On 12/19/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Dec 2006 12:16:29 PST, KT said: > > So we have been dealing with information security from last 20 years
i'd argue this is closer to 40 years than 20. [0] > 20 years after the first automobile, we'd gotten as far as a Model A or T > or so. 1885 [1] to 1965 [2] for decent auto security. 80 years? add 10 years if you consider air bags the requisite threshold. > (Incidentally, the fact that we still have a lot of security issues isn't > actually a software problem, so much as an innate lack of tools to help > humans understand *any* complex system, be it software, or the economy, > or global climate, or....) i argue that the vast majority of insecure computing problems are indeed software problems, in the sense that proper software design and development would fix them. consider the automobile theme, where a wheel, some pedals, and a few signalling levers allow you to operate a vehicle with more computers and technology than space faring vehicles from a mere 30 years past. these machines are usable and secure, despite their mind boggling technological complexity brought about over a hundred years of evolutionary and radical improvement. let's side step the economics and inertia of existing software / IT practice and look at a future utopia for sake of argument: A: usability is requirement #1 for security [3]. is configuring that IPsec IKE/ISAKMP key distribution and re-key policy iPod (tm) simple? how about generating PKI infrastructure for those OpenVPN connections? "security" products are so ridiculously complicated it's a wonder anyone is able to use them. for a good laugh, write down the steps required to configure full disk encryption and a strong VPN from your laptop to a server. LOL, ROFFLE, etc. B: capability based computing is the norm, as identity based access control is fundamentally flawed [4]. if you've only heard of capability based security in passing, consider this an underscore of the systemic and pervasive nature of our willful ignorance of good practice. C: consumers can recognize and compare the merits of security built into systems they use, with producers willing and able to emphasize security considerations during design, implementation, testing, and support/integration phases of production and life cycle [5]. 99.5% of existing problems disappear in such a world, leaving mostly insider fraud to be addressed via process and policy. we can get there, but it ain't gonna happen soon... 0. "Capability-Based Computer Systems - Chap. 3 Early Capability Architectures" http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/levy/capabook/ [ref: Dennis and Van Horn @ MIT using Capabilities to describe secure composition in 1966] 1. "History of the Automobile" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_automobile 2. "Unsafe at Any Speed" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unsafe_at_Any_Speed 3. "Secure Interaction Design" http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/~ping/sid/ 4. "Capability Security Model" http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?CapabilitySecurityModel 5. "Build Security In" https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/ _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/