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You bring up two very important points: 1) a strong hypo-thesis (somewhat but not completely justified) that it _is_ ethical to attempt to reduce "deprived" segments and 2) ethical justification for various labels (democrat, monarchist, etc.). You also brought up the point that the techniques of complexity studies are, yet, too immature to really bring them to bear on the problem. I don't regard this as an important point because tools must be _used_ to become mature. So, it doesn't matter how immature the techniques are, they must be used on the problems we have at hand. And the corollary point about them not separating out cause/effect and re: prediction are premature conclusions in my opinion. So, I'll leave these points alone for now. A solution to my dilemma might involve _rejecting_ the ethical premise that the deprived segments should not be so deprived. E.g. some children _must_ starve in order for life to effectively do whatever it's doing. That is a completely reasonable solution (and one taken by many of us lucky ones whose selves, friends, family, tribe, etc. have their basic needs taken care of). Because that is a completely reasonable solution, we have to not only question _how_ alternative solutions (maintain the ethical premise) obtain; but we also have to question the entire process of _justification_. Can the ethical premise be more completely justified? This same question comes into your second important point. When I call myself a "monarchist" and that "theorem" is somehow justified via some form of rhetoric, we not only have to question the conclusions derived from the premise. We also have to question the rhetorical justification of the premise, itself. Am I really a "monarchist", regardless of what I call myself? Does the rhetoric: "because I don't want to disband the Royal Family" deductively lead to the label "monarchist"? Etc. This relates fundamentally to the question of whether things like inverse power laws between particular measures can be effectively applied to social and/or ethical problems. It relates because of the following. The results of complexity studies are telling us (in my opinion) _nothing_ about actual (ontological) reality. These results merely tell us how we as ignorant individuals _learn_ about actuality. They are at their core a psychological bridge between reductionism and holism. The dilemma, as I formulated it, relates two unjustified measures: the extent of a control structure and the number of objectives any control structure can competently achieve. I believe the epistemological results of complexity theory can help either: a) justify the two measures, or b) demonstrate how one or both of the measures are unjustified. It's also possible that either measure is justified but falsified (a.k.a. valid but unsound in logic-speak or verified but invalid in M&S-speak). We can't currently falsify the measures and their relationship because we haven't done the science (though I believe it's relatively easy to formulate a falsifiable hypothesis). And whether or not the science is _worth_ pursuing depends on the justification. So, the questions become: Q1) Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many variables? Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely out of the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in those variables? These are _justification_ questions, not falsification questions. Hence, they are perfectly suited for the toy-world models currently being built by social scientists and mathematicians. Once the justification is well-stated; falsification questions can be competently posed. Robert Cordingley wrote: > It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression, > poverty and poor education of segments of its population. Perhaps we > can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived > segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress. > (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?) It is > considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments > of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards > we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will). > > It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of > these deprived segments - it's a big job. The argument is over how. I > don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex > Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in > this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that > way from the perspective of an observer. > > That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise > hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is > *very* interesting and justifies further work. I don't think it > separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using > such studies for predictive purposes. And there is no evidence yet of > successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the > French or Russian Revolutions. (Please correct me if this is wrong). > So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out > what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief > from CAS studies. Many would not want one small class of experts to be > responsible for this task anyway. > > Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is > ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will > change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal > integrity. Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the > problem: > > I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government, > I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so > it remains habitable for us, > I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family, > I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government, > I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources, > I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal > system and its three branches of government, > I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets, > I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care, > education, justice, > I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that > can reign in man's excesses. > etc > > If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take > it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering. All > are amoral. It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our > morals (ethics). - -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don't know what can be done to fix it. This is it: Only nut cases want to be president. -- Kurt Vonnegut -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFG3amOZeB+vOTnLkoRAgEUAKDK7Mjc3EpNgOjqjmIiyyLJ6ppxygCg0n0J 1bFC1hz8fvBJr8cypjkfUGE= =5ozy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
