Excellent, in my opinion. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, Dec 14, 2021, 5:49 AM David Eric Smith <desm...@santafe.edu> wrote: > Yeah. > > Apart from questions about what mechanisms exist and how they work, which > I understand and are the normal business of science, I have never > understood what all the squabbling is about. The only outlines I can see > that make a conversation with any coherence are fairly normal ones. To wit: > > > If your model of the world entails the following premises: > > 0. There is enough regularity to anything that happens that there is a > reason to give names to patterns (otherwise don’t talk) > > 1. Some of the patterns you see include “things’ falling apart” > > 2. The outcome-condition of this falling apart, to the extent that its > patterns are stable for long enough times to result in any steady states, > is what we call “equilibrium” > > > And if you observe that: > > 3. There are steady state patterns that differ from the equilibrium that > would be produced by the falling-apart that you have recognized > > 4. And assuming we haven’t just mis-identified the pattern of falling > apart, which would be a simple error of characterization > > > Then the only class of explanations you have entail a description of > dynamics that differs from the part accounting for your equilibrium in the > features that > > 5. There must be processes of (possibly structured) amplification at work > in addition to the factors leading to your equilibrium account > > 6. There may be further processes of structured removal somehow linked to > the amplification in ways that aren’t just the falling-apart you already > identified. Either way, there must be additional structure in some > combination between the amplification and the removal attached to it. > > > People like Michael Lachmann would argue that the above sequence is > tantamount to evolution is as a causal account. It is “entailed” by the > premises, but that to me is not the same as saying it is “tautological”, > because what is entailed is that there are features of the dynamics that > change states through time that aren’t contained in the descriptions of > states at times. Nothing much different from what we have had in physics > and engineering forever. > > > If you take the above organization of the argument as being > non-problematic, then you have two things to do next, which are distinct > from each other: > > 7. You need to get a clear set of characteristics as those by which you > will _describe_ the structured amplification and pruning. This is the > program that, within population genetics as Fisher and then Price and Steve > Frank set it up, involves defining what fitness is as a summary statistic, > and deciding whether what you mean by “selection” is formalized only in > terms of fitness or requires more. You already know my argument that the > population genetic program is limited but that it isn’t hard to expand > beyond it while retaining the same logic. > > 8. You need a program of inference from the statistics you have taken to > _chaaracterize, empirically_ the amplification and pruning, which are > aspects of dynamics, to models of the aspects of things or organizations > that predict or explain those dynamical regularities. Or, in standard > terms, you need a step of assigning causal models from states to the > processes that change states. > > > All the chatter about “tautology” has never been comprehensible to me, > because it seems to turn on a purposefully confused use of language, in > which you conflate the ability to say what you are trying to explain, with > the provision of a causal model that you call the explanation. Then, > having chosen to use the same word for two completely different meanings, > wring hands and angst out that you have a profound philosophical > difficulty. For a long time I thought that smart people were somehow being > subtle or profound in ways that I was just too dull to follow. But I look > at the rest of what they say, and it just looks like inability to think and > speak in coherent categories, and I give up on them. > > Nick’s point that industrial melanism might have been chemically induced > is a great factoid to have. My thanks for that; my life is now richer with > things knowable about the world. Doesn’t change any logic of the argument > at all, in ways we have had the ability to think clearly about for at least > a century (surely since D’Arcy Thompson). It could be that there is no > implicit model of environmental variability in the developmental > capabilities of Haldane’s peppered moths, and that selection by > differential predation on sooty English walls and birch trees prunes the > population for congenitally dark moths. Or it could be that sooty and > white periods have a long history (gonna find who’s sooty and white), and > that some phenotypic plasticity gets selected for over much longer times, > which then gets canalized a la Waddington by being associated through > selection with chemical signals during reproduction. The availability of > that plasticity would then produce dark moths in excess of (or instead of) > the amount due to selective predation. The logic of the 8-step sequence > above is no different in the two cases; only the degree of developmental > machinery at work, the timescales involved, the difficulty of the > association problems among components of development, differ in one case > from another. So it’s a complex system with several mechanisms, the > distinction among which is underdetermined by a short-term change > variable. No philosophical crisis in that; just complicated work to > control and sort it out. (And of course, there is a third possibility: > that there is no selection by predation in real-time, and there never had > been in history; it is a pure coincidence that chemicals from forest fires > change the pigmentation of moths. To sort that out, one needs a null model > for when a “coincidence” is improbably fortuitous. Such null models can be > the hardest of all to defend quantitatively against nitpickers, but within > a domain of “good enough” that we use for almost-everything else, we can > probably estimate one for this case.) > > > Of course, one can load other requirements on top of the 8 steps above to > the term “Darwinism", and that is why I was asking Dave which ones he had > in mind. > > 9. You could say we are only going to call it “selection” when the stuff > involved is organized by an architecture of individuals and populations, > the criteria for which must then be declared for us to know what we purport > to talk about. Otherwise we will just refer to it as “dynamics”. So > “selection” becomes a reserved term for things that are more distinctively > like what is so glaring in biology. > > 10. You could say “Darwinism” means “not Lamarckism”, meaning that you > are supposing a particular form of separation between germ-type heredity > and phenotypic development, and you want to quarrel about which cases > deserved to be discussed. > > 11. You could mean the word “Darwinism” as a sociological and pejorative > term, to refer to facile explanations that reflect prejudice or pre-formed > opinions more than careful observation and reasoning. > > > All of those uses are quite common. > > But I think Glen has nicely put this to bed by removing the specter of > early Popper, with a more moderated late Popper, though still of only > modest sophistication in his stance compared to what is available today > from a good use of knowledge in developmental biology and many other > sub-domains bearing on evolutionary dynamics. > > > Anyway… > > Eric > > > > > On Dec 13, 2021, at 2:04 PM, uǝlƃ ☤>$ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Right. Sorry if I painted you with that brush. I thought about adding an > addendum of my own opinion, but thought it important to clarify Popper > without muddying it with my own thoughts. > > > > Now, I feel free to stir up the silt. *Some* concept (not nec. Popper's) > of a metaphysical program should work well for those other efforts. As > we've discussed, here, much of it dangles off of a scaffold built on the > concept of consistency (writ large). A great deal of (pure?) mathematics is > interesting in it's flabergasting feeling of how well it all hangs > together. It's that same "seeking"/apophenic drive that we find in QAnon > "researchers" and quantum woo fans. "It just all makes so much sense!" > Similarly with people who are convicted of their own metaphysics. To my > mind, if it makes that much sense, then it must be *false*, not true. The > world is always and everywhere *messy*. But I'm clearly in the minority in > that aesthetic. > > > > As I tried to argue before, though, consistency is only half the > justification for a metaphysical program. The other half is completeness > ... which isn't given as high a priority amongst our rationality-obsessed > brethren. Going back to the idea I broached to EricS recently about > adjointness (in it's "weakly equivalent" sense), we can imagine a world > where relations (or operations) are lossy, including the consequence/cause > relation. And we can imagine an inference system (language?, algebra?, > etc.) where relations are *not* lossy. Then regardless of how well that > inference system hangs together (is consistent), there will be > thing-a-ma-jigs in the world that it doesn't cover ... those interdigital > parts that are ignored/abstracted by the inference system. > > > > Natural selection *attempts* to meet both consistency and completeness > with vast, persnickety, story-telling that comes off a bit like special > pleading at times. But it does seem like a good program because it treats > both. If the story-telling in Jung et al tried seriously to address both > consistency and completeness, then it might work for them, too. > > > > On 12/13/21 10:25 AM, Prof David West wrote: > >> Thank you glen. This clarifies a lot and addresses Steve's question as > well. > >> > >> i included creationists with a great deal of trepidation, because i > assumed it would prompt immediate rejection of the entire question. > >> > >> I do think there is some validity in considering the framework / > testable scientific theory question with regard things like Whitehead's > process philosophy, Jung's alchemy, some portion of the science-faith > reconciliation efforts, and, of course, mysticism and altered states of > consciousness. > >> > >> davew > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Dec 13, 2021, at 9:44 AM, uǝlƃ ☤>$ wrote: > >>> The creationists have been peddling this rhetoric for a very long > time. > >>> It's important to read Popper's recant and clarification. From > Popper's > >>> 1978 paper "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind": > >>> > >>> "However, Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of > >>> evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test. > There > >>> are some tests, even some experimental tests; and in some cases, such > >>> as the famous phenomenon known as "industrial melanism", we can > observe > >>> natural selec- tion happening under our very eyes, as it were. > >>> Nevertheless, really severe tests of the theory of natural selection > >>> are hard to come by, much more so than tests of otherwise comparable > >>> theories in physics or chemistry. The fact that the theory of natural > >>> selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwinists > and > >>> even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. A > >>> tautology like "All tables are tables" is not, of course, test- able; > >>> nor has it any explanatory power. It is therefore most surprising to > >>> hear that some of the greatest contemporary Darwinists themselves > >>> formulate the theory in such a way that it amounts to the tautology > >>> that those organisms that leave most offspring leave most offspring. > >>> And C. H. Waddington even says somewhere (and he defends this view in > >>> other places) that "Natural selection . . . turns out ... to be a > >>> tautology". 6 However, he attributes at the same place to the theory > an > >>> "enormous power ... of explanation". Since the explanatory power of a > >>> tautology is obviously zero, something must be wrong here. > >>> > >>> Yet similar passages can be found in the works of such great > Darwinists > >>> as Ronald Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and George Gaylord Simpson; and > >>> others. > >>> > >>> I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits. Influ- > >>> enced by what these authorities say, I have in the past described the > >>> theory as "almost tautological", 7 and I have tried to explain how the > >>> theory of natural selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) > and > >>> yet of great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of > >>> natural selection is a most suc- cessful metaphysical research > >>> programme. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us > >>> what we would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. > >>> > >>> I still believe that natural selection works in this way as a research > >>> pro- gramme. Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the > testability > >>> and the logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am > >>> glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. My recantation may, > >>> I hope, contribute a little to the understanding of the status of > >>> natural selection. What is important is to realize the explanatory > task > >>> of natural selection; and especially to realize what can be explained > >>> without the theory of natural selection." > >>> > >>> > >>> On 12/13/21 8:32 AM, David Eric Smith wrote: > >>>> Dave, to clarify: > >>>> > >>>> What does Popper (or what do you) take to be the referent for the tag > “Darwinism”. The term has gone through so many hands with so many > purposes, that I am hesitant to engage with only the term, without a fuller > sense of what it stands for in the worldview of my interlocutor. > >>>> > >>>> Thanks, > >>>> > >>>> Eric > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2021, at 10:33 AM, Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm > <mailto:profw...@fastmail.fm>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> “/Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical > research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories./” > >>>>> Karl Popper. > >>>>> > >>>>> I like this distinction but immediately wonder if it might provide > some analytical / research means that could be applied to other > "metaphysical research programs" — creationism for example, or the plethora > of efforts, by scientists, to reconcile their faith with their science. Or, > Newton's [and Jung's] (in)famous commitment to Egyptian Alchemy. > >>>>> > >>>>> Would it be possible to use the Tao de Ching or the Diamond Sutra or > Whitehead's Process Philosophy (not a random selection, I group the three > intentionally) as a metaphysical research program and derive some > interesting and useful science? > >>>>> > >>>>> davew > > > > > > -- > > "Better to be slapped with the truth than kissed with a lie." > > ☤>$ uǝlƃ > > > > > > .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - > . > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2f%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,d379KeHAKPPBeuOYrSynWYqjvV8XOD4k8TN_ZKBiv4SfzPlcealm72lIgmjJ5KSE8ItfJmGkTjQEb2VWrye1BhwokGBiz9SWZ9F4gN0qzQ,,&typo=1 > > un/subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,DTfiC0zbEmBBc599K-AcZ46PhWLlTyH5BQgryxRPw2ibLYvopfo0ygN6GM3zX3OAVOtqf34hsmOVbvPbIguTtpI-axf4Lbnek4MQKu6GFCQG1gX5VUs,&typo=1 > > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,x65TYnqaJ1sKrxVo_FHSbTkGmoAN0Rr9gjsfY-5moCV2joaPe_wPvp3Swe0yQTWw3_wSyGxgBfRAmAhvZ731PivgZI5gaQLtxeCBRohBTp3GsJ64&typo=1 > > archives: > > 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,6iwZVL26UeO5uNDjkflY5au2pHdr6CEDNvktMMPXVZoxTnOoVp-stpVpbf5DEvQ-S1Lu_lGcZW46FqXCVf_PLo5zgAAQfQ0MCl09GqiA7Nk,&typo=1 > > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > > > .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: > 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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