On 16.6.2014 13:31, Martin Kosek wrote:
On 06/11/2014 02:59 PM, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 11.6.2014 13:29, Martin Kosek wrote:
On 06/11/2014 10:58 AM, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 10.6.2014 09:55, Martin Kosek wrote:
On 06/06/2014 12:50 PM, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 23.1.2014 14:34, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 22.1.2014 16:43, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Wed, 2014-01-22 at 16:05 +0100, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 22.1.2014 15:34, Simo Sorce wrote:
On Wed, 2014-01-22 at 10:40 +0100, Jan Cholasta wrote:
On 21.1.2014 17:12, Simo Sorce wrote:
Later in the patch you seem to be changing from needing
managedby_host
to needing write access to an entry, I am not sure I understand
why that
was changed. not saying it is necessarily wrong, but why the
original
check is not right anymore ?
The original check is wrong, see
<https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3977#comment:23>.
The check in my patch allows SAN only if the requesting host has write
access to all of the SAN services. I'm not entirely sure if this is
right, but even if it is not, I think we should still check for write
access to the SAN services, so that access control can be (partially)
handled by ACIs.
Right, I remembered that comment, but it just says to check the right
object's managed-by, here instead you changed it to check if you can
write the usercertificate.
I guess it is the same *if* there is an ACI that gives write permission
when the host is in the managed-by attribute, is that the reasoning ?
Exactly. The ACIs that allow this by default are named "Hosts can manage
service Certificates and kerberos keys" and "Hosts can manage other host
Certificates and kerberos keys".
I think the check can be extended to users as well, so that requesting
certificate with SAN is allowed only to users which have write access to
the SAN services.
I have done the modification, see attached patches.
Sounds good to me then, thanks for explaining.
The patches also look good, but I would like someone to give them a try
for a formal ack.
OK, thanks.
Bump.
I have added stricter validation of subject alt names as well as certificate
extensions in general to the second patch.
Thanks!
Updated patches attached.
Note that you will need python-nss 0.15 in order to test, you can get a
RPM for
Fedora here: <http://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=514739>.
John, do you think we could build python-nss 0.15 also for Fedora 20? The fix
incorporated in it is pretty important to warrant bugfix update in bodhi. It
would also allow FreeIPA 4.0 to be installed on Fedora 20.
Also, resubmitting HTTP and LDAP Server-Cert certmonger requests does not
work,
because <https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4370>.
This worked for me, I suspect this is a DS bug. More info in the ticket.
Now back to review of the patch:
210.4: looks ok
234.4:
1) Virtual operation "request certificate with subjectaltname" should be a
member of Certificate Administrators privilege
OK.
2) I would write "Request Certificate With SubjectAltName" with "with" instead
of "With". I.e.:
Request Certificate with SubjectAltName
OK.
3) Why is the extension check only enforced for non-hosts?
+ if not bind_principal.startswith('host/'):
+ for ext in extensions:
+ operation = self._allowed_extensions.get(ext)
+ if operation:
+ self.check_access(operation)
My tricky certmonger request passed:
# ipa-getcert request -d /etc/pki/nssdb/ -n test-san-1 -I test-san-1 -g
2048 -r
-N "cn=`hostname`" -K host/`hostname` -D test1.example.com -D
test2.example.com
-E mko...@redhat.com
while when I posted the same CSR as privileged user, it was rejected:
$ klist
Ticket cache: KEYRING:persistent:962000003:962000003
Default principal: f...@idm.lab.eng.brq.redhat.com
$ ipa cert-request --principal test/`hostname` certmonger.csr
ipa: ERROR: invalid 'csr': subject alt name type RFC822 Name is forbidden
Right, I meant to NACK myself, but you were faster. Fixed.
4) Regular users cannot read Virtual Operations, so even if I assign them a
permission, command is refused:
$ ipa cert-request --principal test/`hostname` openssl.csr
ipa: ERROR: Insufficient access: No such virtual command
I think we will need to create new managed permission "Read Virtual
Operations"
and assign it to "Certificate Administrators" privilege by default as this
privilege has the virtual operation permissions assigned. Petr3, what is your
take on this?
Otherwise the patch worked well for me, the authorization part looked OK. My
biggest concern was just the host/user differentiation wrt unknown
subjectaltname types.
Martin
Updated patches attached.
1) I could not compile the patch set:
$ make rpms
...
if [ "" != "yes" ]; then \
./makeapi --validate; \
./makeaci --validate; \
fi
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "./makeapi", line 457, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
File "./makeapi", line 428, in main
api.finalize()
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/plugable.py", line 708, in finalize
self.__do_if_not_done('load_plugins')
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/plugable.py", line 482, in
__do_if_not_done
getattr(self, name)()
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/plugable.py", line 645, in load_plugins
self.import_plugins('ipalib')
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/plugable.py", line 689, in import_plugins
__import__(fullname)
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/plugins/cert.py", line 30, in <module>
from ipalib import pkcs10
File "/root/freeipa-master/ipalib/pkcs10.py", line 77
.replace('@', '\\@')
...
The rest of the notes are thus only from reading.
Sorry, last minute change gone wrong.
2) There are lines like
+ if name_type == 'Other Name (OID.1.3.6.1.5.2.2)':
or
+ if name_type not in ('DNS name',
+ 'Other Name (OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3)',
+ 'Other Name (OID.1.3.6.1.5.2.2)'):
or
+ elif name_type in ('Other Name (OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3)',
+ 'Other Name (OID.1.3.6.1.5.2.2)'):
Can we do something better? Getting the extension type based on it's
description seems extremely unstable to me.
These are SAN types, not extension types. Unfortunately the textual
descriptions are the only SAN type representation available in python-nss which
includes OIDs of other names.
Can we for example modify get_subjectaltname to get the type based on
CertificateExtension object's oid or oid_tag attributes?
No, see above.
I would rather see get_subjectaltname return solid type like
CERT_EXTENSION_DNS_NAME defined in pkcs10.py than consumers comparing
descriptions. It would be more readable, too.
Done.
Martin
Updated patches attached.
1) We still miss the managed permission allowing Certificate Administrators to
read Virtual Commands
I was under the impression that Petr would fix this.
2) Extension check
Wouldn't
if any(ext not in self._allowed_extensions for ext in extensions)
be more readable than
+ for ext in extensions:
+ if ext not in self._allowed_extensions:
+ raise errors.ValidationError(
+ name='csr', error=_("extension %s is forbidden") % ext)
?
I don't think so. I don't see how cramming everything into one line
makes anything more readable.
3) I find this part still not ideal:
+ for name_type, name in subjectaltname:
+ if name_type not in (pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME,
+ pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME,
+ pkcs10.SAN_OTHERNAME_UPN):
+ raise errors.ValidationError(
+ name='csr',
+ error=_("subject alt name type %s is forbidden") %
+ name_type)
I still think we should instead:
- change get_subjectaltname's return value to tuples of:
- numeric type, i.e. SAN_DNSNAME,SAN_OTHERNAME_UPN or
SAN_OTHERNAME_KRB5PRINCIPALNAME
- content
It already returns tuples like this. Using a numeric type instead of
string for named constants does not improve anything.
- raise error when an unknown SAN type is detected
This doesn't really fit with the rest of the pkcs10 module.
This would:
a) Allow us to be sure that we do not miss any yet unknown SAN types or allow
us to catch the situation when name_type string changes
b) Allow more natural comparison of the SAN type "name_type ==
pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME" instead of "name_type in pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME"
The code already does all of this. There is no "name_type in
pkcs10.SAN_DNSNAME".
3) I am thinking why do we need to introduce all the ASN parsing? I am talking
about _decode_krb5principalname and others. If we do not use the result
anywhere, why should we include this part at all?
To work around shortcomings of NSS/python-nss. In particular,
_decode_krb5principalname is used to decode KRB5PrincipalName SANs to a
string. This is necessary because certmonger puts such SANs in
certificate requests it generates.
4) I get crash in the certmonger request:
ipa-getcert request -d /etc/pki/nssdb/ -n test-san-1 -I test-san-1 -g 2048 -r
-N "cn=`hostname`" -K host/`hostname` -D test1.example.com -D test2.example.com
-E mko...@redhat.com
# ipa-getcert list -i test-san-1
Number of certificates and requests being tracked: 8.
Request ID 'test-san-1':
status: CA_UNREACHABLE
ca-error: Server failed request, will retry: -504 (HTTP response code
is 500,
not 200).
stuck: yes
HTTPD traceback
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.528642 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
Traceback (most recent call last):
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.528844 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/share/ipa/wsgi.py", line 49, in application
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.529466 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
return api.Backend.wsgi_dispatch(environ, start_response)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.529614 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/rpcserver.py", line 251, in
__call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553116 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
return self.route(environ, start_response)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553261 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/rpcserver.py", line 263, in
route
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553410 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
return app(environ, start_response)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553604 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/rpcserver.py", line 637, in
__call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553749 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
environ, start_response)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.553895 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/rpcserver.py", line 397, in
__call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.554023 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
response = self.wsgi_execute(environ)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.554138 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/rpcserver.py", line 343, in
wsgi_execute
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.554276 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
result = self.Command[name](*args, **options)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.554413 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipalib/frontend.py", line 439, in
__call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.585933 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
ret = self.run(*args, **options)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.586170 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipalib/frontend.py", line 754, in run
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.586305 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
return self.execute(*args, **options)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.586490 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipalib/plugins/cert.py", line 316, in
execute
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.592390 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
subjectaltname = pkcs10.get_subjectaltname(csr) or ()
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.592565 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipalib/pkcs10.py", line 129, in
get_subjectaltname
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.596411 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
san = decoder.decode(san, asn1Spec=_SubjectAltName())[0]
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.596555 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/pyasn1/codec/ber/decoder.py", line
792, in __call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598268 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
stGetValueDecoder, self, substrateFun
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598404 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/pyasn1/codec/ber/decoder.py", line
367, in valueDecoder
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598534 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
component, head = decodeFun(head, asn1Spec)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598633 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/pyasn1/codec/ber/decoder.py", line
798, in __call__
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598746 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
'%r not in asn1Spec: %r' % (tagSet, asn1Spec)
[Mon Jun 16 13:06:14.598954 2014] [:error] [pid 12941] [remote 10.34.47.236:12]
PyAsn1Error: TagSet(Tag(tagClass=128, tagFormat=0, tagId=2)) not in asn1Spec:
_GeneralName()
What version of certmonger are you using?
Martin
--
Jan Cholasta
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