I am not impressed with the PassMark solution. It would be trivial to setup a script of rotating images that are used by the passmark widget.. then feed them back to the user and have a script post stating the image that was on the screen when the user clicked submit..
Also feeding in any 2nd level password.. AND the next code that may change in 60 seconds..
It would just require the attacker to perform some parts of the attack manually rather than scripted..
I'm mean-- the more hoops you have to jump through will make it harder to attack or replicate from a phishing view.. but also making it much more cumbersome on users.
JP
PacketFocus
I have only spent a few minutes looking at the passmark demo.. so disregard if I'm way off :)
Also feeding in any 2nd level password.. AND the next code that may change in 60 seconds..
It would just require the attacker to perform some parts of the attack manually rather than scripted..
I'm mean-- the more hoops you have to jump through will make it harder to attack or replicate from a phishing view.. but also making it much more cumbersome on users.
JP
PacketFocus
I have only spent a few minutes looking at the passmark demo.. so disregard if I'm way off :)
-----Original Message-----I would agree as well, having recently reviewed them with others in the same field. Apart from relying on users to only enter their password if they saw an image, the solution heavily relied on cookie usage. This works fine for most people but a lot of corporate environments have persistant cookie polices so this ends up being an annoyance and ineffective for this segment of users. It also makes it susceptible to keystroke loggers due to the ease of which the challange can be generated. I'd also have trouble justifying this as anything other than a 2 x 1-factor solution and as such it may not meet FFIEC guidlines.
From: Q-Ball [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, 13 June 2006 2:28 PM
To: Randal T. Rioux
Cc: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] PassMark?
The bigger issue, as with any other web based authentication solutions, is what does this protect you against and the answer these days is not a lot.
Q-Ball
On 6/13/06, Randal T. Rioux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: RIPEMD160
Gary E. Miller wrote:
> Yo All!
>
> I thought I'd actually risk a real security question here.
>
> Any one seen the "PassMark" ( www.passmarksecurity.com ) security system
> in action?
>
Yes.
Bank of Bangalore^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^HAmerica uses it, as well as a recent
financial client corp. of mine.
I'm not impressed with it.
Randy
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