maybe you were possessed by the spirit of lucas rife while you were sleeping and he used your body to write his reply. did you forget to wear your tin foil hat?
to be perfectly clear, there is a weak aslr implementation in the vanilla kernel that has been accepted and applied upstream since 2.6.12, but it's hardly a full implementation and is generally completely ineffective. the example program below is trivial to exploit without the compile-time stack protections. you will need to manually patch your kernel with something like PaX to get the full functionality and effectiveness you would expect from aslr. but as I stated, this example program lucas as provided is likely too trivial to implement any of the methods used to defeat compile-time stack protection. the links I provided in my response will, however, show you different methods for defeating both runtime and compile-time stack protections, and will likely be useful against real-world code. but as it is currently written, we don't have any pointers on the stack that we can manipulate so these methods cannot be applied. - epixoip -----Original Message----- From: Jeremy Brown [mailto:0xjbrow...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 11:04 AM To: Jeremi Gosney; full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Executing Code on Linux/x86 with ASLR+GCC4Protections Ooops I made an lol.. or maybe I like talking as a third person? Haha. In any regard, none of that is true, all made up.. except the problem. Won't happen again :) The lesson here is don't lie at all and especially not to trolls on their property :P On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 1:08 PM, Jeremy Brown <0xjbrow...@gmail.com> wrote: > http://wiki.debian.org/Hardening > https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Security/Features#Feature%20Matrix > > In fact, both have ASLR enabled in the kernel by default. > > With all due respect, I've been exploiting buffer overflows on Windows > NT-like x86 operating systems for nearly 4 years. My job recently > required me to know how to attack *nix-based systems, so I figured > Linux would be the easiest to begin with. In fact, it seems many > protections such the compiler and kernel have been in place for a > while now. > > My question is, how do I exploit this program? Looking over my > previous post I see that I did mention defeating GCC protections and > ASLR, both. So of those protections... I am aware. > > I know sometimes you can overwrite other registers and gain code > execution, such as ESI usually points to pointers, etc and so forth. > > I do appreciate your response, but maybe a well armed one next reply? > > On Wed, Sep 23, 2009 at 4:18 AM, Jeremi Gosney > <jeremi.gos...@motricity.com> wrote: >> are you positive you have a kernel patched for aslr on this host? debian and >> ubuntu do not ship with aslr. you will have to manually patch your kernel >> with something like PaX to gain that functionality. >> >> it doesn't really matter. from your question I can tell you do not yet fully >> understand the mechanics of a buffer overflow. the goal is to gain control a >> function's return address by overwriting eip. you've already overwritten the >> registers you are asking if you can overwrite; if you bother to look at your >> gdb output, you'll see that you've of course already written 'BABA' to esi >> and eax. so I guess to directly answer your question... no. >> >> what you're seeing below is the effect of compile-time stack protection, not >> aslr. how do I know? because eip never changed. with aslr, you will likely >> be able to overwrite eip, but you will not know the address to return to in >> order to execute the stack since the stack is randomized at runtime. the >> compile-time stack protection method used (StackGuard, ProPolice, >> StackShield, etc) will determine which method you will use to defeat it, as >> each take separate approaches to protecting eip. there are ways to defeat >> each of the various stack protection methods, but the below program is >> likely too simple to exploit since we don't have a pointer we can >> manipulate. they are more useful against real-world examples. >> >> you should probably read this first: >> http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=49&id=14#article >> >> further reading: >> http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=56&id=5#article >> http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=9#article >> >> - epixoip >> >> >> From: full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk >> [mailto:full-disclosure-boun...@lists.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Lucus Rife >> Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2009 5:28 PM >> To: full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk >> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Executing Code on Linux/x86 with >> ASLR+GCC4Protections >> >> Debian/Ubuntu latest with updates... >> >> (gdb) shell cat bof.c >> #include <stdio.h> >> #include <string.h> >> >> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) >> { >> >> if(argc < 2) return 0; >> >> char buf[128]; >> strcpy(buf, argv[1]); >> >> return 0; >> } >> >> (gdb) r `perl -e 'print "BABA" x 74'` >> Starting program: /home/rife/bof `perl -e 'print "BABA" x 74'` >> >> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. >> 0xb7e355eb in strlen () from /lib/tls/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 >> (gdb) info r >> eax 0x41424142 1094861122 >> ecx 0x2 2 >> edx 0xbfc557b8 -1077585992 >> ebx 0xb7f1cff4 -1208889356 >> esp 0xbfc5520c 0xbfc5520c >> ebp 0xbfc557a4 0xbfc557a4 >> esi 0x41424142 1094861122 >> edi 0xb7f008b2 -1209005902 >> eip 0xb7e355eb 0xb7e355eb <strlen+11> >> eflags 0x210202 [ IF RF ID ] >> cs 0x73 115 >> ss 0x7b 123 >> ds 0x7b 123 >> es 0x7b 123 >> fs 0x0 0 >> gs 0x33 51 >> (gdb) >> >> This is as far as I've gone. Is there some way to point EAX or better than >> that, ESI, to our payload and execute code? >> >> Is there a way in any situation if we overwrite ESI to make it execute code? >> >> Surely to God someone on this list knows something.. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >> > _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
