> > The situation is _worse_; the entropy is minimal, and is _very_ attackable. > > What's wrong about timers for enthropy (I mean high resolution ones)? > Really we need only few bytes of enthropy and can use them to seed RNG for the > first time if no true randomness available. To be joking: MD5 of kernel module > can help too :-) getnanotime() is already extensively used; we just need to force the RNG to reseed once at the beginning. As soon as I'm happy that the code is panic-free, I'll commit it. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
- randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Bill Fumerola
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really ... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is rea... Andrey A. Chernov
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering i... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gatheri... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Louis A. Mamakos
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Alexander Langer
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Alexander Langer
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Steve O'Hara-Smith
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Vadim Belman