Eric, Jon Did you guys know each other at SFI?
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 14, 2020, 5:31 PM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu> wrote: > Hi Roger, Dave, Jon, > > Jon’s answers are at a level of technical sophistication and quality I > don’t have to offer. They already subsume and surpass anything I would say > below., to the extent that I think I appreciate roughly what they refer > to. I also admit not having been able to justify the time to watch > internet videos, much as I would like to, so I haven’t watched Bethe and > Feynman lectures (though have read Feynman on this topic at some length > over the decades). > > But there is a thing it is hard to let go, and which perhaps is not > identical to things already said on the thread. Repeatedly the following > fragment appears as an anchor point: > > [From Bethe below -- I lost the indent symbols:] > 2) "He then goes on to say that the thing which _is_ completely > uncertain is the orbit of the electron in an atom." > > What I wanted to add was: > > Why would anyone expect that an electron in an atom has “an orbit”. The > sentence structure entails that assumption, but why would one make it? An > orbit is an emergent property of “objects” that arise in classical limits, > like the wetness of water is an emergent property of a condensed phase of > matter. Sure, one can ask “how wet is a single H2O molecule”, and then > defend the sentence on the ground that it doesn’t violate rules of syntax. > But would we do that now? If not, why would we grant defensibility to > sentences that contain word sequences like “the orbit of the electron in an > atom”? > > I wish I could put my finger on how and why what I think is the same thing > can be so differently experienced by people. I believe the following are > sort of to the same point: > > From Roger: > > The physicists first discovered that their existing categories of > explanations were mutating into each other, and then watched the objects of > their study disappear into wave functions. [btw, I find this a beautiful > articulation]. Wave functions could be manipulated to predict what nature > would do, but they couldn't be disassembled to show what nature is doing. > > From Dave: > > The tension between what the math can describe and what the math 'means' > is not new. > > What is new; the math has become so esoteric, so incestuous, that it > "means" nothing. It is not even a description of 'the world' merely a > description of itself. > > > I wonder if the way to understand these perceptions links back to Nick’s > metaphor monism/mania/madness (in the Italian sense of “sono pazzo per”, > said of a crush): > > It could be that people never really think “about” “anything”. What they > refer to as “thinking” is just the management of metaphors that point to > metaphors which are metaphors of metaphors. (Nick, embrace your inner > category theorist.) If that is right, then the only thing quantum > mechanics can ever be is a metaphor for classical mechanics with some new > management rules that use other metaphors to create tension and discomfort, > and the classical mechanics is a set of metaphors for something else > (greater fleas having lesser fleas, and so ad infinitum). If that is true > of everybody, then it is true of me, too, and the fact that it seems > incomplete as a description of my experience is just part of a larger > self-delusion. But it feels too linguistic to me, and not > reflective enough of the possible diversity of cognitive or experiential > states. > > The Bethe fragment above feels familiar to me as an antique language that > characterized the ones two generations before me, who reached cognitive > adulthood in a world before QM was established, and who in fact had to > achieve that establishment climbing up on a Wittgenstein’s ladder of > classical mechanics and frequentist probability theory, which they could > not then bring themselves to throw away, any more than they could lose the > accents of their birth languages even as they became good speakers of > languages where they emigrated. As I think Dave said in some earlier > thread (though not in quite these words), the metaphors are Wittgenstein > ladders, but that is not the same thing as the places one climbs to on > them. > > > I _think_ it is different to say that the math is a structured setting > within which the mind is offered a way to have new experiences. Like > working as a musician is a setting within which the mind is offered a way > to have new experiences of music. Or being a tennis player, or being a > chess competitor, or a crime boss, or emperor of the galaxy. An electron > is not a metaphor for a planet. An electron is an electron. But for the > word to take on a meaning, and hence the sentence it appears in, we will > have to experience some new thoughts. > > I don’t know what it would mean to say that mathematics is “a description > of itself”, but I think I am familiar with various practices of doing > things with (fairly low-level, applied) mathematics, and having it affect > the inventory and process of my mental imagery. > > Dunno. > > Eric > > > > > > > On Jul 15, 2020, at 3:14 AM, Roger Critchlow <r...@elf.org> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 3:26 PM Jon Zingale <jonzing...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Roger, >> >> I wish to clarify what I believe our positions to be. Your position is >> that Richard Feynman claims that no one understands quantum mechanics >> and that you believe him. I am claiming that misunderstanding photons >> has its origins in demanding that photons be greek waves or particles >> and that this perspective is reminiscent of the classical problems of >> compass and straight-edge geometry. >> >> Yes, I believe Richard Feynman as I understand him, and I think he makes > his point quite clearly in the lecture. And I believe Hans Bethe in his > 1999 lectures identified the exact same part of quantum mechanics which is > not and can not be "understood" in the usual sense of physicists explaining > things. > > I haven't seen any indication that you understand what I am saying, what > Feynman was saying, or what Bethe was saying. > > I don't think your analogy to post-Euclidean geometry has any bearing. > The geometers simply changed the postulates, turned the logic crank, and > kept on reasoning about geometries in the same way. New geometries for a > new age, but categorically geometries just like the old one. The > physicists first discovered that their existing categories of explanations > were mutating into each other, and then watched the objects of their study > disappear into wave functions. Wave functions could be manipulated to > predict what nature would do, but they couldn't be disassembled to show > what nature is doing. > > you write: >> "...and that led to philosophers proclaiming that everything is >> uncertain. But there are no bad faith actors there, it's just typical >> science journalism, trolling for the juiciest clickbait." >> >> Our discussion arose in the context of 'quantum woo', advocates and >> discontents. From my perspective, it is an instance of bad faith >> when 'philosophers' claim that *the uncertainty of everything* is >> justified by Heisenberg. Additionally, it is an instance of bad faith >> when 'journalists' unfaithfully invoke Heisenberg so as to produce >> clickbait. I gather from your comment that with more discussion you >> perhaps may agree, to some extent? >> >> It would be bad faith if the journalist or philosopher understood quantum > mechanics and deliberately misrepresented it. Misunderstandings are much > more common than villains. Bethe did not accuse anyone of bad faith. > > >> In one sense, I interpret Bethe as speaking about the lack of >> uncertainty associated with macroscopic events as a rebuttal to the >> flights of fancy, the 'quantum woo' espoused by first-year physics >> students. However, further analysis of my interpretation perhaps cannot >> be certain. In another sense, and intended with less cheek, I interpret >> Bethe as highlighting the fact that the point metaphor diverges for the >> very small. Heisenberg uncertainty is a claim about how well we can >> approximate an object of inquiry with a particle, ie. treat the object >> as a dynamical Euclidean point. We can treat a pea or the moon >> accurately in this way, but we cannot treat an electron accurately in >> this way. >> >> you write: >> 1) "I especially liked the derivation of the uncertainty principle >> through the limitations on representing a free particle with a Fourier >> series" >> >> 2) "He then goes on to say that the thing which _is_ completely >> uncertain is the orbit of the electron in an atom." >> >> Bethe speaks to your first point by saying that "this is the best we can >> do with bell-shaped curves". In doing so, he is referring to a toolset >> and it is only within the scope of a given toolset that the meaning of >> uncertainty is defined. Crudely, I interpret the work done by the mixed >> efforts of topos theorists and theoretical physicists to be an effort to >> flesh out better matching objects, objects which are more like electrons >> than Euclid's points are to being like electrons[⏁]. Speaking to your >> second point, my hope is that as such a program continues, we will one >> day have a metaphor for quantum things that we find as satisfactory as >> points are for macroscopic things[⏄]. >> >> > If we imagine a theory which transcends quantum mechanics as it is > currently formulated, then we can imagine some features of quantum > mechanics might turn out to be artefacts of the methods we used? Sure, I > can't and won't argue with that proposition. > > As long as we're talking about quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger > equation, wave functions, basis sets for describing harmonic motion, then > Bethe is saying that the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is a consequence > of fourier analysis, which is a neat argument that I should have learned > decades ago. > > We can talk about what Bethe says, or I can talk about what Bethe says and > you can talk about what you imagine the future will say about what Bethe > says, it's up to you. > > I suggest that my arrogance in this matter is not the claim that someone >> understands quantum mechanics in some universally acceptable way. My >> arrogant assertion is that forcing a known-to-be incongruous model is >> the wellspring of a perceived paradox and an unjustly disproportionate >> production of 'quantum woo'. > > > "forcing a known-to-be incongruous model" is exactly what Schrödinger did, > if you remember Bethe's story about the ski holiday where all Sommerfeld's > students were laughing at de Broglie's paper, and the result was quantum > mechanics. I guess the invention of quantum mechanics must be a necessary > condition for "quantum woo". > > -- rec -- > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,6RxTtddaxKMkYuYjA-L5jV0s-cRnY6j7socJs1S1ErMh1YE-0QFO-H1pmMCYXFRPG4hhtMkRwsjiK74nUHjAqoJu4SBkW9O4PWKTvWSjJFcweKxGhFNg&typo=1 > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,X30l1eToRzCrllYt3MzL6jOaT-le1HfVuLPDYth-HvmMpxIdgRAwqoaBp9xGQtECUkehYx7Y24bYeCYl5yfAx7PVjCEAhGuEEqKlQvnaWec,&typo=1 > > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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