Cari Tutti, ho scritto più volte le stesse cose per cui sono d'accordo con Voi, specialmente con gli ultimi intervenuti. E dato che sono un forestiero rispetto alle Vostre discipline, ma non uno straniero dell'armonia del sapere o del sapere dell'armonia, questo è una bella cosa. Auguri di buon Natale e per il nuovo anno. Francesco
2016-12-24 7:45 GMT+01:00 Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>: > Dear Terrence and colleagues, > > > > I agree that we should not be fundamentalistic about “information”. For > example, one can also use “uncertainty” as an alternative word to > Shannon-type “information”. One can also make distinctions other than > semantic/syntactic/pragmatic, such as biological information, etc. > > > > Nevertheless, what makes this list to a common platform, in my opinion, is > our interest in the differences and similarities in the background of these > different notions of information. In my opinion, the status of Shannon’s > mathematical theory of information is different from special theories of > information (e.g., biological ones) since the formal theory enables us to > translate between these latter theories. The translations are heuristically > important: they enable us to import metaphors from other backgrounds (e.g., > auto-catalysis). > > > > For example, one of us communicated with me why I was completely wrong, > and made the argument with reference to Kullback-Leibler divergence between > two probability distributions. Since we probably will not have “a general > theory” of information, the apparatus in which information is formally and > operationally defined—Bar-Hillel once called it “information calculus”—can > carry this interdisciplinary function with precision and rigor. Otherwise, > we can only be respectful of each other’s research traditions. J > > > > I wish you all a splendid 2017, > > Loet > > > ------------------------------ > > Loet Leydesdorff > > Professor, University of Amsterdam > Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) > > l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of > Sussex; > > Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, > Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, > <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; > > Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of > London; > > http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en > > > > *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Terrence > W. DEACON > *Sent:* Thursday, December 22, 2016 5:33 AM > *To:* fis > > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? > > > > Against information fundamentalism > > > > Rather than fighting over THE definition of information, I suggest that we > stand back from the polemics for a moment and recognize that the term is > being used in often quite incompatible ways in different domains, and that > there may be value in paying attention to the advantages and costs of each. > To ignore these differences, to fail to explore the links and dependencies > between them, and to be indifferent to the different use values gained or > sacrificed by each, I believe that we end up undermining the very > enterprise we claim to be promoting. > > > > We currently lack broadly accepted terms to unambiguously distinguish > these divergent uses and, even worse, we lack a theoretical framework for > understanding their relationships to one another. > > So provisionally I would argue that we at least need to distinguish three > hierarchically related uses of the concept: > > > > 1. Physical information: Information as intrinsically measurable medium > properties with respect to their capacity to support 2 or 3 irrespective of > any specific instantiation of 2 or 3. > > > > 2. Referential information: information as a non-intrinsic relation to > something other than medium properties (1) that a given medium can provide > (i.e. reference or content) irrespective of any specific instantiation of 3. > > > > 3. Normative information: Information as the use value provided by a given > referential relation (2) with respect to an end-directed dynamic that is > susceptible to contextual factors that are not directly accessible (i.e. > functional value or significance). > > > > Unfortunately, because of the history of using the same term in an > unmodified way in each relevant domain irrespective of the others there are > often pointless arguments of a purely definitional nature. > > > > In linguistic theory an analogous three-part hierarchic partitioning of > theory IS widely accepted. > > > > 1. syntax > > 2. semantics > > 3. pragmatics > > > > Thus by analogy some have proposed the distinction between > > > > 1. syntactic information (aka Shannon) > > 2. semantic information (aka meaning) > > 3. pragmatic information (aka useful information) > > > > This has also often been applied to the philosophy of information (e.g. > see The Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy entry for ‘information’). > Unfortunately, the language-centric framing of this distinction can be > somewhat misleading. The metaphoric extension of the terms ‘syntax’ and > ‘semantics’ to apply to iconic (e.g. pictorial) or indexical (e.g. > correlational) forms of communication exerts a subtle procrustean influence > that obscures their naturalistic and nondigital features. This language > bias is also often introduced with the term ‘meaning’ because of its > linguistic connotations (i.e. does a sneeze have a meaning? Not in any > standard sense. But it provides information “about” the state of person who > sneezed.) > > > > So as a first rough terminological distinction I propose using > > > > 1. physical information (or perhaps information1) > > 2. referential information (information2) > > 3. normative information (information3) > > > > to avoid definitional equivocation and the loss of referential clarity. > > > > I would argue that we use the term ‘information’ in a prescinded way in > both 1 and 2. That is, considered from the perspective of a potential > interpretation (3) we can bracket consideration of any particular > interpretation to assess the possible relational properties that are > available to provide reference (2); and we can bracket both 3 and 2 to only > consider the medium/signal properties minimally available for 2 and 3 > irrespective of using them for these purposes.* > > > > Although 2 and 3 are not quantifiable in the same sense that 1 is, neither > are they unconstrained or merely subjective. The possible referential > content of a given medium or sign vehicle is constrained by the physical > properties of the medium and its relationship to its physical context. > Normative information captures the way that referential content can be > correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, useful or useless, etc., > depending on the requirements of the interpretive system and its relation > to the context. In both cases there are specific unambiguously identifiable > constraints on reference and normative value. > > > > There has been a prejudice in favor of 1 because of the (mistaken) view > that 2 and three are in some deep sense nonphysical and subjective. > Consistent with this view, there have been many efforts to find a way to > reduce 2 and 3 to some expression of 1. Although it is often remarked that > introducing non reduced concepts of referential content (2) and normative > evaluation (3) into the theory of information risks introducing non > quantifiable (and by assumption non scientific) attributes, I think that > this is more a prejudice than a principle that has been rigorously > demonstrated. Even if there is currently no widely accepted non > reductionistic formalization of reference and significance within the > information sciences this is not evidence that it cannot be achieved. One > thing is clear, however, until we find a way to use the term ‘information’ > in a way that does not privilege one of these uses over the others and > unequivocally distinguishes each and their relationships to one another, > the debates we engage in on this forum will remain interminable. > > > > So I suggest that we commence a discussion of how best to accomplish this > terminological brush-clearing before further debating the relevance of > information to physics, logic, biology, or art. I apologize if this is > already accepted as “solved” by some readers, and would be glad to receive > and share your different taxonomies and learn of how they are justified. > > > > — Terry > > > > * Stan Salthe might organize them in a subsumptive hierarchy. > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 20, 2016 at 4:19 PM, Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Dear all, > > > > It's important that one should remain practical. Shannon's formulae are > practical. The correspondence with certain tenets of cybernetics such as > Ashby's Law, or Maturana's "Structural Coupling" presents Shannon as a > window for exploring *relations* empirically. This I understand to be Bob > Ulanowicz's focus too. I think Ashby's epistemology which accompanied his > championing of Shannon (and which seems to me to be quite radical) is worth > a much deeper exploration (it was eclipsed by second-order cybernetics in > the early 70s). Klaus Krippendorff wrote an excellent paper about this > here: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? > article=1245&context=asc_papers > > > > Information theory is counting - but it provides a way of measuring > relations, which I think marks it out as distinct from other statistical > techniques such as variance. It also provides the basis for questioning > what we actually mean by counting in the first place: you might call it > "critical counting". For example, Ashby makes the comment about "analogy" > (a key concept if we are to say that one thing is the same class as another > when we count them together)... (apologies because I can't find the > reference to this right now, but will send if anyone is interested): > > > > "The principle of analogy is founded upon the assumption that a degree of > likeness between two objects in respect of their known qualities is some > reason for expecting a degree of likeness between them in respect of their > unknown qualities also, and that the probability with which unascertained > similarities are to be expected depends upon the amount of likeness already > known." > > > > Also, just to correct a possible misconception: I don't think counting > leads to populism. Econometrics has led to populism. Some of the greatest > economists of the 20th century saw the problem - this is why Keynes wrote a > book on probability, and Hayek wrote extensively criticising mathematical > modelling. In the end, I'm afraid, it's an American problem which goes back > to McCarthy and the distrust of criticality in the social sciences in > favour of positivist mathematical "objectivist" approaches. Those schools > in the US which championed mathematical approaches (Chicago, etc) got all > the funding, controlled the journals, whilst others were starved. The > legacy from the 1950s is still with us: it's still very hard to get an > economics paper published unless it's got crazy equations in it. In the > end, it's just bad theory - and bad mathematics. > > > > We could well see a similar thing happen with climate science in the next > four years. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Mark > > > > > > > > > > On 20 December 2016 at 19:55, Bob Logan <lo...@physics.utoronto.ca> wrote: > > Loet - thanks for the mention of our (Kauffman, Logan et al) definition > our definition of information which is a qualitative description of > information. As to whether one can measure information with our > description, my response is no but I am not sure that one can measure > information at all. What units would one use to measure information? *E* = > mc 2 contains a lot of information but the amount of information depends > on context. A McLuhan one-liner such as 'the medium is the message' also > contains a lot of information even though it is only 5 words or 26 > characters long. > > > > Hopefully I have provided some information but how much information is > impossible to measure. > > > > Bob > > > > > > > > ______________________ > > > > Robert K. Logan > > Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto > > Fellow University of St. Michael's College > > Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD > > http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan > > www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications > > https://www.physics.utoronto.ca/people/homepages/logan/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 20, 2016, at 3:26 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> > wrote: > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of bits > of information. > > Alternatively: the expected information content *H *of a probability > distribution is . > > *H* is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb’s formulation > of the entropy . > > > > This definition of information is an operational definition. In my > opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the > question of “what is information?” As the discussion on this list > demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one can > answer the question “how is information defined?” Information is not > “something out there” which “exists” otherwise than as our construct. > > > > Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move > forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman’s and Bob Logan’s (2007) definition > of information “as natural selection assembling the very constraints on the > release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of > organization.” I asked several times what this means and how one can > measure this information. Hitherto, I only obtained the answer that > colleagues who disagree with me will be cited. J Another answer was that > “counting” may lead to populism. J > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > ------------------------------ > > Loet Leydesdorff > > Professor, University of Amsterdam > Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) > > l...@leydesdorff.net <l...@leydesdorff.net>; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of > Sussex; > > Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, > Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, > <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; > > Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of > London; > > http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en > > > > *From:* Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com <dick.sto...@gmail.com>] > > *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM > *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net > *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? > > > > List, > > > > Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information > stated below. > > > > 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive > ("bizarre"); (p. 27) > > > > I agree. I struggled with this definition for a long time before > realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information" or the > number of bits needed to convey a message. He was looking for a formula > that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of bits needed to > convey a message and realised that the amount of information (number of > bits) needed to convey a message was dependent on the "amount" of > uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he equated these. > > > > It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of > information" and "information". For example, we can measure amount of > water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise the > measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what > information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed to > fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should not think > that water is therefore identical to an empty volume. Similarly we should > not think that information is identical to uncertainty. > > > > By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the "amount > of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shannon, in effect, equated > opposites so that he could get an estimate of the number of bits needed to > eliminate the uncertainty. We should not therefore consider that this > equation establishes what information is. > > > > Dick > > > > > > On 18 December 2016 at 15:05, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> > wrote: > > Dear James and colleagues, > > > > Weaver (1949) made two major remarks about his coauthor (Shannon)'s > contribution: > > > > 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive > ("bizarre"); (p. 27) > > 2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." (p. 8) > > > > The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference > confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus sacrifices the > surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition. > > > > information observer > > > > that integrates interactive processes such as > > > > physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye, > human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on), > biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or heat > source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro, economic > interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1]. > > > > We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure > meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we discussed > redundancy from this perspective. > > > > Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between of a > priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is distinguished from > the notion of relative information Iap (Learner, page 7). > > > > ) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the a > priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This follows > within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I use this > equation, for example, in my 1995-book *The Challenge of Scientometrics* > (Chapters > 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972). The relative information is > defined as the *H*/*H*(max). > > > > I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the Latin > “in-formare” (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use “force” and > “mass” in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. J The proliferation of the > meanings of information if confused with “meaningful information” is > indicative for an “index sui et falsi”, in my opinion. The repetitive > discussion lames the progression at this list. It is “like asking whether a > glass is half empty or half full” (Hayles, 1990, p. 59). > > > > This act of forming forming an information process results in the > construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information. > > > > The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the observer > who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I agree that this is > a selection process, but the variation first has to be specified > independently (before it can be selected. > > > > And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective > observes (page 27). This leads to a consideration selection and > cooperation that includes entanglement. > > > > I don’t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. An > observer can be entangled. > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > > PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week which > ends tonight. L. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > > > 4 Austin Dr. Prior Park St. James, Barbados BB23004 > Tel: 246-421-8855 <(246)%20421-8855> > Cell: 246-243-5938 <(246)%20243-5938> > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > > Dr. Mark William Johnson > Institute of Learning and Teaching > > Faculty of Health and Life Sciences > > University of Liverpool > > > > Phone: 07786 064505 > Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com > Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > > Professor Terrence W. Deacon > University of California, Berkeley > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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