On Sat, 10 Jun 2000, Kris Kennaway wrote:
> Given the other replies in this thread I think I'll just remove the PID
> stuff altogether and make the temp filename only constructed from
> alphanumeric character. The price is that there's a chance of collision
> between two programs who mktemp() and come up with the same random
> filename, which is a theoretical security risk (at present only something
> with the same PID can come up with a colliding tempfile name) but the
> probability is altogether pretty small. I'll do some calculations to
> estimate the exact level of risk here.
Actually, it's not of course a security risk in the new algorithm (this is
mktemp() after all), but it's a potential failure mode which can cause
applications to fail in ways they otherwise wouldn't (with some very low
probability) on a normal system. But, I don't think it's a big enough
problem to worry about (numbers still coming :-)
Kris
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