I'm considering upgrading a drive acquisition toolkit and I'm torn
between write-blockers and PCMCIA cards given one unique requirement:
software write-blocking (booting into Linux and mounting the drive
read-only) is sufficient to guarantee the drive has not been tampered
with for this level of response.

I was leaning toward the Tableau write-blockers (T14, T4, T3u) assuming
that they would provide some benefit by acting like universal
controllers so that I could be guaranteed the ability to read from ANY
IDE, SCSI, or SATA drive.  However, the price tag is quite hefty and
since having a hardware write-blocker (software read-only mounting is
sufficient) is not required for the group the toolkit will belong to,
I'm considering using a boot CD (like Helix) and purchasing PCMCIA cards
to externally connect IDE, SCSI, and SATA drives (e.g.,
http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=120002700854&category
=3710) to the forensics laptop.

Some concerns:

* My primary concern: will I be able to find IDE, SCSI, and SATA PCMCIA
controllers which will be compatible with all device designs (e.g., SCSI
SE/LVD/DIFF), excluding the data and power cable interface issues
addressed below?
* I have to be careful to ensure each PCMCIA card is compatible with the
Helix distro of Linux.
* I'll still need to buy all the same cables and adapters I would if I
were using write-blockers:
   - 40-pin IDE Cable
   - 80-pin IDE Cable
   - Extra Jumpers
   - SATA signal cable
   - 4-pin Molex to SATA power cable
   - 68-pin SCSI cable
   - 50-pin SCSI cable
   - SCSI terminators
   - 68-pin to SCA-80 adapter
   - 68-pin to 50-pin SCSI adapter
   - 1.8" to 3.5" IDE Notebook Adapter
   - 2.5" to 3.5" IDE Notebook Adapter
   - 2 versatile power supplies
* I'll probably have to re-boot to change drives
* Of course it'll be stocked with other non-electronics tools such as a
flashlight, screwdriver w/ bits, anti-static bags, evidence labels, etc.

Is there anything I'm overlooking when going to PCMCIA card route?  Is
that equivalent to using write-blockers without the hardware
write-blocking protection?



One a second unrelated note, can anyone give advice on the pros/cons
associated with different RAID image acquisition techniques?  I'm trying
to avoid booting from the suspect machine (even when using a trusted OS
CD) but it seems this is by far the easier way to go.  This discussion
from last year seems somewhat helpful
(http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/104/392700).  It would seem the
primary techniques are:

* Individually imaging the drives and then reconstructing them using
software (like RAID Reconstructor
http://www.softslist.com/download-11-2-23686.html?).  I think this will
be too time-consuming and painful.
* Booting the suspect machine from trusted media and transferring the
data using a cross-over cable.


I'm interested in any pros/cons related to the different RAID
acquisition techniques.


Thanks in advance,


Seth Robertson 


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