This is way off-topic from IDS, I know, but couldn't you use NAC then to
assert such a thing? Depending on what NAC you use, of course, but for
most of them, the goal is that only authenticated and authorized devices
are attached to your LAN. Wouldn't that let you assert, validly, that
there are no rogue devices of ANY kind (why are APs so different from
other kinds of devices anyway?) attached?
jms
Jeremy Bennett wrote:
Gary,
I'm sorry if my statements seemed to self-contradict. I'm a member of the
Wireless SIG reporting to the PCI DSS. We've had numerous discussions on
this topic and have been working to provide better guidance on all of this.
So, let me put this another way. You must assert that there are no rogue APs
connected to your CDE. By definition a rogue device is unauthorized and out
of your control. Therefore you can't use networking technologies like
firewalls to prevent someone from physically connecting a rogue device to
your network. The only way to be certain that there are no rogue devices
connected to your CDE is to scan for them. Hence 11.1 applies whether you
have a wireless network or not.
Is that more clear?
-J
On 4/24/09 11:48 AM, "Gary Everekyan" <[email protected]>
wrote:
Hi Jeremy IMHO you just contradicted yourself. PCI DSS SCOPE is for
Cardholder Data Environment that deals with PAN Data. It is this type of scope
creep that moves InfoSec professionals away from the business decisions. It is
very costly to include all your network hence you do what is absolutely
necessary to be complainant. (including segmentation)
Here is the excerpt from the PCI DSS 1.2 that talks about in scope and out of
scope. You can get the document at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss_download.html
Scope of Assessment for Compliance with PCI DSS Requirements
..........................
Network Segmentation
Network segmentation of, or isolating (segmenting), the cardholder data
environment from the remainder of the corporate network is not a PCI
DSS requirement. However, it is recommended as a method that may reduce:
The scope of the PCI DSS assessment
The cost of the PCI DSS assessment
The cost and difficulty of implementing and maintaining PCI DSS controls
The risk to an organization (reduced by consolidating cardholder data into
fewer, more controlled locations)
Without adequate network segmentation (sometimes called a "flat network") the
entire network is in scope of the PCI DSS assessment. .......................
Regards,
Gary Everekyan
CISSP, CISM, CHS-III, ISSAP, ISSPCS, ITILp, CGEIT, MCSE, MCT
[email protected]
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeremy Bennett [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2009 11:04 AM
To: Gary Everekyan; Taras P. Ivashchenko; [email protected]
Subject: Re: PCI DSS 11.1 - ".. deploying a wireless IDS/IPS..". Kismet+Snort?
Gary,
That is not true. The requirement for scanning for (and dealing with)
unauthorized APs or wireless devices is applicable to any physical location
that has a part of the CDE (Cardholder Data Environment). Whether you have a
wireless network and whether that wireless network is in or out of scope for
PCI DSS you are still required to scan.
There are a number of other wireless requirements if your WLAN *is* in scope
that you can avoid if you can move it out of scope but this is not one of
them.
Taras,
That requirement is focused on rogue detection and mitigation. If your WLAN
can be moved out of scope for PCI (using a stateful firewall) then you are
only required to scan for rogue devices.
You can either do walk-around scans using something like kismet or
NetStumbler or you can invest in a system with distributed sensors that can
scan for the rogue devices all the time. In theory you could build this with
low cost sensors running kismet and syslog and watch/filter the logs in a
central location. You'd need a way of filtering out the known neighbors and
internal devices and set up something to alert you, etc. I think you'll find
that it is a lot less "free" than you would hope.
-J
On 4/23/09 2:20 PM, "Gary Everekyan" <[email protected]>
wrote:
You can bypass the requirement if the WIFI Does NOT in any way transmit or
connect to PAN data. If the Wireless network does not transmit PAN data and
is
segmented from the wired network with VPN FW ACL etc. than your WIFI is out
of
scope.
Regards,
Gary Everekyan
CISSP, CISM, CHS-III, ISSAP, ISSPCS, ITILp, CGEIT, MCSE, MCT
[email protected]
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Taras P. Ivashchenko
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2009 12:51 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: PCI DSS 11.1 - ".. deploying a wireless IDS/IPS..". Kismet+Snort?
Hello, list!
There is requirement in PCI DSS v.1.2:
"...11.1 Test for the presence of wireless access points by using a wireless
analyzer at least quarterly or deploying a wireless IDS/IPS to identify all
wireless devices in use..."
I made some research for open source wireless IDSs and results are not good.
I found some articles about using together Kismet and Snort but it looks like
not best soliution.
Air Snort project is dead.
What wireless IDS/IPS (especially opensource/free) do you use?
--
Тарас Иващенко (Taras Ivashchenko), OSCP www.securityaudit.ru
----
"Software is like sex: it's better when it's free." - Linus Torvalds
--
Joel M Snyder, 1404 East Lind Road, Tucson, AZ, 85719
Senior Partner, Opus One Phone: +1 520 324 0494
[email protected] http://www.opus1.com/jms
