Jack's summary of the dilemma is interesting in that it does not identify
which assumptions of the model are responsible.       If there were a Hari
Seldon around, or a bio-mimic of some kind, someone capable of reading those
assumptions of the model that seal our fate unless they are considered as
variables. he'd still need a collective to make that reading useful.
Every direction of progress ends in diminishing returns, but nature is full
of things that come to a balance that way and thrive, and only a small
minority become stymied by it and fail at their peak.     Patrick's idea
that love may be all it takes is radical enough, but unless people also know
what to do too, I don't think it works.

 

Phil

 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of Sunny Fugate
Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2008 3:24 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Civilizations and complexity

 

This sounds very much like the Isaac Asimov Foundation series'
psychohistory. And, just like Hari Seldon, we might have something our
ancestral civilizations did not; insight into our past, our present, and our
problem.  

 

-Sunny

 

BTW. This is my first post to the list.  I am a Computer Science PhD student
at UNM and a Navy researcher working for Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Center out of San Diego, CA.  My primary research interests are the
human-machine interface, machine-mediated communication, language
representation, cognition, and visual language linguistics.   More about our
language research is at http://cs.unm.edu/~vail  

 

I hope to make it up to a Friday morning meeting soon!  

 

 

 

On Apr 10, 2008, at 11:01 AM, Jack Stafurik wrote:



Here is an interesting article from the New Scientist applying some
complexity concepts to civilizations. The depressing thesis is that
civilizations are inherently unstable, and will collapse. This is due to the
fact that over time they evolve from simple hierarchic systems (hunter
gathers, tribes) with centralized decisionmaking to large nation states and
empires where decisionmaking is dispersed and the evolving network is highly
interconnected. Initially, this may make the system (civilization) more
robust and better able to weather disruptions, but eventually the
disconnected decisions (with no entity responsible for or able to optimize
the entire system dynamics) result in a situation where shocks are amplified
and transmitted rather than absorbed. Scary.

It would be interesting to see if a quantitative measure of network
complexity could be developed and applied to civilizations or parts of
civilizations, to identify danger points where the system must be "balanced"
to prevent or mitigate the effects of major shocks.

 

 

Why the demise of civilisation may be inevitable

          . 02 April 2008

          . From New Scientist Print Edition. Subscribe and get 4 free
issues.

          . Debora MacKenzie

 

DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of
plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet, leaving a few survivors
scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every civilisation in
history has collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different?

Doomsday scenarios typically feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid,
all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic pandemic (see "Will a pandemic bring
down civilisation?"). Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the
very nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is
destined to collapse sooner or later?

A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly,
recent insights from fields such as complexity theory suggest that they are
right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of
complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point
at which even a relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing
down.

Some say we have already reached this point, and that it is time to start
thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too
late, and that we can - we must - act now to keep disaster at bay.

Environmental mismanagement

History is not on our side. Think of Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the
Maya. In his 2005 best-seller Collapse, Jared Diamond of the University of
California, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of
the Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the
same way unless we choose to stop destroying our environmental support
systems.

Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees. He has
long argued that governments must pay more attention to vital environmental
resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about saving
civilisation," he says.

Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started
to settle down and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the
problems that success brings. "For the past 10,000 years, problem solving
has produced increasing complexity in human societies," says Joseph Tainter,
an archaeologist at Utah State University, Logan, and author of the 1988
book The Collapse of Complex Societies.

If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they
silt up, organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a
bigger population, build more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc
repairs, install a management bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it.
When they complain, invent tax inspectors and a system to record the sums
paid. That much the Sumerians knew.

Diminishing returns

There is, however, a price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation
imposes a cost in terms of energy, the common currency of all human efforts,
from building canals to educating scribes. And increasing complexity,
Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced by
each extra hour of labour - or joule of energy invested per farmed hectare -
diminishes as that investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a
declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that research
investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere,
Tainter says.

To keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet
each problem solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger
population, more kinds of specialists, more resources to manage, more
information to juggle - and, ultimately, less bang for your buck.

Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and
resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing
level of complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade,
overstretched institutions break down and civil order collapses. What
emerges is a less complex society, which is organised on a smaller scale or
has been taken over by another group.

Tainter sees diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse
of all ancient civilisations, from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek
city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar energy that
could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this had
been stretched to its limit, things fell apart.

An ineluctable process

Western industrial civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any
before it by exploiting new sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but
these are limited. There are increasing signs of diminishing returns: the
energy required to get each new joule of oil is mounting and although global
food production is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope
with environmental degradation and evolving pests and diseases - the yield
boosts per unit of investment in innovation are shrinking. "Since problems
are inevitable," Tainter warns, "this process is in part ineluctable."

Is Tainter right? An analysis of complex systems has led Yaneer Bar-Yam,
head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying
history. Social organisations become steadily more complex as they are
required to deal both with environmental problems and with challenges from
neighbouring societies that are also becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says.
This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the way the society is
organised.

"To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they
are managing," Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever
more layers of management but, ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has
to try and get their head around the whole thing, and this starts to become
impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to networks in which
decision-making is distributed. We are at this point.

This shift to decentralised networks has led to a widespread belief that
modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't
foresee a collapse in society because of increased complexity," says
futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our
highly distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western
societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in which
decision making was centralised.

Increasing connectedness

Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political scientist
at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside
of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness and diversity helps: if one
village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that
didn't."

As connections increase, though, networked systems become increasingly
tightly coupled. This means the impacts of failures can propagate: the more
closely those two villages come to depend on each other, the more both will
suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher vulnerability in
some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood."

The reason is that as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit
shocks rather than absorb them. "The intricate networks that tightly connect
us together - and move people, materials, information, money and energy -
amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A financial crisis, a
terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising
effects, from one side of the world to the other."

For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and Europe suffered
blackouts when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective
electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered a similar blackout
after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly coupled networks like these create
the potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says
Charles Perrow of Yale University, a leading authority on industrial
accidents and disasters.

Credit crunch

Perrow says interconnectedness in the global production system has now
reached the point where "a breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown
everywhere". This is especially true of the world's financial systems, where
the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a debt crisis with the biggest
player, the US. The consequences could be enormous."

"A networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam,
"random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep." Whether or not the
sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure
which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't clear - it may not even be predictable
- which chunks of our densely networked civilisation are critical, until
it's too late.

"When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you lose enough of
it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more
sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable.
That means civilisation is very vulnerable."

So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully
in the face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means
making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first place -
something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the
world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle.

Tightly coupled system

Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex systems are prone
to collapse. Similar ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in
ecosystems, based on the work of ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the
University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily more
complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist
species may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the
trees, beetles and bacteria form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly
coupled system.

"It becomes an extremely efficient system for remaining constant in the face
of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions
- an insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the
impact cascades through the system. The end result may be the collapse of
the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one.

Globalisation is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our
systems to a narrow range of conditions, he says. Redundancy is being
systematically eliminated as companies maximise profits. Some products are
produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes sense, as mass
production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises
resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity
and speed of our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs
outweigh the benefits."

Is there an alternative? Could we heed these warnings and start carefully
climbing back down the complexity ladder? Tainter knows of only one
civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine
empire lost most of its territory to the Arabs, they simplified their entire
society. Cities mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined, their
economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to
peasant militia."

Staving off collapse

Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more advanced society.
Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we
need to encourage distributed and decentralised production of vital goods
like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack
isn't always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose
some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even if its suppliers are
temporarily out of action."

The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in
the grid with no redundancy available and is putting some back in,
Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow
suit. The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private
companies will always increase efficiency unless governments subsidise
inefficiency in the public interest.

Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what
he calls "tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled
system outside the range of conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned
to. These include population growth, the growing divide between the world's
rich and poor, financial instability, weapons proliferation, disappearing
forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new complex solutions
we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are running
out of cheap and plentiful energy.

"This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to allow for the
healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't
produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal,"
Homer-Dixon says. This is what happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of
old growth and newer areas created by disease or fire. If the ecosystem in
one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by younger forest
elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by
renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by
increasing complexity that any resulting crisis is actually worse.

Tipping points

Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The world can no
longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in
wartime," he says. "There has been tremendous progress in just the past few
years. For the first time, I am starting to see how an alternative economy
might emerge. But it's now a race between tipping points - which will come
first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?"

Tainter is not convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in
the long run. "I sometimes think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the
future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated by cheap new energy sources
will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns once more.
Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps
absolute limits.

Studies of the way cities grow by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea. His team's work suggests
that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing
and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be
sustainable.

The stakes are high. Historically, collapse always led to a fall in
population. "Today's population levels depend on fossil fuels and industrial
agriculture," says Tainter. "Take those away and there would be a reduction
in the Earth's population that is too gruesome to think about."

If industrialised civilisation does fall, the urban masses - half the
world's population - will be most vulnerable. Much of our hard-won knowledge
could be lost, too. "The people with the least to lose are subsistence
farmers," Bar-Yam observes, and for some who survive, conditions might
actually improve. Perhaps the meek really will inherit the Earth.

Read the companion article about pandemics

Related Articles

          . Could a pandemic bring down civilisation?

          . http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg19826501.400

          . 05 April 2008

>From issue 2650 of New Scientist magazine, 02 April 2008, page 32-35

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