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Stratfor Weekly: The Region After Iraq
Here is your complimentary
Stratfor Weekly, written by our Chairman and Founder, Dr. George
Friedman.
Please feel free to email this analysis to a friend.
The
Region After Iraq
Summary
Desert Storm was about restoring the
status quo ante. The 2003 war with Iraq will be about redefining the status quo
in the region. Geopolitically, it will leave countries like Syria and Saudi
Arabia completely surrounded by U.S. military forces and Iran partially
surrounded. It is therefore no surprise that the regional powers, regardless of
their hostility to Saddam Hussein, oppose the war: They do not want to live in a
post-war world in which their own power is diluted. Nor is it a surprise, after
last week's events in Europe indicating that war is coming, that the regional
powers -- and particularly Saudi Arabia -- are now redefining their private and
public positions to the war. If the United States cannot be stopped from
redefining the region, an accommodation will have to be
reached.
Analysis
Last week, the focus was on Europe -- where
heavy U.S. pressure, coupled with the internal dynamics, generated a deep
division. From the U.S. point of view, regardless of what France and Germany
ultimately say about the war, these two countries no longer can claim to speak
for Europe. Ultimately, for the
Americans, that is sufficient.
This
week, U.S. attention must shift to a much more difficult target -- the Islamic
world. More precisely, it must shift to the countries bordering Iraq and others
in the region as well. In
many ways, this is a far more important issue than
Europe. The Europeans, via multinational organizations, can provide diplomatic
sanction for the invasion of Iraq. The countries around Iraq constitute an
essential part of the theater of operations, potentially influencing the course
of the war and even more certainly, the course of history after the war. What
they have to say and, more important, what they will do, is of direct
significance to the war.
As it stands at this moment, the U.S. position
in the region, at the most obvious level, is tenuous at best. Six nations border
Iraq: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. Of the six, only one
-- Kuwait -- is unambiguously allied with the United States. The rest continue
to behave ambiguously. All have flirted with the United States and provided
varying degrees of overt and covert cooperation, but they have not made peace
with the idea of invasion and U.S. occupation.
Of the remaining five,
Turkey is by far the most cooperative. It will permit U.S. forces to continue to
fly combat missions against Iraq from bases in Turkey as well as allow them to
pass through Turkey and maintain some bases there. However, there is a split
between the relatively new Islamist government of Turkey, which continues to be
uneasy about the war, and the secular Turkish military, which is committed to
extensive cooperation. And apart from Kuwait, Turkey is the best case. Each of
the other countries is even more conflicted and negative toward an
invasion.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iran are very different
countries and have different reasons for arriving at their positions. They each
have had very different experiences with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Iran
fought a brutal war with Iraq during the 1980s -- a war initiated by the Iraqis
and ruinous to Iran. Hussein is despised by Iranians, who continue to support
anti-Hussein exiles. Tehran certainly is tempted by the idea of a defeated Iraq.
It also is tempted by the idea of a dismembered Iraq that never again could
threaten Iran, and where Iran could gain dominance over its Shiite regions.
Tehran certainly has flirted with Washington and particularly with London on
various levels of cooperation, and clearly has provided some covert intelligence
cooperation to the United States and Britain. In the end, though -- however
attractive the collapse of Iraq might be -- internal politics and strategic
calculations have caused Iranian leaders to refuse to sanction the war or to
fully participate. Iran might be prepared to pick up some of the spoils, but
only after the war is fought.
Syria stands in a similar relation to Iraq.
The Assad family despises the Husseins, ideologically, politically and
personally. Syria sided openly with the United States in 1991. Hussein's demise
would cause no grief in Damascus. Yet, in spite of a flirtation with Britain in
particular -- including a visit with
both Queen Elizabeth II and Prince
Charles for Syrian President Assad -- Syria has not opted in for the
war.
Nor have the Jordanians -- at least not publicly. There are constant
reports of U.S. (and Israeli) special operations troops operating out of Jordan.
U.S. Marines have trained during the past month in Jordan, but the government
remains officially opposed to the war -- and what support it will give, it will
give
only covertly.
Finally, there is Saudi Arabia, which has been one
of the pillars of U.S. power in the region since the 1950s and which has, in
turn, depended on Washington for survival against both Arab radicals and Iraq
itself. The Saudis have been playing the most complex game of all, cooperating
on some levels openly, cooperating on other levels covertly, while opposing the
war publicly.
For all of the diversity in the region, there is a common
geopolitical theme. If the U.S. invasion is successful, Washington intends to
occupy Iraq militarily, and it officially expects to remain there for at least
18 months -- or to be more honest, indefinitely. The United States will build
air bases and deploy substantial ground forces -- and, rather than permit the
disintegration of Iraq, will create a puppet government underwritten by U.S.
power.
On the day the war ends, and if the United States is victorious,
then the entire geopolitics of the region will be redefined. Every country
bordering Iraq will find not the weakest formations of the Iraqi army along
their frontiers, but U.S. and British troops. The United States will be able to
reach into any country in the region with covert forces based in Iraq, and
Washington could threaten overt interventions as well. It would need no
permission from regional hosts for the use of facilities, so long as either
Turkey or Kuwait will permit transshipment into Iraq. In short, a U.S. victory
will change the entire balance of power in the region, from a situation in which
the United States must negotiate its way to war, to a situation where the United
States is free to act as it will.
Consider the condition of Syria. It
might not have good relations with Hussein's Iraq, but a U.S.-occupied Iraq
would be Syria's worst nightmare. It would be surrounded on all sides by real or
potential enemies -- Israel, Turkey, Jordan and the United States - and, in the
Mediterranean, by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Syria -- which traditionally has played
a subtle, complex balancing game between various powers -- would find itself in
a vise, no longer able to guarantee its national security except through
accommodating the United States.
A similar situation is shaping up for
Saudi Arabia. The United States is operating extensively in Yemen; it also has
air force facilities in Qatar and naval facilities in Bahrain. U.S. B-1 bombers
and some personnel are going to be based in Oman. The United States has
established itself along the littoral of the Arabian peninsula. With U.S. forces
deployed along the Saudi- Iraqi border, and with U.S. domination of the Red Sea
and Persian Gulf, the Saudis will be in essence surrounded.
The same
basic problem exists for Iran, although on a less threatening scale. Iran is
larger, more populated and more difficult to intimidate. Nevertheless, with at
least some U.S. forces in Afghanistan -- and the option for introducing more
always open -- and U.S. forces in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, the Iranians too
find themselves surrounded, albeit far less overwhelmingly than would be the
case for Syria or Saudi Arabia.
The only probable winners would be
Turkey, which would lay claim to the oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk; Jordan,
whose security would be enhanced by U.S. forces to the east; and Kuwait, which
is betting heavily on a quick U.S. victory and a prolonged presence in the
region.
If we consider the post-Iraq war world, it is no surprise that
the regional response ranges from publicly opposed and privately not displeased
to absolute opposition. Certainly, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran have nothing to
gain from a war that will be shaped entirely by the United States. Each
understands that the pressure from the United States to cooperate in the war
against al Qaeda will be overwhelming, potentially irresistible and politically
destabilizing. This is not the world in which they want to live.
Add to
this the obvious fact of oil, and the dilemma becomes clear. The United States
is not invading Iraq for oil: If oil was on Washington's mind, it would invade
Venezuela, whose crisis has posed a more serious oil problem for the United
States than Iraq could. Nevertheless, Washington expects to pay for the
reconstruction of Iraq from oil revenues, and there will be no reason to limit
Iraqi production. This cannot make either Riyadh or Tehran happy, since it will
drive prices down and increase competition for market share.
Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Syria have every reason to oppose a war in Iraq. The
consequences of such a war will undermine their national interests. They were
depending on Europe's ability to block the war, but that strategy has failed.
The Saudis and Syrians then launched into an attempt to find a political
solution that would prevent a U.S. occupation of Iraq. That centered around
either Hussein's voluntary resignation and exile, or a coup in Baghdad that
would produce a new government -- one that would cooperate fully with weapons
inspectors, and remove the U.S. justification for occupation.
This
attempt, in collaboration with other regional powers and countries like Germany
and Russia, is still under way. The problem is that Hussein has little
motivation to resign, and his security forces remain effective. Hussein
apparently still is not convinced that the United States will invade, or that he
will be defeated. His seems to assume that, if his troops can inflict some
casualties on U.S. forces, then the United States will accept a cease-fire
without toppling him. He will not abdicate, nor will his followers overthrow
him, until those two assumptions are falsified. What that means is that the
United States still would occupy Iraq militarily, even if there was a coup or
resignation as the campaign unfolded.
If you can't beat them, join them.
The European split -- and the real possibility that France and Germany
ultimately will endorse war in some way -- mean that war cannot be prevented.
Hussein will not abdicate or be overthrown until the war is well under way.
Therefore, it is highly likely that the war will take place, the United States
will occupy Iraq and that the map of the Middle East will change
profoundly.
Continued opposition to the war, particularly from Riyadh's
standpoint, makes little sense. The issue until now has been to cope with the
internal political challenges that have arisen in the kingdom since Sept. 11,
2001. After the Iraq war, this issue will be supplemented by the question of how
the United States regards the kingdom. It is not prudent for a nation surrounded
by a much more powerful nation to allow itself to be regarded as an enemy.
Therefore, we are witnessing a shift in the Saudi position that might evolve to
reluctant, public support for the war by the time an attack is
launched.
Iranian leaders do not feel themselves to be quite in such
desperate straits -- since they are not. However, the presence of U.S. power on
Iran's borders will create an urgent need to settle the internal disputes that
divide the country. The need to do so, however, does not guarantee a successful
outcome. The division between those who feel that an opening to the United
States is essential and those who feel that protecting Iran against the United
States is paramount might become exacerbated and destabilize the country.
However, there is no immediate, overt threat to Iran, although the possibilities
for covert operations increase dramatically.
Jordan will do well, but
Syria's future is cloudier. Washington has concerns about Syria's long-term
commitment to U.S. interests, and Damascus might find itself squeezed
unbearably. Turkey will fatten on oil and manage the Kurds as it has done in the
past. But nothing will be the same after this war. Unlike Desert Storm, which
was about restoring the status quo ante, this war is about establishing an
entirely new reality.
The United States is, of course, well-aware that
its increased presence in the region will result in greater hostility and
increased paramilitary activity against U.S. forces there. However, the U.S.
view is that this rising cost is acceptable so long as Washington is able to
redefine the behavior of countries neighboring Iraq. In the long run, the Bush
administration believes, geopolitical power will improve U.S. security interests
in spite of growing threats. To be more precise, the United States sees Islamic
hostility at a certain level as a given, and does not regard an increase in that
hostility as materially affecting its interests.
The conquest of Iraq
will not be a minor event in history: It will represent the introduction of a
new imperial power to the Middle East and a redefinition of regional geopolitics
based on that power. The United States will move from being an outside power
influencing events through coalitions, to a regional power that is able to
operate effectively on its own. Most significant, countries like Saudi Arabia
and Syria will be living in a new and quite unpleasant world.
Therefore,
it is not difficult to understand why the regional powers are behaving as they
are. The disintegration of the European bloc has, however, left them in an
untenable position. The United States will occupy Iraq, and each regional power
is now facing that reality. Unable to block the process, they are reluctantly
and unhappily finding ways to accustom themselves to it.
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