On Thu, 03 Mar 2005 15:33:09 EST, Matt Marooney said: > The intent of the BIOS portion of the program was just to have a small > bit of code that checked for the existence of the main monitoring > program on the disk, and if it was not there, reload it somehow. > > The main program would run from the disk, not the BIOS.
Like I said - all it takes is a Knoppix disk to screw over most of these schemes - you can't even disable booting from CD and put a BIOS password on, because you have the following: 1) A motivated user 2) Unmonitored, unobserved physical access (if you don't, there's *bigger* problems in this scenario ;) 3) Somewhere in there, there's a jumper that will reset the BIOS password.... There's really *NO* way to do this on today's commodity hardware in a way that will stop a user who knows it's there and has physical access. At best, you can do it in a way that will surprise an *unsuspecting* person (which is what most of these anti-theft beacon programs do - the only reason they work is because the guy who jacked the laptop probably doesn't realize the program is installed, and thus doesn't take precautions to stop it). The only way you can make this work is if you have hardware that includes something like the TPM chipsets from NatSemi or Atmel. Unfortunately, if your operating system contains enough support for the chipset to use it so the person at the keyboard can't subvert it, it will almost certainly use it *itself* to stop people from doing exactly the sort of code insertion you're trying to do. So you're *still* screwed. :)
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