"As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways, as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible, or impossible."
I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context?
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