Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information' per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.
STAN On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> wrote: > Dear Loet, > Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is > Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy. > > Sincerely, > Mark > > > > On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: > > Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues, > > The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans* > and* res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case > that things could have been different is not out there in the world as > something seizable such as piece of wood. > > Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but > it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). > The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to > operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the > measurement as information. > > Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by > a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer > to call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is > embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as > Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical. > > In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical > entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a > distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this > distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the > probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) = .86 – .37 = > .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this information is not > physical. > > Best, > Loet > > ------------------------------ > > Loet Leydesdorff > > Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam > Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) > > l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of > Sussex; > > Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, > Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, > <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; > > Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London; > http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en > > > ------ Original Message ------ > From: "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> > To: "Søren Brier" <sbr....@cbs.dk>; "Krassimir Markov" <mar...@foibg.com>; > "fis@listas.unizar.es" <fis@listas.unizar.es> <fis@listas.unizar.es> > Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM > Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis > > Dear Søren, > You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the > Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real, > or it cannot be real if it is not physical. > Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other > realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,” allows > understand information as real but not physical. > > Sincerely, > Mark > > On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Dear Mark > > > > Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that raises > the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s theorem or > mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and > self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with > feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I > only see what you write and your behavior. And are the meaning of your > sentences physical? So here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and > hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the > meaning of signs in cognition and communication). We have problems > encompassing these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the > technical sciences that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of > information science. > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *Fra:* Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> *På > vegne af *Krassimir Markov > *Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33 > *Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> > <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> > *Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis > > > > Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues, > > > > First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish > it in IJ ITA. > > It will be nice to continue our common work this way. > > > > At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on > > *Is information physical?* > > was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to > come to some conclusions. > > > > I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis. > > > > What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below. > > > > > > For me, physical, structural and mental are one and the same. > > > > Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos > consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”. > > > > Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the > relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well as > “between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities. > > > > I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”. > > > > Finally, IF “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN simply > the “information is physical”! > > > > Friendly greetings > > Krassimir > > > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> > > *Sent:* Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM > > *To:* <fis@listas.unizar.es>fis@listas.unizar.es > > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis > > > > Dear FISers, > It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and > creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many > interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I > would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our > intrinsic and often tacit assumptions. > > To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information > physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical > means the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the > substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or > quantum. By the way, expression “quantum information” is only the way of > expressing that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of > nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal > numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and not numbers > themselves. > > If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, > to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that > information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our > discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for example, > Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information). > > Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, > to admit that information is physical because only physical things exist. > If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we > have three options assuming that information exists: > - information is physical > - information is mental > - information is both physical and mental > > Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises > three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of > structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists: > - information is physical > - information is mental > - information is structural > - information is both physical and mental > - information is both physical and structural > - information is both structural and mental > - information is physical, structural and mental > > The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to avoid > unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information (in a > general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical world, it > is called *energy*, in the mental world, it is called *mental energy*, > and in the world of structures, it is called *information* (in the strict > sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson > that information is both physical and not physical only the general theory > of information makes this idea more exact and testable. > In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the > strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and > carriers. Note that any representation of information is its carrier but > not each carrier of information is its representation. For instance, an > envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in this letter but it is > not its representation. > Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by the > name energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy. > > Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this discussion, > may be Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative combining the most > interesting contributions into a paper with the title > *Is > information physical?* > and publish it in his esteemed Journal. > > Sincerely, > Mark Burgin > > On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote: > > Dear Arturo, > > > > > > There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that > relate to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. > That was the time as computers could newly be used in an interactive > fashion, and the Rogers techniques were a current discovery. > > (Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the > contents of what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the > message, assumed to be at work in the patient.) > > > > They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a > human or a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations. > > > > Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are > indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called "expert > systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is rational, > that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the > difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery or a human", becomes > irrelevant. > > > > Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to > translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not > yet well understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the > current fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall > live to experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely that humans are a > combinatorial tautology. > > > > Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you state: > that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints that > as far as rational capabilities go, the same principles apply. There is a > rest, you say, which is not of this kind. The counter argument says that > irrational processes do not take place in organisms, therefore what you > refer to belongs to the main process, maybe like waste belongs to the > organism's principle. This view draws a picture of a functional biotope, in > which the waste of one kind of organism is raw material for a different > kind. > > > > Karl > > > > < <tozziart...@libero.it>tozziart...@libero.it> schrieb am Do., 10. Mai > 2018 15:24: > > Dear Bruno, > You state: > "IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, > THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. > “physical” becomes a mathematical notion. > ...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of > description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any > change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the > brain/body at that level of description". > > The problem of your account is the following: > You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS". > Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested > and it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a sort of > postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it. The current > neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) > a digital machine. > In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not > exist in our real world. Here your entire building falls down. > > -- > Inviato da Libero Mail per Android > > giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be > : > > > (This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, > with minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first > comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”. > > > > > > Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues, > > > > > > Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new > computer classifies them in some mysterious way! > > This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the > end of the week. > > > > > > On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> > mbur...@math.ucla.edu> wrote: > > > > Dear Colleagues, > > I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion > > Is information physical? > > > > That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. > > > > My result here is that > > > > *IF* indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, > > > > *THEN* “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. > “physical” becomes a mathematical notion. > > > > The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from > Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" > (logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory"). > > > > Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of > description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any > change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the > brain/body at that level of description. > > > > Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all > physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. > Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete > machinery. Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of > arithmetic) is Turing complete (Turing Universal). > > > > The basic idea is that: > > > > 1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an > arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And, > > > > 2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are > necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in > arithmetic. > > > > That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my > actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I > can describe more precisely in some future post perhaps). > > > > Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we > cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to > recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano > arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first > and third person views (and six others!). > > > > I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this > (including the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago. I was > about sure this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum > mechanics, which verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical > Mechanism, unless we add the controversial wave collapse reduction > principle. > > > > The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many > computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy > becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter > becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person > indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a > duplication, …) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that > neither matter appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as > the whole arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion as > we know since Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics > leaning to inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which > implies the negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire > physical universe, which I rather doubt). > > > > My opinion is presented below: > > > > > > Why some people erroneously think that information is physical > > > > The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong > belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical > reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter > something that they call information. > > When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information > because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, > i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that > information is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend > that it is information because with the e-mail they receive information. > The e-mail comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, > which are physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that > information is physical. > > However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical > objects are only carriers or containers of information. > > To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to > say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the > textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, > the textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same > is true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical > objects because all of them only contain information but are not > information. For instance, as we know, different letters can contain the > same information. Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any > other text, then the letter and its copy will be different physical objects > (physical things) but they will contain the same information. > > Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, > data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on > physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who > think that information is physical. > > > > OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non > physical objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem > faced by dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover > many dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies. > > > > > > > > One more misleading property of information is that people can measure > it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only > physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous > conclusion that information is physical. However, measuring information is > essentially different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. > There are no “scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do > this. > > > > OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one. > > > > Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the > “knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not > tell me that this table is unreal”. > > > > I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams > in which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that > argument … until I wake up. > > > > When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument” > illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A > subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of > consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of > strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a > primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it > quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus). > > > > Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the > world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very > elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is > already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a Universal > Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all programs). > > > > So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we > assume Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not > *primarily* physical: it is all in the “head of the universal > machine/number” (so to speak). > > > > And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there > is a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, > and the physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took > me more than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that > there is no discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by > incompleteness (formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, > sigma_1) propositions, with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it > fits rather well. > > > > Best regards, > > > > Bruno > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
_______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
