-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 and as previously stated, if you have 'remote management' enabled then you are truly vulnerable to outside threats. csrf works as well. but an attack carried out on the LAN would still be considered a remote attack; although, you'd likely be within arm's reach of the attacker, so you'd know who to punch in the nose when the web server stopped responding. both vectors are considered 'remote' since the attacker is not legitimately authenticated to the system.
- ------------- From: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of sr. Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2009 8:17 AM To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Netgear DG632 Router Remote DoS Vulnerability it could still be carried out remotely by obfuscating a link sent to the "admin" of the device. this would obviously rely on the admin clicking on the link, and is more of a phishing / social engineering style attack. this would also rely on the router being setup with all of the default internal LAN ip's. sr. 2009/6/16 Vladimir '3APA3A' Dubrovin <3ap...@security.nnov.ru> Dear Tom Neaves, It still can be exploited from Internet even if "remote management" is only accessible from local network. If you can trick user to visit Web page, you can place a form on this page which targets to router and request to router is issued from victim's browser. - --Tuesday, June 16, 2009, 2:11:27 AM, you wrote to m.elyaz...@gmail.com: TN> Hi. TN> I see where you're going but I think you're missing the point a TN> little. By TN> *default* the web interface is enabled on the LAN and accessible by TN> anyone on that LAN and the "remote management" interface (for the TN> Internet) is turned off. If the "remote management" interface was TN> enabled, stopping ICMP echo responses would not resolve this issue TN> at all, turning the interface off would do though (or restricting by IP, ...ack). The "remote management" TN> (love those quotes...) interface speaks over HTTP hence TCP so no TN> amount of dropping ICMP goodness will help with this. Anyhow, I am TN> happy to discuss this off list with you if its still not clear to TN> save spamming everyone's inboxes. :o) TN> Tom TN> ----- Original Message ----- TN> From: Alaa El yazghi TN> To: Tom Neaves TN> Cc: bugt...@securityfocus.com ; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk TN> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 11:03 PM TN> Subject: Re: Netgear DG632 Router Remote DoS Vulnerability TN> I know and I understand. What I wanted to mean is that we can not TN> eventually acces to the web interface of a netgear router remotely if we cannot localy. TN> As for the DoS, it is simple to solve such attack from outside. We TN> just disable receiving pings (There is actually an option in even TN> the lowest TN> series) and thus, we would be able to have a remote management TN> without ICMP requests. TN> 2009/6/15 Tom Neaves <t...@tomneaves.co.uk> TN> Hi. TN> I'm not quite sure of your question... TN> The DoS can be carried out remotely, however one mitigating factor TN> (which makes it a low risk as opposed to sirens and alarms...) is TN> that its turned off by default - you have to explicitly enable it under "Remote Management" TN> on the device if you want to access it/carry out the DoS over the Internet. TN> However, it is worth noting that anyone on your LAN can *remotely* TN> carry out this attack regardless of this management feature being on/off. TN> I hope this clarifies it for you. TN> Tom TN> ----- Original Message ----- TN> From: Alaa El yazghi TN> To: Tom Neaves TN> Cc: bugt...@securityfocus.com ; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk TN> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 10:45 PM TN> Subject: Re: Netgear DG632 Router Remote DoS Vulnerability TN> How can it be carried out remotely if it bugs localy? TN> 2009/6/15 Tom Neaves <t...@tomneaves.co.uk> TN> Product Name: Netgear DG632 Router TN> Vendor: http://www.netgear.com TN> Date: 15 June, 2009 TN> Author: t...@tomneaves.co.uk <t...@tomneaves.co.uk> Original URL: TN> http://www.tomneaves.co.uk/Netgear_DG632_Remote_DoS.txt TN> Discovered: 18 November, 2006 TN> Disclosed: 15 June, 2009 TN> I. DESCRIPTION TN> The Netgear DG632 router has a web interface which runs on port 80. TN> This allows an admin to login and administer the device's settings. TN> However, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists that causes TN> the web interface to crash and stop responding to further requests. TN> II. DETAILS TN> Within the "/cgi-bin/" directory of the administrative web interface TN> exists a file called "firmwarecfg". This file is used for firmware TN> upgrades. A HTTP POST request for this file causes the web server TN> to hang. The web server will stop responding to requests and the TN> administrative interface will become inaccessible until the router TN> is physically restarted. TN> While the router will still continue to function at the network level, i.e. TN> it will TN> still respond to ICMP echo requests and issue leases via DHCP, an TN> administrator will no longer be able to interact with the TN> administrative web interface. TN> This attack can be carried out internally within the network, or TN> over the Internet if the administrator has enabled the "Remote TN> Management" feature on the router. TN> Affected Versions: Firmware V3.4.0_ap (others unknown) TN> III. VENDOR RESPONSE TN> 12 June, 2009 - Contacted vendor. TN> 15 June, 2009 - Vendor responded. Stated the DG632 is an end of TN> life product and is no longer supported in a production and TN> development sense, as such, there will be no further firmware TN> releases to resolve this issue. TN> IV. CREDIT TN> Discovered by Tom Neaves TN> _______________________________________________ TN> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. TN> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html TN> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ - -- Skype: Vladimir.Dubrovin ~/ZARAZA http://securityvulns.com/ Ибо факты есть факты, и изложены они лишь для того, чтобы их поняли и в них поверили. (Твен) _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iEYEARECAAYFAko34B8ACgkQIBHDN8vm6zunxgCcCPmJIYu8B/BAsxyowPAGXqxm bxsAoJ91QWPH8AZuIAwhC7aI95yaTp5m =NgL1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. 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