On Fri, May 04, 2001 at 08:34:57PM -0700, Alfred Perlstein wrote:
> The silly part of it is that the socket's initial credentials
> might be different than the holder's credentials.
A user calls connect() with one set of credentials, subsequently changes
credentials, and writes to the socket. Alternatively, the same user first
changes credentials, then calls connect() and writes to the socket.
So what?
> What makes a lot more sense is packaging the messages with the
> credentials using the existing interface rather than trusting
> possibly stale credential information.
My conditions are:
1. Server can obtain credentials of connect() caller (effective uid and gid suffice).
2. Server can obtain credentials without depending on client to send data.
Condition (2) prevents local users from launching an anonymous DoS attack by
calling connect() and sending no data. How does your approach satisfy
condition (2)?
W.
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