Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true propositions of the form "x is real".
----------------------------------- Frank Wimberly My memoir: https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly My scientific publications: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 Phone (505) 670-9918 On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net wrote: > Thanks, Eric, > > > > I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out. > Thank you. > > > > One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the > grammar of the two terms. True seems to apply only to propositions, while > real only to nouns. Now the way we get around that is by saying that the > real things are the objects of true proposition. But that leads to what I > call the unicorn problem. “Unicorns don’t exist” is a true proposition > that does not, however, make “unicorns” real. > > > > This seems like the kind of problem a sophomore might go crazy ab0ut in an > introductory philosophy course, so I am a bit embarrassed to be raising > it. For my philosophical mentors, it is beneath their contempt. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric > Charles > *Sent:* Sunday, December 23, 2018 4:02 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < > friam@redfish.com> > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction > > > > I think Peirce is getting at something a bit different. When Peirce is on > good behavior, he is laying out The World According to The Scientist. When > a Scientist says that some claim is "true" she means that future studies > will continue to support the claim. Perhaps even a bit more than that, as > she means all investigations that could be made into the claim would > support the claim, whether they happen or not. Peirce also tells us that > "real" is our funny way of talking about the object of a true belief. *If > *"I believe X" is a statement about a *true *belief, *then *future > investigations will not reveal anything contradicting X, and... as a simple > matter of definition... X is real. > > > > When Peirce is first getting started, he seems to think that you could > work that logic through with just about any claim (and either find > confirmation or not). Did my aunt Myrtle screw up the salad dressing recipe > back on June 1st, 1972? Maybe we could descend upon that question using the > scientific method and figure it out! Why rule out that future generations > could find a method to perform the necessary studies? > > > > However, at some later point, I think Peirce really starts to get deeper > into his notion of the communal activity of science, as embodied by his > beloved early chemists. Did the honorable Mr. Durston really succeed in > isolating oxygen that one winter day, by exposing water to electricity > under such and such circumstances? Isn't that the thing Scientists argue > over? Well, it might be the type of thing people argue over, but is has > little to do with the *doing *of science. Individual events are simply > not the type of thing that scientists actually converge to agreement about > using the scientific method; the type of thing they converge upon is an > agreement over whether or not the described procedures contain some crucial > aspect that would be necessary to claim the described result. "Water" as an > abstraction of sorts, under certain abstract circumstances, with an > abstracted amount of electricity applied, will produce some (abstract) > result. And by "abstract" I mean "not particular". Scientists aren't > arguing over whether some exact flow of electrons, applied in this exact > way, will turn this exact bit of water into some exact bit of gas. They > want to know if a flow of electrons with some properties, applied in a > principled fashion, will turn water-in-general into some predictable amount > of gas-with-particular-properties. We can tell this when things go wrong: > Were it found that some bit of water worked in a unique seeming way, the > scientists would descend upon it with experimental methods until they found > something about the water that allowed them to make an abstract claim > regarding water of such-and-such type. > > > > I suspect most on this list would agree, at least roughly, with what is > written above. > > > > Now, however, we must work our way backwards: > > * The types of beliefs about which a community of Scientists coverage > upon are abstractions, > > * the scientists converge upon those beliefs because the evidence bears > them out, > > * that the evidence bears out an idea is what we mean when we claim the > object of an idea is real. > > * Thus, at least for The Scientist, the only things that are "real" are > abstractions. > > > > In the very, very long run of intellectual activity, the ideas that are > stable are ideas about abstractions, which means that the object of those > ideas, the abstractions themselves, must be "real." > > > > (I feel like that was starting to get repetitive. I'll stop.) > > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > > U.S. Marine Corps > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:38 PM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> > wrote: > > Nick, > > > > Alas, I was not present to hear the inchoate discussion. Please allow me > to do some deconstruction and speculation on what you might be asking about. > > > > Imagine a vertical line and assume, metaphorically, that this is a > 'membrane' consisting of tiny devices that emit signals (electrical > impulses) into that which we presume to be 'inside that membrane'. I am > trying to abstract the common sense notion of an individual's 5 senses > generating signals that go to the brain — without making too many > assumptions about the signal generators and or the recipient of same. > > > > We tend to assume that the signal generators are not just randomly sending > off signals. Instead we assume that somewhere on the left side of the line > is a source of stimuli, each of which triggers a discrete signal generator > which we rename as a sensor. > > > > First question: do you assume / assert / argue that the "source" of each > stimulus (e.g. the Sun) and the means of conveying the stimulus (e.g. a > Photon) are "Real?" > > > > Signals are generated at the membrane and sent off somewhere towards the > right. > > > > Second question: do you assume a receiver of those signals, e.g. a > 'brain-body', and do you assume / argue / assert that the receiving entity > is "Real." > > > > If a signal is received by a brain-body and it reacts, e.g. a muscle > contraction; there are least two possible assumptions you can make: > > > > - some sort of 'hard wiring' exists that routes the signal to a set of > muscle cells which contract; and nothing has happened except the completion > of a circuit. Or, > > - the signal is "interpreted" in some fashion and the response to it > is at least quasi-voluntary. (Yogis and fakirs have demonstrated that very > little of what most of us would assume to be involuntary reactions, are, in > fact, beyond conscious control.) > > > > Third question: are both the 'interpretation' and the 'response' Real > things? > > > > Depending on your answers, we might have a model of interacting "Real" > things: Source, Stimulus, Membrane, Signal, Interpretation, and Response. > Or, you might still wish to assert that all of these are "abstractions," > but if so, I really do not understand at all what you would mean by the > term. > > > > But, you are an amenable chap and might assent to considering these things > "Real" in some sense, so we can proceed. > > > > The next step would be to question the existence of some entity receiving > the signals, effecting the interpretation, and instigating the response. > Let's call it a Mind or Consciousness. [Please keep the frustrated > screaming to a minimum.] > > > > It seems to me that this step is necessary, as it is only "inside" the > mind that we encounter abstractions. The abstractions might be unvoiced > behaviors — interpretations of an aggregate of stimuli as a "pattern" with > a reflexive response, both of which were non-consciously learned, e.g. > 'flight or fight'. Or, they might be basic naming; simple assertions using > the verb to-be; or complicated and convoluted constructs resulting from > judicious, or egregious, application of induction, deduction, and abduction. > > > > Fourth question: are these in-the-mind abstractions "Real?" > > > > At the core, your question seems to be an ontological / metaphysical one. > Are there two kinds of Thing: Real and Abstract? If so what criteria is > used to define membership in the two sets? It seems like your anti-dualism > is leading you to assert that there are not two sets, but one and that > membership in that set is defined by some criteria/characteristic of > 'abstract-ness'. > > > > Please correct my failings at discerning the true nature of your question. > > > > dave west > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 20, 2018, at 10:00 PM, Nick Thompson wrote: > > Hi, Everybody, > > > > Yes. St. Johns Coffee Shop WILL be open this Friday. And then, not again > until the 3rd of January. I am hoping Frank will have some ideas for > what we do on the Friday between the two holidays. > > > > Attached please find the copy of an article you helped me write. Thanks > to all of you who listened patiently and probed insistently as I worked > though the issues of this piece. > > > > I need help with another article I am working with. Last week I found > myself making, and defending against your uproarious laughter, the > proposition that all real things are abstract. Some of you were prepared > to declare the opposite, No real things are abstract. However, it was late > in the morning and the argument never developed. > > > > I would argue the point in the following way: Let us say that we go along > with your objections and agree that “you can never step in the same river > twice.” This is to say, that what we call “The River” changes every time > we step in it. Wouldn’t it follow that any conversation we might have > about The River is precluded? We could not argue, for instance, about > whether the river is so deep that we cannot cross o’er because there is no > abstract fact, “The River” that connects my crossing with yours. > > > > Let’s say, then, that you agree with me that implicit in our discussions > of the river is the abstract conception of The River. But, you object, > that we assume it, does not make it true. Fair enough. But why then, do > we engage in the measurement of anything? > > > > I realize this is not everybody’s cup of tea for a conversation, but I > wanted to put it on the table. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > Email had 1 attachment: > > - BP 2018 (Thompson) (in press).pdf > > 640k (application/pdf) > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove