ISSUE Several vulnerabilities in web interface of Fortigate firewall of which the most serious one will under specific circumstances allow a remote attacker to obtain a username and password of the Fortigate. RELEASE pre 2.50 maintenance release 4 FIXED Issue 3 - Fortinet OS 2.50 MR4, available from FTP as of 29 Sept. 2003 Issue 1 and 2 - Fortinet OS 2.50 MR5, available from FTP as of 05 Nov. 2003 RELEASE DATE 12/Nov/2003 VENDOR FIRST NOTIFIED 14/sept/2003 RELATED ADVISORIES Advisory posted on issue 3 a month ago.
DISCOVERED VULNERABILITIES 1. Improper input validation. 2. Username and MD5 hash of password are stored in cookie. 3. Web filter log parses unfiltered session details. IMPROPER INPUT VALIDATION ========================= The variables from several URL's are parsed in the HTML code of the resulting web page. However, the variables are not sanitized before they are used. Therefore, they can be used to inject code into the admin interface. The examples below show you an simple alert box, but this could just as well be used to: - Steel the cookie of the user that is logged in - Include (for instance) the Cisco homepage into the website that is displayed after clicking the URL. Besides, improper input validation is also a very good starting point for other types of attacks. https://172.16.1.254/firewall/policy/dlg?q=-1&fzone=t<script>alert('oops')</script>>&tzone=dmz https://172.16.1.254/firewall/policy/policy?fzone=internal&tzone=dmz1<script>alert('oops')</script> https://172.16.1.254/antispam/listdel?file=blacklist&name=b<script>alert('oops')</script>&startline=0 https://172.16.1.254/antispam/listdel?file=whitelist&name=a<script>alert('oops')</script>&startline=0(naturally) http://172.16.1.254/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session";><script>alert('oops')</script>&button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session http://172.16.1.254/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&button_url=/system/status/status";><script>alert('oops')</script>,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session http://172.16.1.254/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter";><script>alert('oops')</script>,/system/status/session http://172.16.1.254/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session";><script>alert('oops')</script> USERNAME AND MD5 HASH OF PASSWORD ARE STORED IN COOKIE ======================================================== The username and MD5 hash of the password are stored in a cookie like the one below. When combining this knowledge with the previously found XSS vulnerabilities, a remote attacker can trick an administrator into revealing his credentials. cookie=APSCOOKIE=1063444738 %2615 %26FGT-602803043728 %26maarten %26vsys0 %26$1$2a05ca7c$nU7W6SI.7L5ncc7tfZZ7D The password hash is recognized as FreeBSD, MD5 (probably the base OS of the firewall). WEB FILTER LOG PARSES UNFILTERED SESSION DETAILS =============================================== After the web filter has been enabled, the administrator has the ability to review the web filter logs via the web interface. The web filter logs contain the URL that has been denied by the filter. Because of the fact that unwanted characters are not stripped from the denied URL, a remote attacker is able to gain the username and MD5 hash of the password, as soon as the administrator reviews the logs. An example: Pages with the keyword "mp3-download" are denied by the web filter. The page http://192.168.5.11/maarten.html contains such a keyword. A remote attacker could poison the log files by retrieving http://192.168.5.11/maarten.html<script>alert('oops')</script>a When altering the script a bit, the user credentials could easily be forwarded to the attacker, who could then use these credentials to alter the firewall if the administrator has not properly secured access to HTTPS/SSH/TELNET/HTTP. SOLUTION ========= 1. A basic rule in firewall administration is to only allow connections to the firewall-administration-options from specific IP addresses (or preferably, specific IP addresses connecting from a management network to the management interface of the firewall). When this best practise is applyed, an attacker that manages to gain administration credentials as described above, will not be able to abuse them too easily. 2. Manage your firewall from a dedicated workstation that has no connections (directly OR through a proxy) to untrusted networks in order to avoid a credential push as described above. 3. Upgrade FortiOS 2.50MR5, which (according to fortinet) does not contain these problems. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
