A couple of in-line answers to explicit questions below, and then a comment 
that at least I couldn’t make before, because I read some tiny new thing (of no 
significant import)

> On Mar 17, 2026, at 12:31, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> My worry is that scientists, when they use such rich metaphors as 
> entanglement fail to take responsibility for the consequences of such use. 
> Let's assume that the person who first used the metaphor, entanglement, meant 
> something by it.   We can formalize the analysis of metaphors just as we can 
> mathematicize any proposition.

Wrong order, and not what happened.  Fuller explanation below.  I hope I can 
report on what people are actually doing, as opposed to what the psychologist 
who hasn’t asked them, or even in any serious way studied them without asking 
them, supposes them to be doing.  

> And in that formalization, we can sort out the direction, and misdirection in 
> the metaphor.  What did they intend when they used the metaphor entanglement? 
>  What did they NOT intend?  And when the disclaimers have been completed, is 
> there anything left of the metaphor.  If not, then, perhaps, scientists 
> should stop using the metaphor.  In the same way that we have stopped calling 
> porpoises "fish".  

The intent of the paragraph is okay (indeed, of course fine).  But the term 
that is missing is “moniker”.  Metaphor here is missing the point.  The term is 
just a label.  DaveW noted this as one of the lifecycle stages in his list.

To the extent — referring back to Frank’s post — that it is metaphorically 
anything, directing anybody’s thoughts anywhere, it would be in Glen’s didactic 
subsense.  

> 
> I don't know enough to even speculate what role "entanglement" as a metaphor 
> has played in the development of quantum physics.

None (afaik). 

> But I claim to know enough about human behavior to assert that it has played 
> some role, and that physicists run some risks if they altogether disclaim it. 
>  

So: the antisymmetric character of many-electron states was worked out from 
around 1926–1929, as I find it online.  (I think that is likely all right.)  
They just described the properties of the states.  Good, concrete, operational 
language.  Slater determinants, and whatnot, if one wants search terms.

Now, I learn from whatever AI serves answers to web searches (Gemini?) that, 
like many things, apparently Schroedinger introduced “entanglement” as an 
actual term in 1936, so say the kinds of things Schroedinger would say 
(complaints about incompleteness that I still don’t think have substance).  The 
math was already in place and being used.  From anything I learned, 
Schroedinger’s having put a label on it had no effect at all on anybody’s 
actually doing any quantum mechanics.  It also doesn’t seem to have been 
adopted, and I never heard it used by anybody before the mid-1990s.

The fashion in the 1990s came from the quantum computing engineers.  They write 
lots of multi-electron wave functions down, with lots of combinations, and they 
want a shorthand to refer to them.  They also _really_ like slang.  Almost as 
much as the Japanese, for whom “building” becomes just “biru” and “convenience 
store” becomes “combini”.  So, for the engineers, a unitary transformation 
becomes “A unitary” (so cool to turn an adjective into a noun), and to refer 
endlessly to entanglement.  I don’t mean to scoff.  They really are very good 
at what they do, and they are all smarter than I am, and understand their 
subject better than I do.  I just can’t take the coolness.

Anyway, that’s what the term is doing now.  It’s a shorthand, and (not entirely 
incidental, I think) communicating hipness.

Is it, didactically, directing people’s minds?  Probably.  Or maybe only maybe. 
 But the story that somebody started with a metaphor and then formalized it 
sounds as backward as it is possible to get from those ingredients.  They 
started with a fog of confusion, stirred up a mass of math that perplexed the 
hell out of people for several years, learned to use it, gradually got better 
at it, and came up with a few experiments to cash out that the math had 
unambiguous consequences (Stern-Gerlach experiment), and over time built up a 
quite rigid operational meaning.

Then some people came along in whose hands it became a commodity, and having a 
short name to gesture at the structure (seen in whole, only at the end, within 
the math) served a certain function.  A didactic-metaphoric name is of course 
nice for that, and Shroedinger is often a good source of such things.


In different news, out of a sense that I needed to do due diligence before 
getting myself into bluffing trouble, I actually went back and read Kuhn’s 
Structure… a few weeks ago.  Okay.

But there did seem to be something concrete worth commenting in reply.  

TK suggests that in revolutionary times, people generate new ideas, and then in 
the periods of “normal science” people spend their time on “puzzle solving”, 
not really _inventing_ much of anything new.

There I think I often disagree (or at least with some cases).  Usually somebody 
gets some small fragment of something right-adjacent, often in some formal form 
(say, Bohr’s atom: big mess, but a few little things that nobody else can do, 
and that are specific), and a language gradually gets drafted out, in which 
there are _lots_ of what I like to call “placeholder terms”.  While the 
revolution is running, many of them can’t really be said to have anything as 
operational and concrete as “meaning”, and they are often significantly 
aspirational in the service they give.

What TK characterized as “puzzle solving” is often a period of checking lots of 
cases and variations, to see what an edifice of concrete work can be extended 
outward to cover, while retaining some kind fo consistency.  I would argue that 
that work is what actually _builds_ the operational semantics of “meaning 
something”.  Toward the end, that semantics has finally raised the original 
term to better than a placeholder — to a real moniker for the operational 
semantics that it is used to refer to.

In the case of entanglement, the placeholders were really quite thin: Pauli’s 
“two classically undescribable values” (the half-integer spin values), 
“exclusion principle”, and similar.  Then the semantics got built up, and 
finally some didactic metaphors got attached to them, somewhat ad hoc and not 
really standardized.

Anyway, all this is probably off the point that Nick and Glen are addressing 
(contesting?).  But if one is to adduce Fermionic QM as a use case, probably 
good to stay sort of faithful to what the people doing work are doing.

Eric



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