Replying to Bogdan Webb's reply recommending sohusin:
This appears to be exactly what I needed, thanks! The stock ports PHP
install already has the suhosin patch, but the extension is a godsend!
Not only does it log everything, but it let's you manage php functions on
a per virtual host basis, not just in php.ini. Fantastic and is working
great. About the only thing I could want more would be to control the
functions under the apache <Directory> directives (on top of in
<VirtualHost>).
On Mon, 1 Feb 2010, James Smallacombe wrote:
(please reply-all; I am not sub'd and sorry for the top posting):
I have safe_mode off due to popular demand. So many customer apps demand
that it be kept off. In fact, here is a post from one of the Zen people on
the Zen-cart forum. In light of this exploit, this might be a little ironic:
http://www.zen-cart.com/forum/showthread.php?t=76740
"There is one for-sure patch: Turn off safe-mode.
Keep in mind that future versions of PHP will *not* even include a safe-mode
... because it's a weak bandage giving a false sense of security to hosts who
don't otherwise know how to properly secure their servers.
This begs the question: why? ie: why would you want to run your online
business on a server that's got to use safe-mode in order to think they're
securing the server?
I'm not trying to badmouth your server administrator; rather I'm attempting
to strongly make the point that unless safe-mode is being used for a very
specific reason for which there is no other solution (an unlikely situation),
it shouldn't be used. And, if it is being used, you shouldn't run your
business there, because there will be other security issues to which you'll
be vulnerable but never have a clue about it until disaster strikes, because
the big picture of security protection has been poorly implemented.
That said, Zen Cart will install and run even if Safe Mode is active;
however, you run the risk of certain features not working with or without
notice, and the unexpected appearance of warning or fatal errors while
customers are using the site. And then there's the issue of the admin side
needing to do various things that safe-mode doesn't like.
So, I guess, in short ... you can do it, but you do so at your own risk.
Maybe that's more than you wanted to hear ... sorry"
----
From: Bogdan Webb <bog...@pgn.ro>
try php's safe_mode but it is likely to keep the hackers off, indeed they
can get in and snatch some data but they would be kept out of a shell's
reach... but sometimes safe_mode is not enough... try considering Suhosin
but the addon not the patch... and define the
suhosin.executor.func.blacklist witch will deny use of certain php commands
that allow shell execution... but keep in mind it's impossible to prevent
all breaches... this php patch will only keep the hacker kiddos off but
there's still a good chance it can be broken... stay safe !
ref's:
http://www.hardened-php.net/suhosin.127.html
http://beta.pgn.ro/phps/phpinfo.php
On Sun, 31 Jan 2010, James Smallacombe wrote:
Whoever speculated that my server may have been compromised was on to
something (see bottom). The good news is, it does appear to be contained
to the "www" unpriveleged user (with no shell). The bad news is, they can
still cause a lot of trouble. I found the compromised customer site and
chmod 0 their cart (had php binaries called "core(some number).php that
gave the hacker a nice browser screen to cause all kinds of trouble)
Not sure if this is related to the UDP floods, but if not, it's a heck of a
coincidence. At times, CPU went through the roof for the www user, mostly
running some sort of perl scripts (nothing in the suexec-log). I would
kill apache, but couldn't restart it as it would show port 80 in use. I
would have to manually kill processes like these:
www 70471 1.4 0.1 6056 3824 ?? R 4:21PM 0:44.75 [eth0] (perl)
www 70470 1.2 0.1 6060 3828 ?? R 4:21PM 0:44.50 [bash] (perl)
www 64779 1.0 0.1 6056 3820 ?? R 4:07PM 2:24.34
/sbin/klogd -c 1 -x -x (perl)
www 70472 1.0 0.1 6060 3828 ?? R 4:21PM 0:44.84
I could not find ANY file named klogd on the system, let alone in /sbin.
Clues as to how to dig myself out of this are appreciated....
I found this in /tmp/bx1.txt:
--More--(5%)#!/usr/bin/php
<?php
#
# ------- Zen Cart 1.3.8 Remote Code Execution
# http://www.zen-cart.com/
# Zen Cart Ecommerce - putting the dream of server rooting within reach of
anyone!
# A new version (1.3.8a) is avaible on http://www.zen-cart.com/
#
# BlackH :)
#
error_reporting(E_ALL ^ E_NOTICE);
if($argc < 2)
{
echo "
=___________ Zen Cart 1.3.8 Remote Code Execution Exploit ____________=
========================================================================
| BlackH <bl4c...@gmail.com> |
========================================================================
| |
| \$system> php $argv[0] <url> |
| Notes: <url> ex: http://victim.com/site (no slash) |
| |
========================================================================
";exit(1);
----------- snipped ------
It is dated from two nights ago, after these issues started, but it's
nonetheless larming. Security Focus is aware of the issue and refers you
to Zen for the fix. Only problem is, this is an old version of Zen cart,
and the
James Smallacombe PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor
u...@3.am
http://3.am
=========================================================================
James Smallacombe PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor
u...@3.am http://3.am
=========================================================================
James Smallacombe PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor
u...@3.am http://3.am
=========================================================================
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