Details below. We intended to publish these earlier, but they slipped
through the net. The most recent version is 1.5, and all these were
reported fixed in 1.2.2.
First one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/stored-xss-vulnerability-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
Details
================
Software: BP Group Documents
Version: 1.2.1
Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
CVSS: 8 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C)
Description
================
Stored XSS vulnerability in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
Vulnerability
================
“Display name” and “Description” fields are not escaped, meaning any
tags including script tags can be stored in them.
Proof of concept
================
Go to the upload form, select a document to upload, set the “Display
name” to “photograph of a cute puppy<script>alert(‘xss’)</script>” and
set the “Description” to “this is an innocuous
description<script>alert(‘xss again’)</script>”.
Mitigations
================
Update to version 1.2.2.
Timeline
================
2013-09-26: Discovered
2013-09-30: Reported to plug...@wordpress.org
2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
Discovered by:
================
Tom Adams
Second one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/csrf-vulnerability-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
Details
================
Software: BP Group Documents
Version: 1.2.1
Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
CVSS: 5 (Medium; AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
Description
================
CSRF vulnerability in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
Vulnerability
================
An unauthenticated user can cause a logged in user to edit the name
and description of any existing group document. The fields are also
vulnerable to XSS.
Proof of concept
================
Assume we have a group with slug “x” and a group document with id 8:
<form method="POST" action="https://wp.ayumu/groups/x/documents/";>
<input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_operation" value="edit">
<input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_id" value="8">
<input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_name"
value="<script>alert(1)</script>">
<input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_description" value="abc">
<input type="submit">
</form>
Mitigations
================
Update to version 1.2.2.
Timeline
================
2013-09-26: Discovered
2013-09-30: Reported to plug...@wordpress.org
2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
Discovered by:
================
Tom Adams
Third one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/moving-any-file-php-user-has-access-to-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
Details
================
Software: BP Group Documents
Version: 1.2.1
Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
CVSS: 9 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C)
Description
================
Moving any file PHP user has access to in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
Vulnerability
================
An admin user (or anybody, since there is a CSRF vulnerability in this
form) can move any file the PHP user has access to to a location
inside the uploads directory. From the uploads directory, they are
likely to be able to read the file.
Proof of concept
================
As a logged in admin, visit a page containing this form and submit it
(or add auto-submission, and cause a logged in admin to visit it):
<form method="POST"
action="http://localhost/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=bp-group-documents-settings";>
<input name="group" value="1">
<input name="file" value="../../../../wp-config.php">
<input type="submit">
</form>
This will cause the wp-config.php file to be moved to a location
within wp-content/uploads. In my case it was
wp-content/uploads/group-documents/1/1380203685-……..wp-config.php. In
this example I broke a WordPress installation, leaving the site wide
open to another person to come in and do the “famous five minute
install”. There may also be handy config files laying around that you
could read by moving them to the web root.
Mitigations
================
Update to version 1.2.2.
Timeline
================
2013-09-26: Discovered
2013-09-30: Reported to plug...@wordpress.org
2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
Discovered by:
================
Tom Adams
--
Harry Metcalfe
07790 559 876
@harrym
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