> 6) Tor introduces a *different* set of privacy/security risks from > traditional ISPs. This relates to 1), in that if you use the Tor network > incorrectly (transmit unencrypted data over it) then that data is completely > vulnerable to snooping by the exit-node operators. This is a serious issue, > because many common Internet protocols are plain-text by default and it is > far easier to set up a Tor exit node and start snooping traffic than it is > to infiltrate an ISP and start snooping the wires there. Anyone can do it, > and it has been shown in the past that anyone does. This is not a > theoretical problem.
If Tor is used on a FB as an Exit Node, that'll increase legal risk for that box for confiscation, when a 'terrorist'/criminal uses that node for clear-text communication.
Isn't one Eben's main FB premises that data on your home-based FreedomBox would be more off-limits than with your data hosted elsewhere? If your data is hosted on this exit node, that seems like there might be some conflict with this premise.
On the positive side, a non-exit node would be less risky. And if FB is setting up some umbrella ISP-like infrastructure, maybe some of the Tor/ISP issues can be reduced.
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss@lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss