Glen, 

Most streams of experience don't converge.  Random streams predict nothing.  
They are of no use to the organism.  Only streams that converge, "are".  I.e, 
only they exist.  Random streams, aren't.  Most co-occurrences in stream are 
random, they reveal no existents.  Since you can never know for sure whether 
you are in a random or a non random stream, you can never know whether the 
parts of the stream you are responding to exist or not.  But you can sure make 
educated (i.e., probabilistic)  guesses, and that's what organisms' learning 
mechanisms do.  So, I don’t have a ==>faith<== in convergence.  I, like all 
learning creatures, have a lack of interest in non-convergence.  Non being 
interested in convergence in experience would be like going to a poker game in 
which some cards are marked and not being interested in the relation between 
the cards and the marks.  

Nick 

Nick Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
thompnicks...@gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
 


-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of glen?C
Sent: Saturday, December 7, 2019 9:40 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?

Excellent! So, your *scalar* is confidence in your estimates of any given 
distribution. I try to describe it in [†] below. But that's a tangent.

What I can't yet reconstruct, credibly, in my own words, is the faith in 
*convergence*. What if sequential calculations of an average do NOT converge?

Does this mean there are 2 stuffs, some that converge and some that don't? ... 
some distributions are stationary and some are not? Or would you assert that 
reality (and/or truth, given Peirce's distinction) is always and everywhere 
stationary and all (competent/accurate/precise) estimates will always converge?




[†] You can be a little confident (0.01%) or a lot confident (99.9%). I don't 
much care if you close the set and allow 0 and 1, confidence ∈ [0,1]. I think I 
have ways to close the set. But it doesn't matter. If we keep it open and agree 
that 100% confidence is illusory, then your scalar is confidence ∈ (0,1). Now 
that we have a scale of some kind, we can *construct* a typology of 
experiences. E.g. we can categorize things like deja vu or a bear in the woods 
as accumulations of confidence with different organizations. E.g. a composite 
experience with ((e1⨂e2⨂e3)⨂e4)⨂e5, where each of ei experiences has some 
confidence associated with it. Obviously, ⨂ is not multiplication or addition, 
but some other composer function. The whole composite experience would then 
have some aggregate confidence.

On December 6, 2019 8:22:29 PM PST, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
>Elegant, Glen, and you caused me truly to wonder:  Is the population 
>mean, mu,  of statistics fame, of a different substance than the 
>individual measurements, the bar x's that are stabs at it?  But I think 
>the answer is no.  It is just one among the others, a citizen king 
>amongst those bar-x's, the one on which the others will converge in a 
>normally distributed world.  I guess that makes me a frequentist, 
>right?
>
>And it's not strictly true that Mu is beyond my reach.  I may have 
>already reached it with the sample I now hold in my hand.  I just will 
>never be sure that I have reached it.
>
>Could you, Dave, and I perhaps all agree that all ==>certainty<== is 
>illusory?
>
>I don't think that's going to assuage you.  
>
>I am going to have to think more. 
>
>Ugh!  I hate when that happens. 


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