On 12-05-27 at 11:54pm, Bjarni Rúnar Einarsson wrote: > A minor clarification... :-) > > On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 11:26 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancs...@yahoo.com> > wrote: > > The approaches I can think of are: > > a) pagekite et al, which would then become a central point of > > attack/failure > > Yes and no. PageKite's "central point of failure" is by design the > exact same central point as that of the web itself: the DNS system. > > PageKite assumes that there are many different front-end relay servers > available, and connections can move from one to another at any time. > So if one relay is taken down, the website is simply routed to another > one and DNS gets updated. This works today.
If such rerouting happens automatic and decentralized, I agree that there is no single point of failure. But if a website owner needs to explicitly pick a different pagekite tunneling provider if the previous one stops working, then I agree with Jonathan that pagekite becomes a central point of attack/failure. So how do rerouting happen? How is it assured that rerouting mechanisms cannot be abused for hijacking? - Jonas -- * Jonas Smedegaard - idealist & Internet-arkitekt * Tlf.: +45 40843136 Website: http://dr.jones.dk/ [x] quote me freely [ ] ask before reusing [ ] keep private
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