Le 2001-05-13, Peter Wemm écrivait :
> The simplest thing is to do a ssh-keygen to generate a new RSA key and
> update ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 once per remote machine that you connect
> to. Once that is done, it never bothers you again. You can change
> /etc/ssh/ssh_config so that it says 'Protocol 1,2', but that is avoiding
> the problem rather than using the more robust, cryptographically secure
> sshv2 wire protocol.
Ah. This seems to work around the very unfortunate situation described in
PR bin/27264. It seems very strange that one has to change the setup
on the *server* side to work around a regression on the client side.
Why cannot one use the same RSA public key for v1 and v2 client
authentication?
Thomas.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message
