Russ, I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. However, by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like a jack ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these answers might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as you accept the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer your questions.
"When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably well" what are you referring to?" In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a critical view to advancing the field. Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication systems." I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the posited device to experience what another is experiencing. "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own visual experiences." Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the advances made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot about how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work like human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not the most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are *people working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision systems for the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good stuff. "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking at what their brain is doing." This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. The approach that I would advocate for could be described as "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward and tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called "hard problem" moot. Was any of that satisfying? Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Russ, > > > > Partly exhaustion, I think. > > > > Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot > ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we > are just dickering about the price. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) > > > > Nick, Eric, > > > > I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to > Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. > > > > -- Russ > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably > well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was > not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something > that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of > mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like > me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help > me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the > science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? > > > > Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the > reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop > technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural > sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are > experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. > > > > We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I > expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own > visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a > subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give > us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open > brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to > subjective experience. > > > > Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though no > science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we > will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. > > > > I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem > of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more > accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking > at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in > the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial > mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive > nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make > subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of > the world. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are > to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way > so that it's easier to do science.*" > > Exactly! Let me try another tact. > > 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds > in which things worked differently from each other. > > 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of > those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up > empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce > was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century > chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the > world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. > (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an > excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, > including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated > elements.) > > 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be > true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out > there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield > stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. > > > > 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of > psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that > context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime > example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the > type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province of > the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those > big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very > nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce the > convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. > > 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can > imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated > empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a > science of the mind would fail pathetically. > > 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for > centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started > thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it > went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in > either scientific circles or philosophical ones. > > 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is > possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some swath > of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of > investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process > takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know > without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted > science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying > bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted > sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind > seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and > empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that > progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently > uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. > > If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate > with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to > study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be > something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods > and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of > psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. > > Best, > > Eric > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role -- > except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you want. > > > > *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst]* > > > > That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my > sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating > in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is > required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective > experiences of one's) experiences. > > > > *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you > entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using > the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, > feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the > amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time > than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I > am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater > familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. > <==nst]* > > > > What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? > I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More > generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? > I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's > behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be > talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? > > > > I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things > without having what I would call subjective experience. > > > > *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head > (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind > things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. > <==nst]* > > > > I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about > subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I > agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. > > > > By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are to > do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. > thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and > quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is > fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way > so that it's easier to do science. > > > > *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the Vital > <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> > . > Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary > condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf > Peirce). <==nst]* > > > > I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The > upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with > that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with > not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without > subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have > "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that > runs it has no subjective experience.) > > > > I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are > using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really > to attribute those processes to computers or software. > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > See Larding below: > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ > Abbott > *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM > > > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy > > > > Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to > defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. > In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the > following. > > > > -------------- > > > > Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world > from where you stand. > > > > I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean > distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close > you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. > > *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space > metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be > yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the > more we are of one mind. <==nst] * > > > > Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward > you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. > *[NST==>You > will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the > notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of > equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and > thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time > we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do > around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, > thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity > with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * > > > > *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me > clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, > in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded > that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * > > > > I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" > What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say > that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time > must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if > the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions > in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) > > *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head > (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind > things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. > <==nst] * > > > > -------------- > > > > You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your > paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, > if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the > second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by > a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be > "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that > you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be > intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what > does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? > > *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of > the Vital > <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> > . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary > condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf > Peirce). <==nst] * > > > > > > > > On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is > meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: > > 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly > > This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do > with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with > "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could > easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering > to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every > tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate > by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the > interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of > whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. > > Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, it's > still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can become > intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are > pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be > inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be > mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. > > And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the > irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ > different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if > we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) > > > On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! > > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that > you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we > are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. > > > > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in Hollywood: > cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a person, it is > like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the person sees. > In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the pain of loosing > someone. > > -- > ⇔ glen > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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