-----Original Message-----
From: Strategic Forecasting Alert
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent:
Wednesday, March 19, 2003 4:07 PM
To:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Stratfor Weekly: Beyond the Iraq
Campaign
=================================================================
Subscribe
now to Stratfor's U.S. Iraq War Web Site and get access
to rapid analyses on
military and political developments,
situation reports, combat reports, 24/7
monitoring of events
and tools for understanding war. Visit this web page for
a demo
and to subscribe:
http://www.stratfor.com/promo/?site=usiraq
=================================================================
Please
feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.
THE
STRATFOR WEEKLY
19 March 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
Beyond the
Iraq Campaign
Summary
If the Iraq campaign ends as most expect, in
a U.S. victory, the most critical questions will be: What will be the next
American campaign in the war, and when will it happen? There are deep pressures
on the United States to call an extended halt to operations while it regroups.
However, events may not permit this, and the place to be most concerned about is
Iran.
Analysis
There are wars. There are campaigns. There are
battles. Winning battles is the key to winning campaigns. Winning campaigns is
the key to winning wars. Knowing which you are fighting is the key to making
sense of the situation and planning strategy. If you confuse winning a battle
with winning a war, that could lead to disaster. So too, confusing a victory in
a campaign with a victory in a war could lead to defeat in the war. Clarity is
indispensable.
The United States is in a war with al Qaeda. The war began
on Sept. 11, 2001. It will conclude when the ability of al Qaeda or related or
follow-on forces, to attack the United States has been sufficiently diminished
that the United States has returned to a state of relative security -- relative,
since absolute security does not exist in this world. The Iraq campaign is not
that war. It is a campaign within that war. It follows a previous campaign --
Afghanistan -- and it will be followed by other campaigns.
In other
words, Iraq is a means toward an end. It is not an end in itself. It achieves
nothing definitive by itself. Its purpose is to enable the United States to
achieve other ends later, ends that will bring the nation closer to winning the
war -- or so Washington hopes. It is useful to think of Iraq in terms of the New
Guinea campaign of World War II: U.S. and Australian troops fought there not
because of any intrinsic value in New Guinea, but because of its geographic and
strategic value. The New Guinea campaign helped block a Japanese invasion of
Australia and served as a springboard for later offensives. New Guinea's value
was in what it made possible later on, not in its intrinsic value. It was not a
war, just a campaign within a war.
Iraq, too, is a campaign within a war.
It will not, by itself, settle anything. Readers of Stratfor know it is our view
that the primary purpose of the Iraq war is to set the stage for undermining the
foundations of al Qaeda in particular and of radical Islam as an effective
paramilitary force in general. The United States has found it enormously
difficult to attack al Qaeda directly. Mapping out the al Qaeda network -- a
sparse global system of operatives -- is intrinsically difficult. Taking
effective action against it on a global, retail level has proven even
harder.
The United States has tried to find the center of gravity of al
Qaeda -- the one spot which, if struck, would cause the system itself to
collapse. Al Qaeda is structured to deny an attacker the luxury of a center of
gravity. The closest the United States could get to one would be the support
systems upon which al Qaeda depends -- financial support and distribution,
recruitment, command and control centers, training centers. Al Qaeda doesn't
float on air. It is connected to the earth through its support systems. Those
support systems, in turn, have locations. If the United States can cause the
host countries to attack these operations, then al Qaeda's ability to operate
will be severely curtailed. Victory in the war will become possible.
Al
Qaeda shrewdly has distributed these operations in several countries. Instead of
depending on state support, they have simply relied upon non-governmental
entities to cooperate with them in providing facilities. These non-governmental
entities are not necessarily supported by local governments, but they normally
consist of individuals with sufficient standing and influence that acting
against them would cause political instability. Therefore, the host countries
have chosen not to act, fearing instability resulting from suppression more than
they have feared the United States.
These countries -- Pakistan, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Syria and so forth -- cannot simply be said to be working with al
Qaeda. Quite the contrary, some, like Pakistan, have taken at least some steps
against al Qaeda. But they share this in common: Whether unwilling or unable,
they have not taken definitive steps to render al Qaeda's support systems
inoperative within their territory. Moreover, in the case of Iran, for example,
the danger that Iranian weapons of mass destruction will be transferred by some
means to al Qaeda remains substantial.
The occupation of Iraq will
provide the United States with a base of operations from which to influence --
and coerce -- regional powers into attacking internal sources of support for al
Qaeda. It also will help to deter state support. Therefore, the real question
now is what will happen at the close of the Iraq campaign and where United
States' war on al Qaeda will lead it next.
The politico-military logic of
the situation argues for a very rapid exploitation of the Iraq campaign, and a
rapid evolution to new confrontation in the region. There are a number of
reasons we think this won't happen.
1. The United States is exhausted by
the Iraq campaign at all levels. The American public has been dealing with this
issue for months. The Bush administration has gone through intense internal and
external struggles that will require a period of reevaluation and possibly
reorganization and personnel changes. U.S. troops are exhausted. The military
reserve system has been stretched to the limits. It needs radical surgery if it
is to sustain the United States through the rest of the war.
2. It is
important for the lessons of the Iraq campaign to sink into countries like Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Iran. If the campaign goes well, two points will sink in:
First, that the international system, alliances and institutions cannot contain
American power; there is no protection there. And second, that the American
ability to exercise warfare at extreme distances is overwhelming. Therefore,
resistance to the United States is less rational than accommodating the United
States. Since Washington seeks a change of behavior -- and war is merely a means
toward that end -- time must be taken to allow the lessons of Iraq to be
absorbed.
3. The United States has issues outside of the Iraq region. The
North Korean affair is orders of magnitude less serious than the war against al
Qaeda, but it must be attended to. Of far greater importance is Pakistan, which
remains the critical center of al Qaeda operations. Each time the Musharraf
government appears to collaborate with the United States, it becomes a bit less
stable. There are forces in Pakistan that would like, for a range of reasons, to
overthrow Musharraf. Some are simply ambitious, others want to reshape Pakistan
in a secular mode. The most important of these forces are radical Islamists who
want to halt Pakistani cooperation with the United States. Washington has a
vested interest in the Musharraf government. It has no desire to see another
ambitious general in charge, and it has no belief that a secular government
would produce anything beyond a civil war that would make attacks on al Qaeda
even more difficult. It does not want to see an Islamist government. Washington
has interests to manage in Pakistan. It has issues in the Philippines and
Indonesia. Time is needed to tend to these.
4. There are tremendous
opportunities for the United States in Europe. The Franco-German bloc has
maneuvered itself right up against a brick wall. Washington has opportunities to
consolidate its relationships in Europe in the wake of successful war --
particularly one in which proof of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction would be
available. Pushing Europe into another campaign prematurely would undermine that
process. Waiting could well create broad European support for the war. The
dynamics are there in Europe, but it will take time to bring them to
fruition.
The problem that the United States faces right now is that,
while a pause in operations makes both operational and political sense, enemy
actions dictate whether this option will be available. Syria and Saudi Arabia
are not really concerns. The Syrians, who shortly will be surrounded on all
sides, are nothing if not practical. They understand reality. Saudi leaders
already have capitulated to the war, allowing U.S. forces to be based within the
kingdom. The Saudis will go through a very painful time, but in the end the
royal family consists of realists -- and whatever dreams some of the younger
members might have had, U.S. divisions on Saudi Arabia's northern border will
breed moderation. The regime will cooperate more avidly than before.
But
Iran is the basic issue. U.S. officials said last week that they are concerned
about Iran's nuclear weapons program. That was not a casual statement. The
Iranians said they knew that they were next on Washington's target list. That
wasn't a casual statement either. One might think the logical move would be for
Tehran to reassure Washington about both its nuclear program's security and its
ability to control al Qaeda -- but that isn't all that easy to do
either.
The United States is not concerned with the current intentions of
the Iranian state. Washington is concerned about what those intentions will be
in the future. It is concerned about who will constitute the Iranian state in
the future. It is concerned about the internal political processes in Tehran and
whether the state apparatus can control quasi-state and non-state processes. In
other words, the United States must, by the logic of the campaign in Iraq, be
deeply concerned not only about the intentions of the Iranian government, but
also the intentions of a host of non- governmental actors. Iran is inherently
unpredictable. It is also a complex, sophisticated and -- on many levels --
competent country.
Competence and unpredictability are the things that
most endanger the United States in the Islamic world. Therefore, if the United
States has its way, months, perhaps a year, will elapse before it chooses to
confront Iran. However, Washington may not have this luxury, depending on the
pace of Iranian weapons programs and the degree of control that President
Mohammed Khatami's government has over them. The ideal evolution for the United
States would be to reach a stable understanding with the Khatami regime over
Iran's weapons programs and its relations with al Qaeda. However, as in other
cases, it is not clear that the president of Iran has the ability to deal
authoritatively with the United States.
Therefore, depending on how
rapidly events evolve in Iran, the United States might find itself embroiled in
a crisis there. The U.S. military is certainly not ready for another campaign
against a country the size of Iran at this time. It is capable of attacking
known weapons of mass destruction facilities in Iran -- so long as they are
known. Which brings us back to where we came in -- next door, in Iraq.
It
would appear to us that the United States will try to spend the next year
reconstructing Iraq, building military facilities there and probing the
responses of neighboring countries. It will use the time to exploit the French
miscalculation in Europe and to deal with peripheral issues in places like North
Korea or the Philippines. Pakistan must now be a focus. The United States
certainly will want time to regroup and reorganize its forces. At the same time,
the probes can result in rebuffs. Campaigns are not always planned.
It
appears to us that, sooner or later, the settlement of the Iraq issue must lead
to Iran, whatever the detours might be.
...................................................................
STRATFOR
SERVICES NOW AVAILABLE:
Join decision-makers around the world who read
Stratfor for daily intelligence briefs, in-depth analyses and forecasts on a
wide range of international security, political and economic
affairs.
Stratfor Premium is our flagship product providing
comprehensive
global intelligence including daily analyses, special
reports,
intelligence alerts, premium analyses, situation reports,
country
and regional net assessments as well as Stratfor's sought
after
Annual and Quarterly Forecasts. Corporate or multi-user
volume
discount packages available. Visit this web page for
details:
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=c
Stratfor
Basic offers daily analysis, situation reports and ongoing
coverage of global
events. Also available with this package is a
pay per view service for
many of our premium reports. Visit this web
page for details: http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=d
Stratfor's
U.S.-Iraq War Web Site provides subscribers with rapid
analysis of military
and political developments, situation reports,
combat reports and breaking
intelligence as discovered. Visit this web page for details: http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=IRA&c=d
EnergyCast
is dedicated to delivering analysis, forecasts and briefings
on
security-related issues affecting oil markets and the energy
industry.
EnergyCast includes a blend of strategic forecasts and analysis,
tactical
alerts, and email alerts for key triggers affecting this
industry.
Visit theis web page for details:
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=INT&c=d
Stratfor's
Global Intelligence Report is authoritative analysis of the
world's latest
political and economic developments that is emailed
directly to members
Monday through Friday. Visit this web page for
details: http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=a
Stratfor's
Iraq War Diary is a daily commentary on key events in the
march toward a
U.S.-Iraq war. Visit this web page for details:
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=b
...................................................................
CONTACT
INFORMATION:
Product inquiries, partnership, and sales:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subscription and customer service issues:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Comments and/or information for analysis:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Media services and trade show requests:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
...................................................................
HOW
TO UNSUBSCRIBE:
If you wish to remove yourself from this mailing
list,
send an email to <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> with
the
following command in the body of your email message:
unsubscribe
weeklylist
...................................................................
http://www.stratfor.com
====================================================================
(c) 2003
Strategic Forecasting LLC. All rights reserved.
If you ever want to
remove yourself from this mailing list,
you can send mail to
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> with the following command in the body of
your email message:
unsubscribe
medialist
Copyright 2003 Strategic Forecasting,
LLC
