Our family rule was, "Don't name anything you aren't ready to take to the vet."
On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 10:47 AM Steve Smith <sasm...@swcp.com> wrote: > This may be something of a "punt" but I tripped over an essay on BCS's > OOO a few weeks ago and I've been wanting to introduce it into the > conversation. I wonder if the gap in the metaphysical fundament that we > (don't) share might be bridged by some of BCS's ideas about "what means > object anyway?" > > > https://www.academia.edu/73428704/Extruding_intentionality_from_the_metaphysical_flux > > I think where I might get most bamboozled by talk of "there is something > that it is *like* to *be* trampled dirt has to do with the boundaries of > identity and object and the subject-object relation of affordances. A > subject perceives/experiences/exercises/relates-to the affordance of an > object? A pile of dirt has identity as a pile only insomuch as there > is a subject (also an object in it's own right) which percieves/acts-on > the pile of dirt *as if* it had a boundary and an identity and with some > kind of affordance (e.g. trampleable?). I don't think there is > anything intrinsic in being a distribution of dirt-particles which has > anything to do with trampling or trampleable... but then the nature of > a foot does not make for trample-ability alone either? To trample > requires a tramplee? A thing to be trampled? A state change in the > tramplee from untrampled to trampled? > > Or to repeat myself, perhaps I am barking up the wrong > lexicon/ontology/cosmology here? We are possibly (always and forever?) > on the opposite sides of a looking glass? > > woof! > > - Steve > > On 2/17/23 9:11 AM, glen wrote: > > Interesting. I never claimed I can "feel what it is like to be > > trampled dirt". I merely asserted there is something that it is like > > to be trampled dirt. I have no sympathy or empathy for dirt > > whatsoever, trampled or otherwise. I can't be like trampled dirt or > > feel what it is like to be trampled dirt. (Soil, now, maybe that's a > > different, more interesting idea. But we won't talk about soil or > > mycelia because it's easier to rely on incredulity.) But the absence > > of [sy|e]mpathy for some thing does *not* imply the absence of some > > arbitrary property like "what it is like" to be that thing. I also > > wouldn't claim that dirt "feels" anything. Why is "feeling" correlated > > with "being" or qualia? > > > > More importantly, your examples of "mental stuff" simply don't carry > > any water for me. "Occurring to me" is entirely a body thing to me. It > > literally stops and redirects my behavior, my body. I don't see how > > its any different from any other subtle thing like smelling coffee or > > glimpsing movement in peripheral vision. > > > > Empathy-seeking as an example of "mental stuff"? Hm. For me, I > > empathize with people I interact with. I don't think I can empathize > > with some[one|thing] I haven't interacted with. Now, *imagining*, that > > may be a useful foil. But, again, I can't imagine anything without > > some imagining tools. Tool-less imagining doesn't exist for me. (And > > I'm arrogant in thinking it doesn't exist for anyone else, either. > > Those who *think* they can imagine without tools have been tricked, > > brainwashed into believing in "pure mental stuff".) > > > > I've had trouble finding the research lately. But there's evidence > > that when we imagine spinning, say, a ball around its axis, there's a > > lot of overlap with the neural structures that fire in our brain as > > when we're actually spinning a ball with our hand. That's body stuff. > > Even if my "imagining" seems entirely within the bounds of my skull, > > it's still body stuff. It's still tool-mediated, even if the mediation > > occurs longitudinally, through time/training. I just have no idea what > > you guys mean by "mental stuff". > > > > > > On 2/17/23 07:43, Steve Smith wrote: > >> As absurd as this whole conversation feels in some ways, I find it > >> fascinating (and possibly useful). At the very least it seems to be > >> an extreme example of empathy-seeking. > >> > >> This is "me" doing "mental stuff". I don't know how to separate > >> "mental stuff" from "body stuff" except perhaps /en extrema/, /per > >> exemplia/. Imaginating on what it is like to be trampled-dirt would > >> fit into my category of "doing mental stuff", whatever that actually > >> means (beyond being able to label extreme examples of it?) > >> > >> Glen sez "there is something it is like to be trampled dirt" as if > >> that actually means something and that any/all of us perhaps can > >> experience that. Try as I might I can't quite "feel what it is like > >> to be trampled dirt".... however I do find that I can find within the > >> things I'm more inclined to call "body stuff" that my "mental stuff" > >> is willing to label (very loosely) as "being like trampled dirt". > >> BUT I don't know that in that process I ever imagine I actually "feel > >> like trampled dirt". > >> > >> I could ramble forever (uncountable, not infiinite) on examples of > >> what it is for *me* to "be like trampled dirt" ( a great deal of what > >> feeds good poetry actually) and some here *might8 recognize some/many > >> of my examples and end up "feeling like trampled dirt" more than they > >> did before they read it. This would be what *I* call communication > >> (which Glen insists does not actually exist?). I'm possibly > >> talking/thinking (mental stuff) into "feeling like trampled dirt" > >> (body stuff) here. I don't know that I can claim (imagine) that > >> dirt is in any way communicating "what it is like to be trampled > >> dirt" to me except perhaps simply by *being trampled dirt*. > >> Observing dirt as it is trampled, or as it's configuration suggests > >> "having been trampled" seems to be part of *my* strategy in trying to > >> imagine "being trampled dirt" > >> > >> And it occurs to me (mental stuff, this 'occuring to") that the very > >> description *as* "trampled" dirt is a projection of a living creature > >> onto something with no obvious agency nor sensation? To the extent > >> that dirt is something that *most* creatures walk/run/stomp-about > >> upon (at least dirt on the surface of a gravitational body), it is > >> *all trampled*? Of course, dirt on the surface of the moon (is it > >> actually *dirt* if it's origins are not earthly? Moon-dust, > >> Moon-rock, Moon-gravel) is on the whole untrampled (with the > >> exception of the small area where Apollo Astronauts placed their > >> feet?) and maybe by extension where the landing-pads of the Lunar > >> Lander's touched down and then by yet-more extension, every place a > >> bit of man-made debris has struck or landed-on the surface? Which > >> leads us to the possibility that *all* moon-surface material is > >> "trampled earth", being "trampled by meteors"? > >> > >> As I write this I "feel like moondust, trampled not only by > >> meteorites/asteroids but also by cosmic rays"... > >> > >> What is the opposite-of/complement-to /reductio ad absurdum/ ? > >> /ridiculum faciens nota /or more likely/ridiculum faciens usitata > >> verberando sicut equus mortuus/ > >> > >> > >> On 2/17/23 12:35 AM, ⛧ glen wrote: > >>> Doubling down on the incredulity fallacy? OK. Yes. There is > >>> something it is like to be trampled dirt. I don't know what you mean > >>> by "mental stuff", of course. I don't do any mental stuff as far as > >>> I know. Everything I do is inherently "body stuff". Maybe that's > >>> because I've experienced chronic pain my whole life. Maybe some of > >>> you consistently live in a body free experience? I've only > >>> experienced that a few times, e.g. running in a fasted state. And I > >>> later suffered for that indulgent delusion. > >>> > >>> No. Neither the dirt nor I do "mental stuff". So you need a more > >>> concrete question. > >>> > >>> On February 16, 2023 6:04:17 PM PST, Eric > >>> Charles<eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>> "an account of the seemingly analogous position of panpsychism" > >>>> > >>>> What is that more than something people say? > >>>> > >>>> Do *you* experience the dirt at your feet as having a mental life? > >>>> If so, > >>>> tell me about it: What is the dirt like when it seems to be doing > >>>> mental > >>>> stuff? What kind of mental stuff is it doing? > >>>> > >>>> If not: Have you seen anyone who earnestly thinks the dirt is doing > >>>> mental > >>>> stuff? If so, what were *they* like? How was that belief pervasive > >>>> in their > >>>> adjustments to the world? Based on your experiences with that > >>>> person, how > >>>> do you think your ways of acting in the world would change if you > >>>> adopted > >>>> such a position? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> <echar...@american.edu> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Feb 16, 2023 at 1:27 PM glen<geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I don't grok the context well enough to equivocate on concepts > >>>>> like "have" > >>>>> and "category of being". But in response to Nick's question: "What > >>>>> is there > >>>>> that animals do that demands us to invent categories to explain their > >>>>> behavior?", my answer is "animals discretize the ambient muck". So if > >>>>> categorization is somehow fundamentally related to discretization, > >>>>> then > >>>>> animals clearly categorize in that sense. > >>>>> > >>>>> I mean, all you have to do is consider the frequencies of light the > >>>>> animals' eyeballs do or don't see. That's two categories right > >>>>> there, the > >>>>> light they do see and the light they don't. Unless there's some > >>>>> sophistry > >>>>> hidden behind the question, the answer seems clear. Reflection on > >>>>> what one > >>>>> does and does not categorize isn't necessary. I could even claim > >>>>> my truck > >>>>> discretizes fluids ... those that make it seize up versus > >>>>> lubricate it, > >>>>> those that it burns vs those that stop it cold. Etc. Maybe the > >>>>> question is > >>>>> better formulated as "What makes one impute categories on > >>>>> another?" Clearly > >>>>> my truck doesn't impute categories on squirrels. > >>>>> > >>>>> But Nick does follow that question with this "experience" > >>>>> nonsense. So my > >>>>> guess is there *is* some sophistry behind the question, similar to > >>>>> EricC's > >>>>> incredulous response to DaveW's question about phenomenological > >>>>> composition > >>>>> of experience(s). What I find missing in Nick's (and EricC's) > >>>>> distillation > >>>>> of experience monism is an account of the seemingly analogous > >>>>> position of > >>>>> panpsychism. Were I a scholar, I might take such work on myself. > >>>>> But I'm > >>>>> not and, hence, very much appreciate these distillations of dead > >>>>> white > >>>>> men's metaphysics and will take what I can get. 8^D > >>>>> > >>>>> On 2/16/23 09:22, Steve Smith wrote: > >>>>>> Might I offer some terminology reframing, or at least ask for some > >>>>> additional explication? > >>>>>> 1. I think "behaviours" would be all Nick's Martians *could* > >>>>>> observe? > >>>>> They would be inferring "experiences" from observed behaviours? > >>>>>> 2. When we talk about "categories" here, are we talking about > >>>>> "categories of being"? Ontologies, as it were? > >>>>>> Regarding ErisS' reflections... I *do* think that animals behave *as > >>>>> if* they "have categories", though I don't know what it even means > >>>>> to say > >>>>> that they "have categories" in the way Aristotle and his > >>>>> legacy-followers > >>>>> (e.g. us) do... I would suggest/suspect that dogs and squirrels > >>>>> are in no > >>>>> way aware of these "categories" and that to say that they do is a > >>>>> projection by (us) humans who have fabricated the (useful in myriad > >>>>> contexts) of a category/Category/ontology. So in that sense they > >>>>> do NOT > >>>>> *have* categories... I think in this > >>>>> conception/thought-experiment we > >>>>> assume that Martians *would* and would be looking to map their own > >>>>> ontologies onto the behaviour (and inferred experiences and > >>>>> judgements?) > >>>>> of Terran animals? > >>>>>> If I were to invert the subject/object relation, I would suggest > >>>>>> that it > >>>>> is "affordances" not "experiences" (or animals' behaviours) we > >>>>> want to > >>>>> categorize into ontologies? It is what things are "good for" that > >>>>> make > >>>>> them interesting/similar/different to living beings. And "good > >>>>> for" is > >>>>> conditionally contextualized. My dog and cat both find squirrels > >>>>> "good > >>>>> for" chasing, but so too for baby rabbits and skunks (once). > >>>>>> Or am I barking up the wrong set of reserved lexicons? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> To segue (as I am wont to do), it feels like this discussion > >>>>>> parallels > >>>>> the one about LLMs where we train the hell out of variations on > >>>>> learning > >>>>> classifier systems until they are as good as (or better than) we > >>>>> (humans) > >>>>> are at predicting the next token in a string of human-generated > >>>>> tokens (or > >>>>> synthesizing a string of tokens which humans cannot distinguish > >>>>> from a > >>>>> string generated by another human, in particular one with the > >>>>> proverbial > >>>>> 10,000 hours of specialized training). The fact that or > >>>>> "ologies" tend to > >>>>> be recorded and organized as knowledge structures and in fact usually > >>>>> *propogated* (taught/learnt) by the same makes us want to believe > >>>>> (some of > >>>>> us) that hidden inside these LLMs are precisely the same "ologies" we > >>>>> encode in our myriad textbooks and professional journal articles? > >>>>>> I think one of the questions that remains present within this > >>>>>> group's > >>>>> continued 'gurgitations is whether the organizations we have > >>>>> conjured are > >>>>> particularly special, or just one of an infinitude of superposed > >>>>> alternative formulations? And whether some of those formulations > >>>>> are > >>>>> acutely occult and/or abstract and whether the existing (accepted) > >>>>> formulations (e.g. Western Philosophy and Science, etc) are > >>>>> uniquely (and > >>>>> exclusively or at least optimally) capable of capturing/describing > >>>>> what is > >>>>> "really real" (nod to George Berkeley). > >>>>>> Some here (self included) may often suggest that such formulation > >>>>>> is at > >>>>> best a coincidence of history and as well as it "covers" a > >>>>> description of > >>>>> "reality", it is by circumstance and probably by abstract > >>>>> conception ("all > >>>>> models are wrong...") incomplete and in error. But nevertheless > >>>>> still > >>>>> useful... > >>>>>> Maybe another way of reframing Nick's question (on a tangent) is > >>>>>> to ask > >>>>> whether the Barsoomians had their own Aristotle to conceive of > >>>>> Categories? Or did they train their telescopes on ancient Greece > >>>>> and > >>>>> learn Latin Lip Reading and adopt one or more the Greek's > >>>>> philosophical > >>>>> traditions? And then, did the gas-balloon creatures floating in the > >>>>> atmosphere-substance of Jupiter observe the Martians' who had > >>>>> observed the > >>>>> Greeks and thereby come up with their own Categories. Maybe it was > >>>>> those > >>>>> creatures who beamed these abstractions straight into the neural > >>>>> tissue of > >>>>> the Aristotelians and Platonists? Do gas-balloon creatures even > >>>>> have > >>>>> solids to be conceived of as Platonic? And are they missing out > >>>>> if they > >>>>> don't? Do they have their own Edwin Abbot Abbot? And what would > >>>>> the > >>>>> Cheela<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_Egg> say? > >>>>>> My dog and the rock squirrels he chases want to know... so do the > >>>>>> cholla > >>>>> cactus fruits/segments they hoard in their nests! > >>>>>> Mumble, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> - Steve > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2/16/23 5:37 AM, Santafe wrote: > >>>>>>> It’s the tiniest and most idiosyncratic take on this question, but > >>>>> FWIW, here: > >>>>>>> https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520752113 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I actually think that all of what Nick says below is a perfectly > >>>>>>> good > >>>>> draft of a POV. > >>>>>>> As to whether animals “have” categories: Spend time with a dog. > >>>>> Doesn’t take very much time. Their interest in conspecifics is > >>>>> (ahem) > >>>>> categorically different from their interest in people, different > >>>>> than to > >>>>> squirrels, different than to cats, different than to snakes. > >>>>>>> For me to even say that seems like cueing a narcissism of small > >>>>> differences, when overwhelmingly, their behavior is structured around > >>>>> categories, as is everyone else’s. Squirrels don’t mistake acorns > >>>>> for > >>>>> birds of prey. Or for the tree limbs and house roofs one can jump > >>>>> onto. > >>>>> Or for other squirrels. It’s all categories. Behavior is an > >>>>> operation on > >>>>> categories. > >>>>>>> I found it interesting that you invoked “nouns” as a framework > >>>>>>> that is > >>>>> helpful but sometimes obstructive. One might just have said > >>>>> “words”. This > >>>>> is interesting to me already, because my syntactician friends will > >>>>> tell you > >>>>> that a noun is not, as we were taught as children, a “word for a > >>>>> person, > >>>>> place, or thing”, but rather a “word in a language that transforms > >>>>> as nouns > >>>>> transform in that language”, which is a bit of an obfuscation, > >>>>> since they > >>>>> do have in common that they are in some way “object-words”. But > >>>>> from the > >>>>> polysemy and synonymy perspective, we see that “meanings” cross the > >>>>> noun-verb syntactic distinction quite frequently for some categories. > >>>>> Eye/see, ear/hear, moon/shine, and stuff like that. My typologist > >>>>> friends > >>>>> tell me that is common but particular to some meanings much more than > >>>>> others. > >>>>>>> Another fun thing I was told by Ted Chiang a few months ago, > >>>>>>> which I > >>>>> was amazed I had not heard from linguists, and still want to hold in > >>>>> reserve until I can check it further. He says that languages without > >>>>> written forms do not have a word for “word”. If true, that seems > >>>>> very > >>>>> interesting and important. If Chiang believes it to be true, it is > >>>>> probably already a strong enough regularity to be more-or-less > >>>>> true, and > >>>>> thus still interesting and important. > >>>>>>> Eric > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Feb 15, 2023, at 1:19 PM,<thompnicks...@gmail.com> < > >>>>> thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>> FWiW, I willmake every effort to arrive fed to Thuam by 10.30 > >>>>> Mountain. I want to hear the experts among you hold forth on WTF a > >>>>> cateogory actually IS. I am thinking (duh) that a category is a > >>>>> more or > >>>>> less diffuse node in a network of associations (signs, if you > >>>>> must). Hence > >>>>> they constitute a vast table of what goes with what, what is > >>>>> predictable > >>>>> from what, etc. This accommodates “family resemblance” quite > >>>>> nicely. Do > >>>>> I think animals have categories, in this sense, ABSOLUTELY EFFING > >>>>> YES. Does > >>>>> this make me a (shudder) nominalist? I hope not. > >>>>>>>> Words…nouns in particular… confuse this category business. Words > >>>>> place constraints on how vague these nodes can be. They impose > >>>>> on the > >>>>> network constraints to which it is ill suited. True, the more my > >>>>> associations with “horse” line up with your associations with > >>>>> “horse”, the > >>>>> more true the horse seems. Following Peirce, I would say that > >>>>> where our > >>>>> nodes increasingly correspond with increasing shared experience, > >>>>> we have > >>>>> evidence ot the (ultimate) truth of the nodes, their “reality” in > >>>>> Peirce’s > >>>>> terms. Here is where I am striving to hang on to Peirce’s realism. > >>>>>>>> The reason I want the geeks to participate tomorrow is that I keep > >>>>> thinking of a semantic webby thing that Steve devised for the > >>>>> Institute > >>>>> about a decade ago. Now a semantic web would be a kind of > >>>>> metaphor for an > >>>>> associative web; don’t associate with other words in exactly the same > >>>>> manner in which experiences associate with other experiences. > >>>>> Still, I > >>>>> think the metaphor is interesting. Also, I am kind of > >>>>> re-interested in my > >>>>> “authorial voice”, how much it operates like cbt. > > > > > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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