Eric -

I wonder if there is a game theory problem to be worked on here.
Naturally there would be, the question of course would be about the relevance and interest in such a problem (or suite o
Arrow's Impossibility is real but no more significant IMO than the real-world 
ambiguities and paradoxes introduced by practical realities such as voter 
suppression and fraud, system hacking and mechanical errors (e.g. hanging 
chads)…
The Impossibility Theorem has the character of a case-existence proof: for any 
algorithm, there is a case of voter preferences for which that algorithm 
produces an unwanted outcome.
  In the sense of only counting cases, it reminds me of no-free-lunch theorems: 
for any algorithm that is fast to solve one problem of combinatorial search, 
there is some other problem for which it is slow.  However, the NFL _threorem_ 
— that no algorithm is any better than any other — depends on an appropriately 
symmetric search space and a suitable associated uniform measure over problems 
on that space.  If search and optimization are embedded in a larger dynamic 
where correlation between algorithms is allowed, there can be global better or 
worse approaches.
   I don’t (as in every other area) have details and references ready in 
memory, but David Wolpert wrote some of his later papers on NFL addressing the 
ways it ceases to apply under changed assumptions.

I wonder if anyone has done an analysis of Arrow Impossibility in a context of 
a kind of ecosystem of adversaries.
Yes, I think this is the crux of the implications of my questions and observations on the topic.   It would seem that the ecosystem or landscape associated with the very idea of democracy (representative or direct) allows (and deserves) more exploration.    The acute point I was making is that I don't believe that one can dismiss ranked choice methods because it can be proven that there are point solutions which are pathological to the original goal (discovering collective preference?).
   To game any algorithm, crucially with the outcome that not only _some_ voter 
is handled poorly, but that _a sufficiently large pool_ of voters is handled 
poorly that the algorithm is not best, requires arranging the preference case 
that violates the algorithm for suitably many voters.  Is this coordination 
problem harder for some preference-orders than for others?
This is a good question...  I have a little experience around related topics, but have not really explored it in relationship to "preference" in this sense.  It also seems that "preference" is not really crisp, and is subject to abrupt revisions (how many would-be Hillary Voters chose not to vote when Comey's e-mail exposure came out, and how many would-be Trump Voters withdrew from him when the Billy Bush tapes were aired?).
  Is there something akin to “canalization” in evolutionary biology, where some 
algorithms live further from the boundary of being collectively tipped into 
producing the wrong outcome than others?  Thus, are there measures of 
robustness for statistical violation of algorithms based on what happens in 
most cases rather than what happens in the worst case, as there are for 
spin-glass phase transition problems?

This is where I find this list to be at it's best, when the deep and broad thinkers here recognize a real-world problem and how it maps into the abstractions we are already capable enough with to study it much more thoughtfully than pop culture/media is even capable of, much less inclined.  Of course, any result we might discover in such analysis still needs to be rendered back into recognizeable language and metaphor for the general public to understand well enough to respond to with more than knee-jerk support/rejection.

I don't mean this to sound (be?) techno-elitist,  it is one of the things that those of us with enough background have a chance of contributing, just as (ideally) each person has a vote to cast and  a day-job.   Those folks whose job is to continue to pull coal out of the ground until the demand curve crosses the cost (including socially-defined regulatory) curve, do us a favor by (mostly) keeping their heads down and doing their job.  Meanwhile, it behooves the rest of us to make sure that when the only demand for coal is the boutique one to fill the stockings of bad boys and girl that those who kept on doing that (apparently necessary) work to the end have something else suitable to move on to (could be early retirement, with or without a battle with black-lung).

Another thing it seems unlikely I will ever put time into being serious about.  
Or maybe there is already a large standing literature that claims to have 
addressed this.

This is a key point to another thread I haven't found the time/focus to do more than allude to, the "Commons".   Dave (and others including myself sometimes) can be very big on the idea of self-reliance, individualism, personal responsibility.... but without factoring in the true role of the "Constructed Commons" and the "Exploitable Natural Commons", those arguments seem very self-indulgent, entitled privilege, and me-firsty.

The fact that there is almost surely a "standing literature" which might or might not claim to have addressed this instantiation in particular,  is a key part of said "Constructed Commons".   The potential value of this seems well (if not best) addressed by a loose collective of people with diverse backgrounds, interests, abilities and resources, even as simply as in a rambling series of tangential posts on the topic by a tiny subset of the O(1k) mail-list here.   I think this is what Nick returns to often (the value of these discussions and his personal desire to see them condensed into something more formal/accessible).

Your own contribution here is (at least) that of powerful catalyst for this kind of discussion.  While you claim to have only shallow and sometimes narrow knowledge of these topics, the *relative* breadth and depth of your offerings stimulates others here to speak up, dig deeper, throw down.

Maybe *I* will find some time to dig around for said Region of the Constructed Commons...  and perhaps others already are familiar with rich territory to look in.


Eric




On Dec 28, 2018, at 7:04 PM, Steven A Smith <sasm...@swcp.com> wrote:

oops... originally sent only to Marcus by mistake...

On 12/28/18 6:59 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/politics/maine-governor-certifies-congressional-election/index.html
From: Steven A Smith <sasm...@swcp.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2018 9:50:02 AM
To: Marcus Daniels
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 2019 - The end of Trumpism
Marcus writes:
Steve writes:
"Democracy is the tyranny of the majority over the minority" The majority elected Hillary Clinton. Marcus
The Electoral College is archaic and ambiguous:
     
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html#changes.
Perhaps our current orange-tinted clusterf*ck will continue to degenerate to 
the point of motivating the necessary will to mount the necessary 
constitutional amendment.
Republicans are acutely good at gaming vulnerable systems to their benefit 
(gerrymandering, voter suppression, etc.) but the DNC and Hillary proved to be 
their equal during the primary with Superdelegates.
     
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/democrat-primary-elections-need-reform
Ranked Choice voting seems ultimately yet more promising to *improve* the 
selection of our representatives.  I believe that Maine is running that 
experiment for us now at the State level. Arrow's Impossibility is real but no 
more significant IMO than the real-world ambiguities and paradoxes introduced 
by practical realities such as voter suppression and fraud, system hacking and 
mechanical errors (e.g. hanging chads)...   Technology (can a direct democracy 
be facilitated by something like block-chain technology?) might resolve some of 
these questions, but very likely it will miss the more fundamental 
philosophical questions.
We are a Federal Republic with a Representative Democracy for good reasons... some of the 
context of those "good reasons" surely has evolved over the 250ish years it has 
been in place while the mechanisms maybe have not evolved as quickly.   Individual and 
small groups of Opportunistic, Brash, Narcissists can usually outmanouvre such a slow 
moving leviathan.   I'm not sure what to do about that.
How does Direct Democracy distinguish itself from Populism and Mob Rule?   What 
constitutes (guarantees/assures?) an engaged and informed electorate?
But the question remains:  Is there a better way to meet the goals of governance than the 
democracies we have tried and/or imagined?  How do we balance (or align?) the needs of 
the group and of the individual?  Is "Democracy the worst form of government except 
for all of the others we have tried" (Churchill paraphrase)?
- Steve



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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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