> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of > Ron DuFresne > Sent: Wednesday, 30 July 2003 8:51 a.m. > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: Jason; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Avoiding being a good admin - > was DCOM RPC exploit (dcom.c)
> Still the best defensive porture is taken at the entrance and exit points > as pertains to most all these 'services'. If the ports 135 and 1433 etc > are blocked, both tcp and udp protocols, then patching becomes far less > dramatic, even if a few machines inside get infected due to laptops or > what have you. when the flow on the wire for a segment Perimeter blocking is not everything. It's an important part of your security policy, but I think you're overstating that. Is it too difficult to write a worm which will spread through RPC DCOM (this is just to stay OT) *AND* mass e-mailing. See that? Mass e-mails ... You can have the best port blocking in the world and still be infected in a second. The solution for this is long term improvement of security, strong security policies *AND* education. Regards, Bojan Zdrnja _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
