On 11/05/2014 09:14 PM, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
Before this patch users could log in using only the OTP value. This
arose because ipapwd_authentication() successfully determined that
an empty password was invalid, but 389 itself would see this as an
anonymous bind. An anonymous bind would never even get this far in
this code, so we simply deny requests with empty passwords.
This patch resolves CVE-2014-7828.
https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4690
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Hello Nathaniel,
With the DS flag 'nsslapd-allow-unauthenticated-binds', customer
have the ability to allows unauthenticated binds and connections.
With the fix, a ldapclient bind containing only OTP part will fail
even if the flag was set.
When ipapwd_pre_bind, stipping the OTP part, detects that the
password is zero length, I wonder if it should not test that flag to
determine if it should fail or succeed.
thanks
thierry
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