So, partly prompted by how it seemed Kauffman got there.    There's a
particularly curious "hiding place" for nature's accumulative individuality
and complex behavior within an otherwise "deterministic" universe obeying
universal natural laws.     

 

It's the somewhat deceptive meaning of "uncertainty".    If you prove an
uncertainty for some outcome it means that actual events will "at most" do
one thing, and "at least" do another.    That's "information" about a
probability of behavior, not a specification for individual behaviors.   It
specifies the "range of freedom" within the system for non-conforming
individual behaviors, which could perhaps lead to accumulatively diverging
behaviors.  When you multiply successive uncertainties, the accumulative
uncertainties are essentially limitless. 

 

Uncertainty is really both a measure of the freedom for individual
differences within a system, and at the same time the a measure of the
limits beyond which individual differences have no effect.   The range
beyond which individual differences have no effect specifies with certainty
the potential for deterministic system control.     It means that
statistical mechanics is a way of describing where accumulative individual
behaviors do not matter, not a statement that they never matter. 

 

What is hiding is that within the uncertainties of natural law nature is
free to develop accumulative diverging effects, the eventful stuff.
Accumulation is not "vitalism", but a process that sometimes builds things
that "have vitality", as an emergent property.    In my approach to systems
study that's what watching animated accumulations of events is about.
Observed divergence in accumulating change is a process that shows vitality,
and one you can use to closely examine how animated events develop and what
becomes of them.

 

d'zzat help.?   ;-)

 

Phil Henshaw   

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