It seems that at its' limit this ends up being equivalent to Tor -- having genuine traffic filling all the links, but it is impossible to know who is consuming any particular piece of it.
Paul. On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 4:53 AM, Petter Reinholdtsen <p...@hungry.com>wrote: > > [Bob Mottram] > > It's a reasonable enough idea and worth a try so long as the amount of > > decoy traffic isn't too high. However, the threat model for this case > > is sophisticated data mining on the traffic graph, and over a time > > series such techniques may be able to filter out predictable user > > patterns from background noise. > > This is not the only threat model I had in mind. It is known that some > network monitoring actors pay special attention to everyone visiting > some web pages, and by sharing URLs we can make sure "everyone" visit > "every" page visited by someone, making sure those tracking visits to > some web pages get a lot of noise. We also make sure the value of any > legal proof of "this machine own by this person visited these pages" > become a lot smaller. > > > One way to try to counter that might be to build decoy personas whose > > fictitious web browsing activity has the same degree of statistical > > predictability/variance as the real user. It would be tricky to > > implement, but perhaps not impossible. > > Well, it really should impersonate some other user too. :) > > -- > Happy hacking > Petter Reinholdtsen > > _______________________________________________ > Freedombox-discuss mailing list > Freedombox-discuss@lists.alioth.debian.org > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss >
_______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss@lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss