Dear Bruno, Thanks for your nice and kind comments! I'm honoured that you got through my manuscript. -- Inviato da Libero Mail per Android lunedì, 25 settembre 2017, 07:47PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be :
>Dear Arturo, > > >On 24 Sep 2017, at 21:35, tozziart...@libero.it wrote: >>Dear FISers, >> >>This text is brief is an effort to provide a viable solution for a double >>concern: >>a) 1) the proliferation of models, theories and interpretations that >>suggest pseudoscientific explanations (e.g., lacking the even theoretical >>possibility of empiric testability) for not-observable quantities, such as >>“God”, the “quantum brain”, “phenomenalistic” accounts of experience, >>“holistic” accounts of “Nirvana-like” psychological states, “observer-based >>information”, “string theories”, “quantum loop gravity” theories, and so on. >>b) 2) the attitude of scientists to generalize their results beyond >>their own experimental observations. For example, it is easy to read, in the >>CONCLUSIONS of good papers, claims such as: “we demonstrated that some >>Primates acquired the vision of the red; this occurred because this novel >>ability gave them the evolutionary benefit to detect red soft fruits in the >>green bushes’ background”. >> >>In order to avoid the inconsistencies that undermine the (otherwise good) >>legitimacy of scientific claims and to make them as accurate as possible, >>here we provide a few suggestions concerning the very structure of scientific >>propositions. >>Our formulation of the required language for scientific propositions wants to >>be as simple as possible and, at the same time, to encompass syntactic, >>semantic and pragmatic concerns. We take into account the claims of >>several Authors and sources who tackled the difficult issue to cope with the >>structure of scientific language: Galileo, Mach, Frege, Brower, Carnap, >>Popper, Quine, Godel, Zermelo and Fraenkel, Brigdman, Feyerabend, Kellogg and >>Bourland, Kripke, Gadamer, McGinn, Badiou. >> >>We suggest, so as to describe facts and observables of our physical and >>social environment, to make use of phrases written or spoken according to the >>following rules (provided in sparse order): >> >>1) 1) Never use the verb “to be”, including all its conjugations, >>contractions and archaic forms. Indeed, the misuse of this verb might give >>rise to a “deity mode of speech” that allows people “to transform their >>opinions magically into god-like pronouncements on the nature of things” >>(Kellogg and Bourland, 1990-91) > >I think I understand. But it is hard in practice to avoid existential words. I >would say: be clear of what is assumed, and what is derived, and if the >derivation is ontological or phenomenological. "to be" has many meanings, and >the effort must be to reason validly with each of the possible meaning. (cf >Frege, Carnap, Quine, Godel, Zermelo and Fraenkel). > > > > > > >>2) 2) Clearly define the universe of discourse in which your >>proposition is located. > >Yes, that is important. But some domain, like metaphysics or theology will >have multidisciplinar facets. 1) above still applies. > > > >>3) 3) Define your concepts not in abstract terms, but in terms either >>of observables, or, if observables are not properly definable, in a language >>as closest to observable quantities as possible. >I agree. But that should be only on "observable in principle". How we could >kill the next good theory, which not only predict better, but linked the many >observable better. > >Here, if doing metaphysics, it is important to distinguish, observable, >believable, knowable, justifiable and ... true. > > > >>4) 4) Do not compare and mix sets and subsets in the same context >>(e.g., cat and feline). >And don't confuse A included in B, with B included in A, like the paper >justifying prohibition of "drugs" do systematically. > > >>5) 5) Do not use the first order logic (based on universals described >>in the very premises of the propositions), rather describe just the >>relationships between the observables you are coping with. >Why? First order logic is the best tool to avoid metaphysical baggage. But it >is OK to use set theory or second order logic. It will really depends on the >goal. >>6) 6) Use (at least qualitative) terms that indicate the probability >>of an event. > >Or laws that such probabilities have to conform with. Some theories can >predict higher order relation between measurable numbers. > > >>7) 7) Describe events or things that are (at least in principle) >>testable. > >OK. That's imporant too. > > >>Otherwise, state clearly that yours is just a speculation. > >In the case of "my theory", it is a subtheory of all theories in physics, and >of most of math. So it is obviously the less speculative theory, except for >one strong axiom, two actually (Church thesis, and the existence of a digital >substitution level). Some would argued that the theory of evolution would not >make sense without assuming some mechanist subtitution level, to get notably >the redundancy and the error tolerance). > >In metaphysics, when aboarded with the scientific attitude, we must be aware >that Aristotle's assumption of the existence of a primary physical universe >(physicalism) is a speculation until now, when we can test it against >mechanism. A bit like with the violation of Bell's inequality which makes >possible concludes "action-at-a-distance OR superposition propagate on their >environments (many-histories/worlds)". Metaphysics enters the experimental >realm, and not just through physics. >> >>8) 8) Do not generalize your descriptions, but take into account just >>the specific content of what you are assessing. > >To talk about laws and make prediction, we have to generalize. Without >generalization, there is no testing possible. > > > >>9) 9) Be as vague as possible about cause/effect relationships. > >? > >Be valid about them, which asks for not being too much vague. I think. Vague, >means generalization. I think I have to disagree with 8) and 9) for the same >reason. > > > > >>1010) 10) Do not make inferences not supported by your data. > >I agree. > > > >>11) 11) Do not use too formal or specialized languages. > >Use them appropriately. I would just say. depending on the hypothesis and the >domain, formal things (like physical objects notably) are the things about >which we theorize, and when people want the real things, you have to name a >cat a cat, and carbon dioxyde CO_2. > > >>12) 12) Try you hidden your own theory-laden approach and your >>personal considerations. > >Absolutely. > > > >> >> >>Here we provide a few practical examples. >> >>John is nice. >>A lot of people state that John looks pleasant. >> >>E=mc 2 >>In our Universe, it has been demonstrated that a given experimentally >>measured value of energy corresponds to a experimentally measured value of >>mass at rest, multiplied for the fixed value of the speed light constant. > >E = mc^2 is more vague, and to say "in our Universe .." should be: "in our >current theory of the universe (which is still inconsistent (cf gravity and >quantum)), theoiry coming from many (but finite) number of evidences, we >assume that a given experimentally measured value of energy corresponds to a >experimentally measured value of mass at rest, multiplied for the fixed value >of the speed light constant. > >More or less OK, although some translation seems more jargon in some, and >remind me of political correctness. > > > >>The brain is equipped with a functional and anatomical network consisting of >>edges and nodes, termed the connectome. >>When researchers experimentally assess brain activity and anatomy in terms of >>network theory, they find anatomical and functional structures that fully fit >>their theoretical framework and that they term the “connectome”. >> >>John is ill, because he took the flu. >>John suffers an alteration of his statistically normal biological parameters, >>because his Medical Doctor diagnosed, based on clinical and epidemiological >>findings, the highly-probable occurrence of an infection due to the Influenza >>virus. > >This one! > > >> >>Scientific studies of the brain must take into account the first-person, >>epistemological phenomenalistic standpoint, because the latter is the only >>way to gain sure knowledge. >>Some scientists and philosophers believe, in touch with the accounts of the >>philosophical mainstream of the “phenomenalism”, that the better way to gain >>knowledge from neuroscientific experimental procedures is to assess the >>subjective first-person account, rather than the individual-unrelated >>experimental findings detectable by objective operational procedures. > >Here the problem is that we have not yet the solution of the mind-body >problem, and many implicit assumptions are made, in both sentences. >I certainly want a dentist taking into account the phenomenal pain which would >occur for his patient if he does not use some pain killer in the process. > >Also, if the subject of study is the first person experience, it is obvious we >have to compile many experiential reports, and try to interpret them in some >way. > >Thank you for the effort. Some of your points are very important. Others are >more debatable, I would say. > >Best regards. > >Bruno > > > >> >> >>REFERENCES >>1) Badiou A. 2005. Being and Event, transl. by Oliver Feltham, New >>York: Continuum. >>2) Brigdman PW. 1959. The Way Things Are. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard >>University Press. >>3) Brouwer LEJ. 1976. Collected Works, Vol. II, Amsterdam: >>North-Holland. >>4) Carnap R. 1947. Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and >>Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press, 1957. >>5) Feyerabend PK. 1981. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: >>Philosophical papers, Volume 1. >>6) Frege G. 1879. Concept Notation, the Formal Language of the Pure >>Thought like that of Arithmetics. >>7) Galileo G. 1932. Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo. >>8) Godel K. 1940. The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the >>Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory. Princeton >>University Press. >>9) Kellogg EW. Bourland Jr DD. 1990-91. Working with E-Prime: Some >>Practical Notes. Etc. 47 (4): 376-392. >>10) Kripke S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard >>University Press. >>11) Mach E. 1897. The Analysis of Sensations. >>12) McGinn C. 2004. Consciousness and Its Objects. Oxford University Press. >>13) Popper K. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific >>Knowledge. >>14) Quine WVO. 1963. Set Theory and Its Logic. Harvard Univ. Press, 1969. >>15) Gadamer H-G. 1981. Reason in the Age of Science. Trans. by Frederick >>Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. >>16) Zermelo E., Ebbinghaus H-D; Fraser CG, Kanamori A. 2013. eds., Ernst >>Zermelo—collected works. Vol. I. Set theory, miscellanea, Schriften der >>Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Klasse der Heidelberger Akademie der >>Wissenschaften, 21, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. >> >> >> >> >>If you want to quote this manuscript, please write: >>Tozzi A. 2017. A pragmatic language for scientific purposes. ViXra, >>http://vixra.org/abs/1709.0362 >> >> >> >>Arturo Tozzi >>AA Professor Physics, University North Texas >>Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy >>Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba >>http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/ >> >>_______________________________________________ >>Fis mailing list >>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > >_______________________________________________ >Fis mailing list >Fis@listas.unizar.es >http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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