> On Sun, Jan 20, 2002 at 23:14:13 +0000, Mark Murray wrote: > > > > The PAM OPIE may only do OPIE authentication. It is entirely up to the > > PAM stack to decide what the login policy is. > > > > (Well, the PAM stack as specified by the pam configs in /etc/pam*) > > Yes. And to allow PAM stack to make right decision, pam_opie pass special > information to PAM stack. Look at the patch, pam_opie not breaks from the > stack by yourself, it is /etc/pam* do that using information from > pam_opie.
Sure - but you are making specialised use of the return value that assumes that pam_opie will be followed by pam_unix. This violates the PAM spec. > > However - the module may pass on the authentication token (the password) > > and any following modules are allowed to use this if they find it. > > (look at the try_first_pass and use_fist_pass options). > > I was thinking about that way but not find a good solution. That way > workatround is: > > 1) In the failure case when Unix (plaintext) passwords are disabled > pam_opie can pass specially-generated incorrect password down to pam_unix. > > 2) pam_unix option must be changed from "try_first_pass" to > "use_first_pass", because it asks again for password if "try_first_pass" > active, i.e. allows user to enter Unix (plaintext) password again. So we > have the same bug, but shifted to one prompt step. You may be able to do something with options. Example: if the sysadmin allows a password to be passed down the stack, otherwise pass a dummy. (like ftpd auth required pam_opie.so keep_password or similar) > I have doubts about 1): what specially-generated incorrect password > can be? It seems that any combination is legal and MAY be equal to real > password. Nope. kill the password if it is not allowed. Pass a NULL. M -- o Mark Murray \_ FreeBSD Services Limited O.\_ Warning: this .sig is umop ap!sdn To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
