Hello, This is response from Cisco PSIRT related to this matter.
On Wed, Oct 10, 2007 at 10:55:54AM +0100, Andy Davis wrote: > During the research, three shellcode payloads for IOS exploits were > developed - a "reverse" shell, a password-protected "bind" shell and > another "bind" shell that is achieved using only two 1-byte memory > overwrites. IRM have produced videos demonstrating each of these > payloads in action within a development environment. They can be viewed Cisco PSIRT is aware of the three videos IRM Plc. published on their web site at <http://www.irmplc.com/index.php/153-Embedded-Systems-Security>. Cisco and IRM agree that the videos do not demonstrate or represent a vulnerability in Cisco IOS. Specifically, the code to manipulate Cisco IOS could be inserted only under the following conditions: - Usage of the debugger functionality present in IOS - Having physical access to the device - Already logged in at the highest privilege level on the device. IRM approached Cisco PSIRT with this information prior to its public release and Cisco has confirmed the information provided is a proof-of-concept that third party code could be inserted under these specific conditions. Regards, Gaus ============== Damir Rajnovic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, PSIRT Incident Manager, Cisco Systems <http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt> Telephone: +44 7715 546 033 200 Longwater Avenue, Green Park, Reading, Berkshire RG2 6GB, GB ============== There are no insolvable problems. The question is can you accept the solution?
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