Sorry about that. I thought I had everything but I missed that piece. They should be coming shortly.
That said, I’m seeing reports of the ipsec patches for 10.x not compiling. Will look into that shortly. Gordon > On Mar 7, 2018, at 06:40, Philip M. Gollucci <pgollu...@p6m7g8.com> wrote: > > The links are 404ing > > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 2:10 AM, FreeBSD Security Advisories < > security-advisor...@freebsd.org> wrote: > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Hash: SHA512 >> >> ============================================================ >> ================= >> FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp Security >> Advisory >> The FreeBSD >> Project >> >> Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities of ntp >> >> Category: contrib >> Module: ntp >> Announced: 2018-03-07 >> Credits: Network Time Foundation >> Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. >> Corrected: 2018-02-28 09:01:03 UTC (stable/11, 11.1-STABLE) >> 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/11.1, 11.1-RELEASE-p7) >> 2018-03-01 04:06:49 UTC (stable/10, 10.4-STABLE) >> 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.4, 10.4-RELEASE-p6) >> 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p27) >> CVE Name: CVE-2018-7182, CVE-2018-7170, CVE-2018-7184, CVE-2018-7185, >> CVE-2018-7183 >> >> For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, >> including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the >> following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>. >> >> I. Background >> >> The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) >> used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time >> source. >> >> II. Problem Description >> >> The ctl_getitem() function is used by ntpd(8) to process incoming "mode 6" >> packets. A malicious "mode 6" packet can be sent to an ntpd instance, and >> if the ntpd instance is from 4.2.8p6 through 4.2.8p10, ctl_getitem() will >> read past the end of its buffer. [CVE-2018-7182] >> >> The ntpd(8) service can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. If a system is >> configured to use a trustedkey and if one is not using the feature >> introduced >> in ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th field in the ntp.keys file to >> specify >> which IPs can serve time, a malicious authenticated peer, i.e., one where >> the >> attacker knows the private symmetric key, can create arbitrarily-many >> ephemeral associations in order to win the clock selection of ntpd and >> modify >> a victim's clock. [CVE-2018-7170] >> >> The fix for NtpBug2952 was incomplete, and while it fixed one problem it >> created another. Specifically, it drops bad packets before updating the >> "received" timestamp. This means a third-party can inject a packet with >> a zero-origin timestamp, meaning the sender wants to reset the association, >> and the transmit timestamp in this bogus packet will be saved as the most >> recent "received" timestamp. The real remote peer does not know this >> value and this will disrupt the association until the association resets. >> [CVE-2018-7184] >> >> The NTP Protocol allows for both non-authenticated and authenticated >> associations, in client/server, symmetric (peer), and several broadcast >> modes. In addition to the basic NTP operational modes, symmetric mode and >> broadcast servers can support an interleaved mode of operation. In >> ntp-4.2.8p4, a bug was inadvertently introduced into the protocol engine >> that >> allows a non-authenticated zero-origin (reset) packet to reset an >> authenticated interleaved peer association. If an attacker can send a >> packet >> with a zero-origin timestamp and the source IP address of the "other side" >> of >> an interleaved association, the 'victim' ntpd will reset its association. >> The attacker must continue sending these packets in order to maintain the >> disruption of the association. [CVE-2018-7185] >> >> The ntpq(8) utility is a monitoring and control program for ntpd. The >> internal decodearr() function of ntpq(8) that is used to decode an array in >> a response string when formatted data is being displayed. This is a >> problem >> in affected versions of ntpq if a maliciously-altered ntpd returns an array >> result that will trip this bug, or if a bad actor is able to read an >> ntpq(8) >> request on its way to a remote ntpd server and forge and send a response >> before the remote ntpd sends its response. It is potentially possible that >> the malicious data could become injectable/executable code. [CVE-2017-7183] >> >> III. Impact >> >> Malicious remote attackers may be able to break time synchornization, >> or cause the ntpq(8) utility to crash. >> >> IV. Workaround >> >> No workaround is available, but systems not running ntpd(8) or ntpq(8) are >> not affected. Network administrators are advised to implement BCP-38 which >> helps to reduce risk associated with the attacks. >> >> V. Solution >> >> Perform one of the following: >> >> 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or >> release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. >> >> The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is >> recommended but not required. >> >> 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: >> >> Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 >> platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: >> >> # freebsd-update fetch >> # freebsd-update install >> >> The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is >> recommended but not required. >> >> 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: >> >> The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable >> FreeBSD release branches. >> >> a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the >> detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. >> >> [FreeBSD 11.1] >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify ntp-11.1.patch.asc >> >> [FreeBSD 10.4] >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify ntp-10.4.patch.asc >> >> [FreeBSD 10.3] >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch >> # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify ntp-10.3.patch.asc >> >> b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: >> >> # cd /usr/src >> # patch < /path/to/patch >> >> c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as >> described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>. >> >> Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system. >> >> VI. Correction details >> >> The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each >> affected branch. >> >> Branch/path Revision >> - ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------- >> stable/10/ r330141 >> releng/10.3/ r330567 >> releng/10.4/ r330567 >> stable/11/ r330106 >> releng/11.1/ r330567 >> - ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------- >> >> To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the >> following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a >> machine with Subversion installed: >> >> # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base >> >> Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: >> >> <URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN> >> >> VII. References >> >> <URL:http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice# >> February_2018_ntp_4_2_8p11_NTP_S> >> >> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7182> >> >> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7170> >> >> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7184> >> >> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7185> >> >> <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7183> >> >> The latest revision of this advisory is available at >> <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp.asc> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAlqfhYNfFIAAAAAALgAo >> aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD >> MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n >> 5cL9GQ/+PLffyegsvxKngL83XWG9UuHbcGG5aWbNwCecTEzNoCI72TI03aga0ge5 >> iLz5kW3SQvl8tsq778U4YbfFcCw6ifq2ws8asqNviv+u4AcJh7oD8CS3/kFuA9xM >> zjAIrScdNR2taBJhBW3nwlb7RmDeKqydQ3OIxHVvs9Fj5Alc5ZEGezUjC2dueB+M >> UdORg6GvHGMYQ+4AtBFRgZHAU3BFkwmgqsIICywYnUVH+AxKj34shs/pMMeJd/d9 >> a+BIu/tUjAIlQp23VunNAfq7r2eZik9LOV8Y5l1Ww7+K1IwlwezxI+Iw18BMFEVn >> L9baBY9RFh8v/yrZCBqUc7Prhs3ExU/lnAb05Va7TYeD4RXVmSU0jNXi/przN3y2 >> PR7Z3JCm60mFKyp0/Hz2MmS1XPBVBrW4P6g9hH8TZmOHb2mZlK3zDXmil7HKp5DK >> UhtMJpPEWV9k5rfP8iijHJnwkPr0ALntMUAAKUyw/6isVtHT6BZLaYsZvRYIm8YY >> Mn2RUl74m+XoIhQ8R4mxRcaAHwKKXyeyP5nlAs6TQVb9QJukoRiNDr3g8TwbtT54 >> iTswVu+z/a89/YIwJoc6Ud7eCZSDYe6qfuC19TVuledayjjy/ZPMH0ZkNWFWJ3AE >> VAvdyvoUuNbmsv42o4AUtpE/1CmDqOjwBRZZbtV4CONCDFpk26o= >> =D2ov >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> _______________________________________________ >> freebsd-security-notificati...@freebsd.org mailing list >> https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security-notifications >> To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security- >> notifications-unsubscr...@freebsd.org" >> > > > > -- > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > 4096R/D21D2752 > <http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xF699A450D21D2752> ECDF B597 > B54B 7F92 753E E0EA F699 A450 D21D 2752 > Philip M. Gollucci (pgollu...@p6m7g8.com) c: 703.336.9354 > Member, Apache Software Foundation > Committer, FreeBSD Foundation > Consultant, P6M7G8 Inc. > Director Cloud Technology, Capital One > > What doesn't kill us can only make us stronger; > Except it almost kills you. > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list > https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscr...@freebsd.org" _______________________________________________ freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"