -- Regarding: ?As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes incoherence and contradiction.
S: Well, why cannot processes be described by subsetting? As in: {energy dissipation {work {building a box}}} and {energy dissipation {finds quickest route around an obstruction {fails to win the race}}} STAN On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote: > Dear Friends and Colleagues, > > The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction > their authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a > phenomenological approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as > the foundation of a philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological > approaches which may be equally or more valid. > > We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a > machine, but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in > various styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am > wrong, this is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again > correct) statements about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes > perhaps overlooks one aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are > only relatively simple binary cases that can be considered reduced versions > of some more fundamental, underlying princple governing relationships in > the real, physical world. These relationships are crucial to an > understanding of the non-binary properties of information. > > A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It > proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a > link between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may > be of interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine: > > As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of > weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of > concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include > an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the > world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has > reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence > which includes incoherence and contradiction. > > All for now, for various reasons, > > Best wishes, > > Joseph > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" <u...@umces.edu> > To: "Stanley N Salthe" <ssal...@binghamton.edu> > Cc: "fis" <fis@listas.unizar.es> > Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 7:36 AM > Subject: Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting > > > Dear Pedro, >> >> Most of the discussion has centered about phenomenology in the sense of >> Husserl. The topic is broader, however, and remains the foundation of the >> engineering philosophy that has guided my career. >> >> I have long advocated a phenomenological approach to biology as the only >> way forward. I have devoted years to the phenomenological study of >> ecosystems trophic exchange networks and have shown how hypothesis >> falsification can be possible in abstraction of eliciting causes >> < >> https://www.ctr4process.org/whitehead2015/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PhilPrax.pdf >> >. >> I have gone so far as to propose an alternative metaphysics to >> conventional mechanical/reductionist theory that followed from >> phenomenological premises. >> <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/publications/philosophy/3rdwindow/> >> >> So I would submit that phenomenology is alive and well as a practical and >> even quantitative tool in science. It's just that, as an engineer, I find >> Husserl tough going. :) >> >> Warm regards, >> Bob >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >
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