H&O are quite methodical: "emergence: The occurrence of a characteristic *W*in an object *w* is emergent relative to a theory *T*, a part relation *Pt*, and a class *G* of attributes if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of *T* from a characterization of the *Pt*-parts of *w* with respect to all the attributes in *G*."
I suspect that the proper characteristics of *T* are the treated in other parts of Hempel's book, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, so it isn't fair to assume that it's entirely arbitrary and *ad hoc.* However, the purpose of the definition is to exterminate emergence, it is a temporary state of ignorance which will be remedied by an improved theory. That the improved theory might be entirely stated in relations between "emergent" ontologies -- eg molecules, cells, organisms, populations, etc -- is of no concern, they are no longer emergent if they're in the theory. -- rec -- If it's in the theory, it's in the theory! On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 2:55 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > Quoting Nick, > > For [Hempel and Oppenheim], a characteristic of on object is emergent > relative to a theory and relative to a particular list of part attributes > when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the part attributes using > that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is only to say > something about the state of our theory with respect to the data we have > already gathered. > > That seems to mean that a characteristic is emergent or not depending on > the theory and the part attributes considered. So based on this view any > characteristic is emergent if one ignores all the part attributes. Is that a > correct conclusion? Similarly no characteristic is emergent if one creates a > theory that maps part attributes to it -- no matter how arbitrary and *ad > hoc* that mapping may be. Neither of these seem like very attractive > positions. They make the notion of emergence subject to all sorts of > manipulation. > > Or is the point simply to define the term "emergence" in terms of this sort > of formalism? If that's the point, i.e., to define the term "emergence" > formally like this, then what do they do with this definition once created? > Does this definition yield any insights, or is it just a definition? > > -- Russ A > > > > On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 1:00 PM, Nicholas Thompson < > nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > >> Glen, >> >> My colleagues have already told you what the assignment is, so what >> follows >> is little more than spin. >> >> In our attempts to understand what is going on in this tangled literature, >> we have come up with only one way to characterize the different views of >> emergence that seems to endure more than a week: that is the >> epistemological vs ontological distinction. Hempel and Oppenheim fall >> soundly on the epistemological side. For them, a characteristic of on >> object is emergent relative to a theory and relative to a particular list >> of part attributes when that characteristic cannot be deduced from the >> part >> attributes using that theory. So, to say that a property is emergent is >> only to say something about the state of our theory with respect to the >> data we have already gathered. >> >> Dennett seems to come down in the middle of our distinction. His argument >> concerns what beliefs are REALLY. His answer -- that beliefs are really >> features of the world as seen from a point of view -- implies a position >> on >> the nature of emergence. Like Hemple and Oppenheim, Dennett would concede >> that seeing emergence requires one to take a point of view.... a STANCE, >> if >> you will. But taking that stance is like looking through binoculars ... >> it >> may limit your field of vision, but it also tells you something that is >> true of the world. In fact, every stance tells you something that is true >> of the world. >> >> A personal note: those who tried to follow my ravings concerning Holt and >> the New Realism this summer wont be surprized to hear me say that Dennett >> is sounding awfully like a New Realist. >> >> See you Thursday at 4pm. >> >> Sorry for duplicate posting. >> >> N >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, >> Clark University (nthomp...@clarku.edu) >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> >> >> >> >> >> > [Original Message] >> > From: glen e. p. ropella <g...@agent-based-modeling.com> >> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> > Date: 10/5/2009 9:38:53 AM >> > Subject: [FRIAM] emergence seminar: what's next? >> > >> > >> > What's next on the reading list? >> > >> > -- >> > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com >> > >> > >> > ============================================================ >> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >> > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
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