Lacking the wit tore- weave the argument that has unraveled into several threads and posts; an attempt to begin afresh from one of the points of origin - the Introduction to a book by Nick and Eric.
First a common ascription: " A description is understood as a simple statement of a fact, whereas an explanation is an interpretation. A description simply says what happened, whereas an explanation says why it happened." Followed by an argument that description and explanation are pretty close to the same thing: all descriptions explain; all explanations describe, and both are in some sense, interpretations. Then a discussion that leads right back to the same distinction: "Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further explanations. Conversely, explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be unverified under the present circumstances." There is, however, a (in my mind) subtle error here, in that the assertion just quoted uses the word "true" as if it was the same thing as "assumed for the purposes of argument" — the conclusion of the argument about differences — which it is not. Similarly, "unverified" is not the same as "contested absent further information;." I presume that this error? was intentional, as they need descriptions and, later, models to have this "truthiness" quality. The discussion of explanations as models with 'basic" and "surplus" implications (surplus being divided into "intended" and "unintended") parallels and, except for vocabulary, duplicates McCormac's discussion of the evolution of metaphor from epiphor to either "lexical term" or "dead metaphor." [Unlike Glen, I have no difficulty with metaphor as a kind of philosopher's stone for sense-making in science.] The discussion of levels of explanations is where the need for "truthy" descriptions comes back into play. Somewhere in our hierarchy of models is the need for a "true" purely descriptive model. Even within any given model there is a need to accept the "Basic Meaning" as being "true" and purely descriptive, so we can go about researching and verifying (or not) the intended "surplus meanings." Although it is evident how and why they need "truth" in order to proceed with their discussion and argument, I am unwilling to grant it. For me, both explanations and descriptions are "interpretations" with no qualitative differentiation. Their goal is to be "scientific" and so "truthy" models must remain and become fundamental to the evaluation of explanations. Evaluation is taken to be a two step process, with each step having three aspects. Specify the explanation: 1. find the foundational (root of the theory) "true" description. 2. expose the model - i.e. the metaphor. 3. expose the intended surplus implications such that research can begin to verify/disprove them. Evaluate the explanation 1. discard the explanation if there are no surplus implications exposed for investigation. 2. confirm the basic implications 3. prove some number of the intended surplus implications to be "true." Nice and tidy - except it does not / cannot work this way. Just like the "scientific method" in general, this construct can serve, at best, as an after the fact rationalization of a course of investigation. Absent a "true" description at its root, a theory becomes a Jenga tower of speculation. "Confirmation" of basic implications is too often a "political" exercise — so too any "proving" of surplus implications as "true" — witness the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. (Or, in the case of 'proving" things, the fact that string theory and many other quantum theories generate no testable intentional surplus implications.) It is far too easy to move inconvenient (i.e. unprovable) "intended surplus implications to the "unintended' category — witness Artificial Intelligence and the mind-is-computer-is-mind model/metaphor. The "unintended" surplus implications might, more often than not, be more important than the "intended" ones — witness epigenetics. Reliance on models, even structured models like those proposed, eliminates "context" because all models are, if not abstractions, simplifications; focusing only on what is deemed 'relevant." This last point makes me want to read the rest of Eric's and Nick's book, because I suspect I would find agreement with the last point of my argument. I surmise this from the all to brief mention that: "we will find that the problem Darwin’s theory does suffer from is that it is wrong. Yes…Wrong! Darwinian Theory is wrong in a much more limited sense – empirical evidence shows that a comprehensive explanation for adaptation will require the inclusion of other explanatory principles, to complement the explanatory power of natural selection. " Which brings me to a concluding question: can 'broken-wing' behavior convey an evolutionary advantage to the Killdeer absent a mechanism the maintains the gullibility of the Fox? It would seem to me that Foxes whose behavior ignored the Killdeer feint would be better fed (eggs and nestlings) than those that were fooled and therefore obtain an evolutionary advantage that would, eventually make the Killdeer seek an alternative strategy. An off-hand BTW — I much prefer postmodern methods of deconstruction as a methodology; not to find "Truth" which does not exist, IMO, but simply to keep the investigation lively and honest. davew ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
