THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 29 May 2003 by Dr. George Friedman The G8 and Its Crisis of Relevance Summary The meeting of the G7 (now the G8) used to be the major diplomatic event of the year. For the past generation, the major G7 powers met to manage the world. The managers included countries like Japan and Canada -- significant economic powers, but not military players. But the world has changed and the G8 meeting has lost its pivotal significance, precisely because many there are only economic powers. U.S. President George W. Bush's decision to cut his attendance at the G8 meeting short by a day so that he could get on with his more important diplomacy in the Arab world is emblematic of how the world has changed. Analysis The annual summit of the G8 will take place on May 31 and June 1. Present will be the leaders of France, Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States. Although the meeting will go for two days, it will be the first meeting of G8 leaders since the Iraq war and U.S. President George W. Bush's first encounter with the leaders of the three major opponents of the war: France, Germany and Russia. The meeting, in part, will be a test of whether the post-Cold War system of global leadership, as expressed in the concept of the G8, still has any practical meaning. In part, the United States is already signaling the relative importance of the G8 in the general scheme of things. Bush will leave early to attend a summit at Sharm el Sheikh in the Egyptian Sinai -- with the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- on June 1. The next day, he will attend a critical meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. On June 5, he will go to CENTCOM headquarters in Doha, Qatar, to meet with commanders and troops. A short while ago, the G8 meetings were the pivotal point in global diplomacy. Presidents did not cut these meetings short to get on with other pressing business--there was no more pressing business. There is now, and Bush does not want to loiter at the G8 meeting. It is not clear that this is an intentional slight, although we have little doubt but that the meetings in the Middle East could have been scheduled differently. It is even more striking if it is unintentional, as it indicates that Bush now takes it as a matter of course that U.S. priorities have shifted. The geography of U.S. concerns has shifted dramatically. During the 1990s, the U.S. vision was that this was a world of opportunities. The G7 countries were all economically significant, even if some were militarily insignificant. The geography of the world focused on economic development, and these nations drove economic development. The inclusion of Russia in the original G7 meetings was done with some hesitation. Russia's economic powers seemed to exclude it from the group. It was included as a reluctant concession. In a world in which borders and military power were seen as increasingly archaic, the G7 meetings of the world's greatest economic powers were seen as the arena in which the world's expanding economic horizons would be managed. That is not the U.S. view of the world since Sept. 11, 2001. This is no longer a world of opportunities. It is a world of danger. The danger originates in the Islamic world and it is a danger that must be faced militarily. Therefore, the G8 countries are, except in particular circumstances, not particularly relevant. The geographic diffusion of these countries reflects a decade that's passed. The United States is now geographically focused. Thus, the president will leave a meeting of global leaders to spend three days in Arab countries -- Egypt, Jordan and Qatar -- to deal with geopolitical and military issues. A schism has developed within the G8 that does not involve only the French, German and Russian opposition to the war in Iraq. That opposition there, but the issue is much deeper. The G8 represented a generation that thought that economic issues had supplanted all other issues. Japan and Canada were there because they had economic significance. From the Bush administration's point of view, this is an outmoded view of the world. It does not address American hopes and -- above all -- fears. Nothing that any of these powers have to say compares to what Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah or Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas might have to say. In a real sense, al Qaeda has succeeded in at least part of its mission. Osama bin Laden's view was that the Islamic world had not been treated with respect or fear by the Christian world for centuries. Bin Laden has succeeded in changing that. The U.S. president has far more respect -- and fear -- of the opinions of the leaders of Egypt or Iran or Turkey than he has for the leaders of France or Germany. Again, this is not simply because of their opposition to the war. Japan can be included in this group and it didn't oppose the war. Rather, it deals with the manner in which al Qaeda has redefined the world for the United States. >From the diffused geography of global economics, the United States has focused on a more concentrated geopolitics of its war with al Qaeda. In the mind of the world's leading power, al Qaeda has moved Islam ahead of economics. This poses a serious problem for the G8. The world is in the midst of an economic slowdown, which is mild in historical comparison, but disconcerting after a decade of economic dynamism. There are issues that the G8 needs to discuss -- particularly the weakness of the dollar, which is helping U.S. exports. The Europeans and Japanese traditionally have expected at least collaboration and usually leadership from the United States on these issues. That isn't going to happen this time. The United States is pursuing its own policies without much concern for the effect on the global economy. Its deficit is driven by war, and war has priority. The weak dollar helps U.S. exports, and that is fine by the United States. Until Sept. 11, the United States saw itself as the leader of the global economy, with a particular responsibility to help manage the international economic system. It no longer views the world that way. First, it sees economics as less important than other issues. Second, the war on al Qaeda is forcing Washington to adopt economic policies that pose problems for the others. Third, the United States is prepared to accept immediate advantage in trade over long-term damage to allies. That last word is, of course, one of the keys. It is unclear that the United States views the other seven countries as allies, at least not as a group. The Bush administration views the fact that the weak dollar is wreaking havoc with the German economy as another way in which to punish the Germans. The fact that France is being torn by strikes generates quiet satisfaction. Active American hostility toward the French and Germans does not extend to the others, but there is a sense that -- save Britain -- the others were not there in any substantial way when the United States needed them and that therefore the United States is under no obligation to be there for them. The G7 (pre-Russia) used to be a meeting of allies talking primarily about economic matters. Not only have economic matters been demoted, but the nature of the alliance has been called into question. Europeans like to say that friends can disagree and remain friends. The U.S. view is quite different: Friends do not disagree over matters of fundamental importance. The disagreement over Iraq was not a disagreement over passing issues, but the unwillingness of France, Russia and Germany to give the United States the benefit of the doubt on a matter that Washington regarded as a matter of fundamental national interest. From Washington's point of view, if these countries could not automatically support the United States over Iraq, what issue would generate automatic support? And if there are no issues on which support is automatic, then in what sense is there an alliance? NATO was built on the assumption that an attack on one is an attack on all -- automatically. There are, therefore, two things working here. First, the needs of the United States have changed. The G8 no longer has the key to the things that the United States wants the most, even if member countries were operating within the context of an alliance. Second, it is no longer clear that these countries are allies, prepared to support each other in a predictable way. The Bush administration now views the G8 as a group of countries with a common interest in economic growth and stability, but not with a common commitment to the war the United States sees itself as in. Therefore, the G8 doesn't address American needs. Russia is an exception that proves the rule. The U.S. administration will continue to cultivate Russia -- not because it is an economic power, but because of geopolitics. Russia intersects U.S. interests in the Islamic world. It is a Central Asian power, as the United States has become. Its cooperation in the region, and its Chechen problem, create a commonality of interest. Russia certainly is not a U.S. ally, but it shares a common interest with the United States that the other G8 members do not. It also has a deep interest in controlling events in the Islamic world. There is nothing automatic in the U.S.-Russian relationship, but there is at least a common, overriding interest. The truth is that in 2003, the United States no longer has a common, overriding interest with the rest of the G8, Britain excepted. The U.S. obsession is not their obsession, the U.S. nightmare is not their nightmare. Therefore, their concerns and needs are not the same as those of the United States. Bush's decision to leave the G8 a day early so that he can get on to more important things symbolizes a fundamental shift in the way the world works: The news this week will not come out of Evian, it will come from Sharm el-Sheikh, Aqaba and Qatar. That makes this a very different world than the one we lived in a few years ago. ___________________________________________________________ FoIB Mailing List - Bits, Analysis, Digital Group Therapy http://www.ianbell.com
