Russ,
To me, the mark of an educated person is the ability to hold different views of
the same subject in mind at the same time. I think our discussions on this
list have tended to lack depth, in the sense that everybody has their opinion
but has grave difficulty representing with any fidelity the opinion with which
they disagree.
Thus, our discussions take on the character of so many fog horns on a
night-shrouded bay. Anybody who has read through and discussed the sources in
this book has increased their ability to articulate their opinion, that is, to
compare and contrast it with other opinions. But hey, I am an academic and a
humanist: what would you expect me to believe
Don't let that woman out of your sight!!
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University (nthomp...@clarku.edu)
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
----- Original Message -----
From: Russ Abbott
To: nickthomp...@earthlink.net;The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
Group
Sent: 9/14/2009 5:39:16 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar--British Emergence
That's the problem I have with taking historical ideas seriously. Why should
we care whether whatever the British Emergentists thought makes sense now? What
we should care about is what does make sense now? Of course, as I mentioned to
you (Nick) privately, my wife, who works in Early Modern English, thinks it's
very important what people used to think.
It seems to me that if you are a historian of ideas, it may be important what
people used to think, and if you want to understand how we got from there to
here it may be important what people used to think, but if what you are
interested in is how to understand emergence, then that should be the question.
If the British Emergentists have something to say about emergence that would be
worth listening to today, then it should be discussed. If the presentation of
what the British Emergentists thought is not clear enough to determine whether
it has something to offer today, then that's certainly a problem -- and one the
author should clear up. But just because the British Emergentists used to think
something, I don't see that as justification for spending much time talking
about it.
-- Russ
On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 4:22 PM, Nicholas Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net>
wrote:
All,
I would like to appeal for some help from The List with the chapter we are
reading this week in the Emergence Seminar. One of the central assertions of
the author is that quantum mechanics put the British Emergentists out of
business by making "configurational" forces seem unlikely. He goes on to say
that "the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA ... make[s] the main
doctrines of Britsh emergentism, so far as ...the biological [is] concerned,
seem enormously implausible." (McLaughlin, 2009, p. 23).
Now here is my problem: everything that I understand about contemporary
Evo/devo seems to make the structure of biological molecules (DNA, RNA, and
proteins) central to our understanding of biological development. Thus, to me,
these discoveries make emergentism (if not the British kind) seem dramatically
MORE plausible. If all the consequences of the folding and unfolding of
proteins, etc., do not constitute effects of "configurational forces" then what
the dickens are they?
Can anybody help me with this paradox????
I have forwarded this comment to the Author and, if he doesn't object, will
forward any remarks he may have back to you.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University (nthomp...@clarku.edu)
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
