I believe that one can believe a, b, and c independently even if a and b entail (or cause) c.
Also, in the definition of causation I reported earlier I carefully said "a cause" rather than "the cause". I taught resolution theorem proving in the AI course that I taught. That's a lot of logic. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Jul 21, 2020, 9:37 AM <thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > OK, so what if I believe x, and I believe y and I believe that beliefs x+y > entail z? Then I believe z, right? But do we want to say that I believe z > BECAUSE I believed x and y? Entailment never "entails" belief unless I > believe in the laws of logic, right? For some reason I want to reserve > "cause" for the situation which believing y and believing that x+y entails > z, I came to believe z because I came to believe x. > > I am plainly out of my depth, here. I mean, even more than usual. We > need > a logician, or 4 years at St. Johns, or both. I think that a logician > consultant would say -- wearily -- that Nick wants to limit the word cause > to "efficient" causes, that experimental psychologists tend to do that, > etc. > So then the question becomes, is the causality asserted when I say that the > snifter broke because I left it on the table when I went to bed AND the cat > knocked it off the table while eating the dip from last night's party the > same causality as I might assert if I said that the snifter broke BECAUSE > it > was brittle. And is the causality that we assert when we assert sidewise > causality -- a sequence of events -- in any way related to the causality > that we assert when we assert upward or downward causality. > > Glen has offered, and EricS has endorsed, a work-around for all this mess > which I have yet to understand. Really, I shouldn't speak to this issue > any > more before I have another go at their messages, which I attach. > > Nick > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > thompnicks...@gmail.com > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale > Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 6:07 AM > To: friam@redfish.com > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM > > What about something being believably prior rather than just temporally > prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause? > > > > -- > Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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