Dave, 

 

Rushing off to FRIAM, but I don’t want to leave this hang.  See larding. 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

 <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> thompnicks...@gmail.com

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> 
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2020 3:05 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A longer response to Dave's question

 

Blending the "question" thread into this one,

 

I promise: no more kidney punches and no more crocodile tears.

 

>From the other thread:  "4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible 
>effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology 
>of the object? [NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people 
>who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” 
>has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns."

 

This is why I said that Peirce, et. al. cannot tell us that Trump is, let alone 
that Trump is a y. 

[NST===>]This makes no sense tome..  What I say, on my account, leaves you 
absolutely free to say that Trump is a y. The pragmatic maxim is a thesis about 
what we MEAN when we say that Trump is a y. Or it can tell us what we  MEAN 
when we say that Trump exists.   It just can’t tell us THAT Trump exists.  Of 
course, saying what we MEAN when we say Trump exists, is a long way along the 
road to saying what it is to saying whether he exists or not, but it does not 
get us there.  That’s the empirical step. 

 

Did I make a terrible mistake in my exposition: Unicorn means to me  (a 
horse-LIKE creature) with a unicorn-horn (sort of LIKE a narwhale tusk) in the 
middle of its forehead. It’s not any kind of horse nor does it have any kind of 
a whale horn.   That’s what the word means to me: to picture it, I have to make 
a chimera of two other creatures.  

 

Now to this thread —

 

Despite what Peirce may have said, (and a book on the history of chemistry I 
remember you were reading` a year or so back), Chemistry did not evolve from 
Alchemy. I am being pedantic here, because when I used alchemy in my narrative, 
I meant the real thing not the pseudo-alchemists playing with mercury and 
promising gold. Psychology (Jung and to a lesser degree Freud) derives more 
from Alchemy than chemistry. Newton was an alchemist but don't think it 
influenced his physics, and don't know how it influenced other aspects of his 
scientific endeavors.

 

But the point I was trying to make: it is impossible to use Peirce's 'method' 
to advance my quest because that method precludes\dismisses the subject matter 
of interest.

 

I need to be clearer about my subject matter as well. It is not drug 
experience, or even mystical experience, although both are significant aspects.

 

Consider:  Descartes' analytic geometry was conceived while sleeping in an oven 
and then rigorously explained after the fact; 2) Kekule "discovered' the 
structure of the benzene ring via a "vision" of Ouroboros — and a whole lot of 
organic chemistry with "visions" of dancing atoms forming chains; Jung's 
psychology and therapeutic method was significantly grounded "visions" and 
"dreams;" etc.

 

What kind of vocabulary can we apply to the substance/essence of 
altered-states-of-consciousness experiences? Metaphor certainly, but "concept," 
"idea," or even "knowledge?" is it possible to develop a philosophy, an 
epistemology, that would be inclusive of "experience" beyond the mundane sort 
addressed by science, or by Peirce's method?

 

Peirce, like all scientists, seems content to tackle only the easiest cases, 
and therefore is not likely to be a helpful guide.

 

 

[ I deleted an attempt to apply "close reading" to a body of sentences and the 
egregious interpretations of those sentences — attempting an analog of the 
scientific evaluation of blood and wine — to see if it might be possible to 
have a reasoned/rational discussion of current politics. Decided it was 
pointless to try. ]

 

davew

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 9:18 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com 
<mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>  wrote:

Dave,

 

Now that Glen points it out, I am beginning to feel a bit trapped, here.

 

Peirce is looking at exactly the transition from alchemy to chemistry as an 
example of how, if one keep spinning out the practicial consequences of ones 
attributions, eventually minds will be changed and convergence will be 
achieved.   I  have no doubt that when you take drugs you have experiences, any 
more than I doubt that when you smash the alarm clock, it makes a sound.  I am 
just not at all sure what you can take from such experiences, other than that, 
if you take the drug, they may happen again.  What future do they predict 
outside the realm of drug-taking?

 

Why did you delete what you wrote?

 

N

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

 <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> thompnicks...@gmail.com

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> 
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

 

 

From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> > On 
Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 12:45 PM

To: friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> 

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A longer response to Dave's question

 

 

Happy to make your day. What would you think about where it not for I?

 

Transubstantiation is a happy example for what i am asking and why I said I 
feel I must leave Peirce behind.

 

Take your first paragraph as a given except that I am not Nick, but an 
alchemist, a master of a tradition with all kinds of "knowledge" of 
transformation.

 

We hie to the lab where "A" science begins. In the preliminaries I posit five 
effects and you posit five effects.

 

However, the scientist, almost certainly, did not write down my five. When 
pushed to provide alternatives I would not posit such as you did, but re-assert 
what I believe to be perfectly valid effects of my conception.

 

Muttering to himself, the scientist does the tests he can do and the results 
are null, null, null, null, null and yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

 

The question, is it really blood or wine becomes, for all intents and purposes, 
unanswerable — at least within the framework of what Peirce is willing to admit 
as Science.

 

If I were to convene a panel of alchemists and give them both my list and your 
list and they performed appropriate tests — the results would be: yes, yes, 
yes, yes, yes and yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

 

This is unacceptable to Peirce's Scientist, but not at all remarkable to the 
alchemist.

 

I already accept an ontology that allows the substance in the chalice to be 
BloodWine/WineBlood, I am curious about the possibility of developing a 
complementary epistemology.

 

I do not believe that Peirce can assist in this quest. I do acknowledge, as 
Glen points out, that Peirce has been helpful in identifying questions to be 
asked that provide a useful foundation from which the quest can begin, and that 
is appreciated.

 

And it is not just Peirce, the whole of classical epistemology is not leading 
to edification.

 

*******

 

Now as to Trump. Yes, the hardest case is the most useful. Your oft stated goal 
for "conversations" that lead to convergence, ala Peirce, and hence some kind 
of truth of the matter is sorely tested by this particular example.

 

[there was more here but I deleted it]

 

davew

 

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 6:01 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com 
<mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>  wrote:

Geez, Dave,

 

There's an awful lot here.  Do you mean to take the hardest case?  A person?  
And particularly a person who has been so much in all our faces that it's hard 
for most of us to think of him rationally, if at all? 

 

Let's take a simpler example.  An example that Peirce takes is 
transubstantiation, the idea that in ritual of the mass the communion wine 
becomes the blood of Christ.  Once consecrated, is the communion "beverage" 
wine or blood?  Let's say we disagree on that point.  We both see that it's a 
red liquid in a chalice, on which basis we jump to different conclusions.  From 
the properties or redness and liquidness that the substance in the chalice 
shares with both blood and wine, you abduce that it is wine, I abduce that it 
is blood.  So far, we stand equal. But now the chalice is brought to our lips.  
For me, (forgive me, Catholics, for I know not what I say) I feel momentarily 
cleansed of my sins, uplifted.  Since part of my conception of Christ's blood 
is that if I drank some of it I would feel cleansed and uplifted, I conclude 
that it is indeed, Christs' blood.  You, on the other hand, experience the 
flat, sour taste of inexpensive wine, feel no uplift whatsoever, and conclude 
that the chalice contains wine.  We are still on equal footing.

 

But now the science begins.  We whisk away the stuff in the chalice to the 
laboratory.  As a preliminary, each of us is asked to list in their entirety 
all the effects of our conception.  We are being asked to deduce from the 
categories to which we have abduced, the consequences of our abductions  They 
are numerous, but to simply the discussion, lets say each of us lists five.  I 
say, if it is Christ's blood, then I should feel transformed when drinking it, 
and then I pause.  The scientists also pause, pencils in hand, and I have to go 
on.  Well, in addition to its red-liquidity,  I say, it should be slightly 
salty-sweet to taste, be thick on the tongue, curdle when heated, sustain life 
of somebody in need of a transfusion, etc.  So we do the tests, and the  
results are yes, no, no, no, no.  The scientists now turn to you and you say, 
it should, as well as red and liquid, be sour, thin on the tongue, intoxicating 
in large amounts, produce a dark residue when heated, etc..  So, the tests come 
out yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.

 

So, is it really blood or really wine?  Well, that of course depends on one’s 
priorities.  If the sole criterion for a red fluid being Christ’s blood is that 
it produces in one person, Nick Thompson, a sense of cleansing, then the fact 
that it doesn’t pass any of the other tests for blood will make no difference.  
I can assert that that Christ’s blood is a very special sort of blood that 
cleanses the spirit of Nick Thompson, but does none of the other things that 
blood does.  Indeed, I might assert that anything the priest handed me in the 
chalice, once duly consecrated, would be Christ’s blood.   The idea that it 
“works for me” makes it “Christ’s blood for me and that’s all that matters.  
And if I could bring a regiment of Spanish soldiers with spears to friam, and 
have them insist that you drink from the chalice and feel cleansed, many of you 
might begin to agree with me. 

 

This is the view of pragmatism that James has been accused of, but it is 
definitely NOT the view that Peirce held.  If the position is, “whatever the 
officiant says is christs blood is christ’s blood by definition”, then, Piece 
would say the position is either

Meaningless or false.  It might be meaningless, because there is no possible 
world in which it could be false.  Or it might be false, because our best guess 
as scientists is  that in the very long run, in the asymptote of scientific 
inquiry, our best scientific guess is that the contents of the chalice will be 
agreed upon to be wine.

 

Again, let me apologize for my ignorant rendition of Catholic ritual.  It IS 
the example that Peirce takes, but I now see that that is probably a poor 
excuse.  Peirce was, after all, a protestant, and one with many prejudices, so 
it would not surprise me if he was anti-catholic and himself chose the example 
in a mean-spirited way.  So, be a little careful in how you respond. 

 

Is Trump a proto-dictator?  What are the consequences in experience of 
believing that he is?  What does that belief cause us to expect in him.  Tim 
Snyder, in his little book ON TYRANNY, does a very good job of laying out the 
parallels between what is going on in our politics right now and what goes on 
in the early stages of the establishment o a dictatorship.  Trump is fulfilling 
many of Snyder’s expectations.  Whether Trump succeeds in establishing a 
dictatorship or not, I think the long run of history will conclude that he is 
making a stab at it. 

 

Nick

 

 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

 

 

Clark University

thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> 

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> > On 
Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> 

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying 
to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that 
it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will 
illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object.

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect 
our object to have?

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is 
defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is 
exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti 
perspectives/convictions, maybe not.

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we 
might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming 
a dictator is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that 
effectuating.]

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our 
"conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a 
conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the 
object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to 
Pierce and prompted the above questions.

 

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism 
over "naturalized epistemology?"

 

davew

 

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